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Abstract. For relational monadic formulas (the Löwenheim class) sec-
ond-order quantifier elimination, which is closely related to computation
of uniform interpolants, projection and forgetting – operations that cur-
rently receive much attention in knowledge processing – always succeeds.
The decidability proof for this class by Heinrich Behmann from 1922
explicitly proceeds by elimination with equivalence preserving formula
rewriting. Here we reconstruct the results from Behmann’s publication
in detail and discuss related issues that are relevant in the context of
modern approaches to second-order quantifier elimination in computa-
tional logic. In addition, an extensive documentation of the letters and
manuscripts in Behmann’s bequest that concern second-order quantifier
elimination is given, including a commented register and English ab-
stracts of the German sources with focus on technical material. In the
late 1920s Behmann attempted to develop an elimination-based deci-
sion method for formulas with predicates whose arity is larger than one.
His manuscripts and the correspondence with Wilhelm Ackermann show
technical aspects that are still of interest today and give insight into
the genesis of Ackermann’s landmark paper Untersuchungen über das
Eliminationsproblem der mathematischen Logik from 1935, which laid
the foundation of the two prevailing modern approaches to second-order
quantifier elimination.
Revision: December 19, 2017
2 Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Part I Introduction – Contributions of Behmann’s
Habilitation Thesis from the View of Computational Logic 5
1 Introduction to Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Specification of the Decision Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Solution of the Decision Problem for Relational Monadic First- and
Second-Order Formulas with Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Specification of the Problem of Second-Order Quantifier Elimination . 9
5 Solution of the Second-Order Quantifier Elimination Problem for
Relational Monadic Formulas with Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6 Clarification of Schröder’s Early Results on Elimination . . . . . . . . 11
7 Methodology: Computation by Equivalence Preserving Rewriting . . . 12
8 Methodology: Normal Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Part II Behmann’s Decision and Elimination Method for
Relational Monadic Formulas 15
9 Introduction to Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10 Notational Conventions and Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2 Boolean Combination of Basic Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.3 Considered Formula Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.4 Remarks on the Presentation of Behmann’s Results . . . . . . . . 19
11 Overview on Behmann’s Results and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.1 Elimination Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.2 Applications to Predicate Elimination and Decidability . . . . . . 23
12 Starting Points: Rewrite Rules and Deciding Propositional Logic . . . 24
12.1 Equivalences and Entailments for Rewriting Formulas . . . . . . 25
12.2 Deciding Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
13 Counting Quantifier Normal Form for MON= Formulas . . . . . . . . . 29
13.1 Counting Quantifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.2 Conversion to Counting Quantifier Normal Form . . . . . . . . . 32
14 Predicate Elimination for MON= . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
15 Predicate Elimination for Formulas without Equality . . . . . . . . . . 39
Part III Further Issues Addressed in and Related to
Behmann’s Habilitation Thesis 45
16 Introduction to Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
17 Innex and Related Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
18 Quine’s Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
19 Other Methods for Deciding Relational Monadic Formulas . . . . . . . 49
Table of Contents 3
20 Normal Form with Respect to a Predicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
21 An Application of Elimination: Modeling Syllogistic Reasoning . . . . 50
22 Polyadic Formulas Allowing Monadic Elimination Techniques and
Handling of Auxiliary Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
23 Ackermann’s Quantifier Switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Part IV Towards Elimination for Relations: The
Correspondence between Behmann and Ackermann 1928–1934 55
24 Introduction to Part IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
25 First Considerations on Elimination for Universal Formulas . . . . . . 58
26 Involvement of Skolemization and Un-Skolemization . . . . . . . . . . 61
27 Behmann’s Representation of Ackermann’s Resolution-Based Method 62
Part V Register of Publications by Behmann and Documents
in his Bequest that are Relevant to Second-Order Quantifier
Elimination 73
28 Introduction to Part V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
29 Publications by Behmann Related to Second-Order Quantifier
Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
30 Manuscripts and Other Archival Documents by Behmann Related to
Second-Order Quantifier Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
31 The Correspondence between Heinrich Behmann and Wilhelm
Ackermann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
32 Discussions Related to Second-Order Quantifier Elimination in
Behmann’s Further Correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
32.1 Bertrand Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
32.2 Rudolf Carnap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
32.3 Heinrich Scholz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
32.4 Alonzo Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
33 Documents that could not be Located . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Part VI Conclusion 95
34 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4 Table of Contents
Part I
Introduction – Contributions
of Behmann’s Habilitation
Thesis from the View of
Computational Logic

Introduction to Part I 7
1 Introduction to Part I
The Habilitation thesis of Heinrich Behmann (1891–1970), published in 1922
in Mathematische Annalen [Beh22a], belongs, along with works by Löwenheim
[Löw15] and Skolem [Sko19; Sko20], to the standard references on the decision
problem for relational monadic first-order formulas (the Löwenheim class),1 and
also for the extension of this class by second-order quantification upon predicates.
Early such references of [Beh22a] include [HA28, p. 77], [HA38, p. 95], and [HB34,
p. 200], where also the methods by Behmann are reproduced [HB34, p. 193ff
and p. 200ff]. A detailed historic account is provided in Church’s Introduction to
Mathematical Logic [Chu56, §49, in particular p. 293]. The book by Church also
presents variants of methods from [Beh22a].
Behmann’s early work up to 1921 is presented in historic context by Man-
cosu [Man99]. The focus there is the dissertation from 1918, but various issues
concerning [Beh22a], in particular its embedding into the context of the Hilbert
school, are also documented. The historic analysis of the development of log-
ics in the period 1917–23 by Zach [Zac99] describes Behmann’s contributions.
In particular, it is observed there that Behmann’s talk on 10 May 1921 at the
Mathematische Gesellschaft in Göttingen on the topic of his Habilitation the-
sis seems the first documented use of the term Entscheidungsproblem (decision
problem) [Zac99, p. 363]. A transcript and English translation of this talk, along
with a comprehensive introduction, has recently been published by Mancosu
and Zach [MZ15]. The first published explicit statement of the decision problem
seems to be in [Beh22a, p. 166] (see [Zac99] for an English translation of the
relevant passages).
Behmann reduces the decision problem for relational monadic formulas to the
second-order quantifier elimination problem, that is, the problem to compute
for a given second-order formula an equivalent first-order formula. In compu-
tational logic, second-order quantifier elimination [GSS08], with variants called
uniform interpolation, forgetting and projection, is today an area with a wide
variety of applications and techniques.2 Some of today’s advanced methods for
second-order quantifier elimination are explicitly based on the so-called Acker-
mann’s Lemma, due to Wilhelm Ackermann [Ack35a], and involve equivalence
preserving rewriting of formulas as key technique [DŁS97]. Although Behmann
actually uses such rewriting techniques and gave with [Beh22a] at that time
Ackermann the impetus to investigate the elimination problem – as Ackermann
courteously remarked in a letter to Behmann dated 29 Oct 1934 [Letter L7]3 (see
also Sect. 27) – it appears that [Beh22a] so far has been largely overlooked in
the context of second-order quantifier elimination in computational logic, such
as the monograph [GSS08], with the exception of historic references in [Cra08;
Sch12] and a recent paper by the present author [Wer15].
1 Relational monadic formulas are first-order formulas with only unary predicates and
no functions other than constants.
2 As for example reflected in the SOQE 2017 workshop [Koo+17].
3 Letters and manuscripts in Behmann’s bequest are listed in Part V.
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In this report we provide a detailed technical reconstruction of the methods
and results from [Beh22a] (Part II) and discuss various related issues, of which
many are still today of relevance in computational logic (Part III). We summa-
rize follow-up works by Behmann himself in unpublished manuscripts and in the
correspondence with Wilhelm Ackermann, which mainly concerns elimination
in presence of predicates with arity larger than one (Part IV). This is supple-
mented by commented listings of publications by Behmann and documents in
his bequest that are related to second-order quantifier elimination (Part V). The
correspondence with Wilhelm Ackermann, as far as archived in Behmann’s be-
quest in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, is registered there completely. Part VI
concludes the report.
We do not address another major concern of Behmann that is related to
computational logic: his approach to resolve paradoxes, based on the idea that
these emerge from unjustified elimination of shorthands (Kurzzeichen), leading
to a variant of lambda conversion and restricted quantifiers [Beh31; Beh59]. He
discussed his approach, which is briefly mentioned by Curry and Feys in [CFC58,
p. 4, 9, 260f], in correspondence with, among others, Ackermann, Bernays, Church,
Gödel and Ramsey.
As already indicated, Behmann’s Habilitation thesis [Beh22a] has so far
mainly been considered in the context of the history of the decision problem.
However, from the point of view of computational logic it is relevant also in vari-
ous further respects, not merely for historical reasons, but there are also technical
aspects that are still of significance today, for example, the successful termination
of second-order quantifier elimination methods on relational monadic formulas
[Wer15], as well as methodical aspects, such as the roles of normal forms. The
remaining sections of this part discuss these contributions.
2 Specification of the Decision Problem
As already mentioned, the first explicit statement of the decision problem seems
to be in [Beh22a]. For a translation of the relevant passages and discussions see
[Zac99; MZ15].
3 Solution of the Decision Problem for Relational
Monadic First- and Second-Order Formulas with
Equality
As indicated above, this result was first obtained by Löwenheim, whereas Skolem
and Behmann provided further proofs. Like Behmann’s method, the techniques
of Löwenheim and Skolem also apply if predicate quantification is considered
[Chu56, p. 293]. As further noted in [Chu56, p. 293], Behmann’s method to
handle equality is similar to that of Skolem in some important respects, but seems
to have been found independently. Behmann himself describes this in a letter
dated 27 December 1927 to Heinrich Scholz [BehNL, Kasten 3, I 63], brought to
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attention in [Man99] with excerpts published in [MZ15] and below – see p. 10
and 91. Skolem’s proof is outlined from the perspective of elimination in [Cra08].
A methodical aspect of [Beh22a] seems worth mentioning: The decision problem
is attacked there by investigating decidability explicitly for specific syntactically
characterized formula classes (Aussagenbereiche).
4 Specification of the Problem of Second-Order
Quantifier Elimination
As described in [Cra08], elimination problems play an important role in the
works of Boole [Boo54] and Schröder [Sch05]. It seems, however, that the prob-
lem of second-order quantifier elimination has not been fully understood and
explicitly stated accordingly before [Beh22a]. The second-order quantifier elim-
ination problem is called there a new “elimination problem” (neue[s] „Elimina-
tionsproblem“) and is explicated in the context of the instance that occurs first
in that paper, the elimination of a unary predicate with respect to a formula
of relational monadic first-order logic without equality.4 This specification can
be paraphrased as follows: Given is a formula ∀pF or ∃pF , where p is a unary
predicate and F is of monadic first-order logic without equality. The objective
is now to find a, or – as can be said more determined – the (first-order) formula
that is equivalent to the given formula – with respect to the predicates with
exception of p, the constants and the free variables in F – but does not contain
p any more. Behmann also gives a second more semantic view on the elimination
problem: The (first-order) relationship among the predicates (with exception of
p), constants and free variables in F should be determined that is a necessary
and sufficient condition for F being true for arbitrary predicates p or for at least
one predicate p, respectively.
Following Schröder [Sch05], Behmann calls the formula sought after resultant
(Resultante). In the context of his elimination method, Behmann speaks in early
manuscripts from 1921 of separation (Aussonderung) instead of Elimination.
For instance, on p. 13 in [Manuscript M1], a method description is headed Eli-
minationsverfahren. (Aussonderung?). In [Manuscript M3], the manuscript for
[Beh22a], on p. 40, the specification of the elimination problem quoted in foot-
note 4 uses „Aussonderungsproblem“ in place of „Eliminationsproblem“, on p. 45
the originally typed term Aussonderungshauptform is altered by a handwritten
annotation to Eliminationshauptform (German for main form for elimination).
4 [Beh22a, p. 196f]: Ich möchte dieses neue „Eliminationsproblem“ in der folgenden
Weise bestimmter fassen: Gegeben ist eine Aussage
ϕFϕfgab oder ϕFϕfgab,
wo der Operand eine Aussage unseres früheren Bereiches A ist und, abgesehen von
ϕx, nur konstante Eigenschaften, natürlich in beliebiger endlicher Anzahl, enthält
– da sie nämlich innerhalb des obigen Ausdrucks nicht durch Operatoren vertreten
sind, haben wir sie eben, solange wir unser Augenmerk nur auf diesen richten, als
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Behmann [Beh22a, p. 218ff] remarks that Schröder distinguishes between
“elimination problem” and “summation problem”, which are in Behmann’s view
actually identical. Schröder’s elimination problem is, in Behmann’s words, to find
a condition for the satisfiability of F that is free from p.5 Schröder’s “summation
problem” is, according to Behmann, to find a formula that is equivalent to ∃pF
and is free from p. As Behmann describes, Schröder observed the equivalence
of both problems in a note inserted during printing of the third volume of his
Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik [Sch95, p. 489–490], whereas the actual
identity of both problems escaped him through his concern for analogy with
numerical algebra. Behmann concludes with commenting that this is a strange
evidence for the extent in which for Schröder content receded in favor of form.6
Although Behmann explicitly formulates the problem of eliminating second-
order quantifiers and reduces the decision problem for relational monadic for-
mulas to that elimination problem, he remains skeptical on whether the gener-
alization to predicates with arbitrary arities and higher-order concepts can still
be based on the elimination problem. His argument in [Beh22a, p. 226f] is sum-
marized in Part IV, p. 57. In his letter to Heinrich Scholz dated 27 December
1927 [BehNL, Kasten 3, I 63], answering Scholz’s question about who has writ-
ten before him and, in particular, who has written at first, about the decision
konstant anzusehen –, außerdem möglicherweise noch konstante und veränderliche
Individuen; diese letzten natürlich zugleich als Operatoren, daher oben nicht ange-
deutet. (Das Auftreten von Aussagen p, q, . . . als Grundbestandteile [im Original:
Grundbestandteilen] hat im gegenwärtigen Zusammenhang kaum praktische Bedeu-
tung.) Es soll nun eine oder – wie wir bestimmter sagen dürfen – diejenige Aussage
(erster Ordnung) gefunden werden, die der gegebenen äquivalent ist – natürlich für
irgendwelche Werte von f, g, a, b –, den Begriff ϕx jedoch nicht mehr enthält. Mit
anderen Worten: Es soll diejenige Beziehung (erster Ordnung) zwischen den Kon-
stanten f, g, a, b ermittelt werden, deren Bestehen die notwendige und hinreichende
Bedingung dafür ist, daß Fϕfgab je nachdem für beliebige Begriffe ϕx oder für min-
destens einen Begriff ϕx eine richtige Aussage darstellt.
5 Another interpretation of Schröder’s concept of the elimination problem is to find a
consequence of F that has exactly those formulas as consequences which are conse-
quences of F and do not contain p. See, for example, [Sch91, p. 200].
6 In modern view, a divergence between syntactic and semantic conceptions of elim-
ination actually arises: For example, the quantified Boolean formula ∃p (q ∧ p) is
equivalent to the propositional formula q ∧ (p ∨ ¬p), where the Boolean quantifier
has been “eliminated”. However, the formula still contains syntactically the formerly
quantified atom p, although, from a semantic point of view, redundantly. The charac-
terization of such redundancy is not always evident, for example, for modern variants
of second-order quantifier elimination, where it its possible to “quantify upon” just
a particular ground atom. On the other hand, for first-order logic, both views coin-
cide in a sense: As noted in [Ott00, Introduction], the construction of interpolants
according to Craig’s interpolation theorem can be applied to compute for a given
first-order formula that is known to be equivalent to a formula expressed with a
certain signature (predicates, functions and constants), an equivalent formula that
is syntactically in that signature. The existence of an equivalent formula in a given
signature can be expressed as validity.
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problem (Postcard from Scholz to Behmann, dated 19 December 1927, [BehNL,
Kasten 3, I 63]), he relates the decision problem to the elimination problem and
remarks that the latter has been treated “first by the Americans, in particular
Peirce, and later with particular love and persistence by Schröder, and eventu-
ally found a specialist in Löwenheim, who wrote several treatises about it in the
Math. Annalen”. Behmann continues that the most important of these works by
Löwenheim is Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül [Löw15] and mentions that
Löwenheim came there already to important partial results of his work [Beh22a],
“however – in a presentation that is neither mathematically strict nor sufficiently
comprehensible, such that I have construed these properly only after publication
of my own paper.”7
5 Solution of the Second-Order Quantifier Elimination
Problem for Relational Monadic Formulas with
Equality
Behmann [Beh22a] presents an effective method for eliminating the second-order
quantifiers in a given relational monadic formula with equality and with predicate
quantification. (The earlier decidability proofs in [Löw15] and [Sko19] mentioned
above are similarly based on second-order quantifier elimination in monadic log-
ics.) Behmann’s method terminates after a finite number of steps with an equiv-
alent relational monadic first-order formula. The result formula might be with
equality also in cases where the given formula is without equality. For a given
formula in which all predicates are quantified, the result formula just expresses
constraints on the domain cardinality: The formula is either true for all domain
cardinalities with exception of a finite number or false for all domain cardinalities
with exception of a finite number. Obviously, valid and unsatisfiable formulas
are special cases of such formulas.
The key technique of Behmann’s procedure is to propagate quantifiers inward,
also for the price of expensive operations such as distribution of conjunction over
disjunction. As suggested by Behmann, we call the resulting form innex.8 This
inward propagation is is applied to quantifiers upon individual variables as well
as to quantifiers upon predicates. A detailed presentation of Behmann’s method
is the topic of Part II, further aspects of the method will be discussed in Part III.
6 Clarification of Schröder’s Early Results on Elimination
Most issues solved in [Beh22a] have been raised by Schröder in his Vorlesungen
über die Algebra der Logik [Sch05]. Their solutions are developed by Behmann in
7 An excerpt of the German letter is quoted in Sect. 32, p. 91. Further parts of that
letter are summarized in [MZ15].
8 Die Endform meines Reduktionsverfahrens wird gelegentlich (sprachlich wenig glück-
lich) als "kontrapränex" bezeichnet; ich ziehe die Benennung "innex" vor. Letter
from Heinrich Behmann to Alonzo Church, 30 January 1959 [BehNL, Kasten 1,
I 11].
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a more modern representational framework, with a dedicated notation for logics,
not obfuscated by the aim for correspondence to numeric algebra. The work by
Behmann seems thus also useful as a guide to Schröder’s results, complementing
the outline in [Cra08]. We already sketched Behmann’s discussion of Schröder’s
notion of elimination in Sect. 4. The precise relationship of Behmann’s core
result to Schröder’s earlier partial result, in particular, his „crude resultant”
(„Resultante aus dem Rohen“), as described Behmann will be shown in Sect. 15.
7 Methodology: Computation by Equivalence Preserving
Rewriting
With the requirement to decide a statement after a finite number of steps, the
Entscheidungsproblem inherently involves some notion of computation. Compu-
tation steps are expressed in [Beh22a] as equivalence preserving rewriting steps
of logical formulas, justified by a collection of formula equivalences. A method
starts with a given formula. At each step, a subformula occurrence is replaced
with an equivalent formula, according to some computation rule (Rechenregel),
that is, an equivalence from the collection, oriented either from left to right or
from right to left. Computation terminates if the formula has reached a specific
syntactic form. As Behmann states [Beh22a, p. 167], the particular collection
of equivalences he gives is motivated not by finding a small set of orthogonal
axioms, but by satisfying the needs of practical computation (Bedürfnisse des
praktischen Rechnens).9
The foundation on equivalence, a semantic property, ensures that equivalence
to the originally given formula is maintained as an invariant throughout the com-
putation. Today, the representation by rewriting rules or transition systems that
preserve semantic properties is a well established elegant way to represent com-
putational methods such that they can be analyzed. Second-order quantification
allows to represent also notions like equi-satisfiability (two formulas are either
both satisfiable or unsatisfiable) as equivalence of formulas, making the preser-
vation of equivalence a particularly useful invariant.
The modern so-called direct methods or methods of the Ackermann approach,
for second-order quantifier elimination [GSS08], initiated by [Sza93; DŁS97], typ-
ically founded on Ackermann’s Lemma [Ack35a], quite literally follow Behmann’s
template of applying equivalence preserving formula rewritings that include var-
ious formula conversions and elimination steps.
8 Methodology: Normal Forms
The methods introduced in [Beh22a] essentially operate by converting given log-
ical formulas to equivalent formulas in specific normal forms, that is, formulas
with specific syntactic properties. Conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms are
9 See [Zac99, p. 351f] for an English translation of the relevant section from [Beh22a].
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used dually there, the innex normal forms for quantifiers upon instance vari-
ables as well as upon predicates are developed and counting (or cardinality)
quantifiers are applied (preceded in [Löw15; Sko19] – see [Cra08]). Behmann’s
method rewrites formulas to a certain intermediate form that allows predicate
elimination according to a simple scheme.
The syntax for formulas used in [Beh22a] is based on disjunction, conjunction
and negation, exposing the symmetry and duality inherent in these operations,
which is, as criticized by Behmann, obscured in notations based on implication
used by Frege and in the Principia Mathematica. For monadic formulas in a
certain normal form, Behmann introduces a special notation (Klassensymbolik),
where individual variables are suppressed.
In modern computational logic, normal forms play various roles. Systems
typically operate on inputs in conjunctive normal form, obtained from prepro-
cessors. Normal forms that allow to perform certain operations in an inexpensive
way are investigated as target formats for knowledge compilation. The preserva-
tion of a certain normal form by calculi is applied to ensure that outputs are in
a certain fragment of first-order logic or can be mapped to some other logic such
as a modal or description logic (the method of [KS13] for second-order quantifier
elimination in description logics can be considered as an example). Normal forms
can provide representations of formulas that facilitate to understand their mean-
ing, which is useful in the development of techniques as well as to present results
to end users. This aspect of getting an overview on a solution in its totality has
been a continuous concern for Behmann, for example in his comments to Acker-
mann’s resolution-based elimination technique, summarized below in Part IV, or
in his later work on the solution problem (Auflösungsproblem) [Beh50; Beh51].
The paradigm of “model computation” or “answer set programming” in auto-
mated reasoning and logic programming can be considered as a variant of normal
form computation: Such systems enumerate data structures that represent mod-
els. Their solutions can be regarded as a normalized representation of the input.
A particular special case is enumerating all conjunctive clauses of a disjunctive
normal norm.
The so-called quantifier elimination approach in early model theory of the
1920s is another area where variants of normal form computation play an essen-
tial role, as will be discussed below in Sect. 13. The integration of such quantifier
elimination methods for decidable theories into reasoning systems is currently
an area of extensive research in automated deduction, motivated in particular by
applications in software and hardware verification. Also the evaluation of rela-
tional database queries can be considered as elimination of first-order quantifiers
[KKR95; Rev10].
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Part II
Behmann’s Decision and
Elimination Method for
Relational Monadic Formulas

Introduction to Part II 17
9 Introduction to Part II
This part focuses on the main technical material in [Beh22a] from the point of
view of second-order quantifier elimination as considered in computational logic.
Modern notation is used throughout, on occasion a concordance to Behmann’s
original labeling and various notations, which have merits on their own, are given.
We aim here at a general formalization, where Behmann sometimes introduces
techniques only with exemplary cases that provide intuition and indicate the
general case. Also the structuring of the presentation deviates from the original
paper, aiming at the modern reader.
The rest of this part is structured as follows: In Sect. 10 notation and termi-
nology are introduced and general remarks on the presentation are given. Sec-
tion 11 provides an overview on Behmann’s results, proceeding in a “top-down”
fashion where the more involved methods and proofs are only sketched. With
a collection of equivalences and entailments for use in formula rewriting and
considerations on deciding and normalizing propositional logic, Sect. 12 paves
the way for the more thorough presentation of Behmann’s techniques in the
subsequent sections. First, the general case of monadic formulas with equality
is considered. Sect. 13 describes a normalization method for such formulas. The
second-order quantifier elimination method, which applies to the normalized for-
mulas, is then shown in detail in Sect. 14. A simplified variant of the general
method is then considered in Sect. 15. It applies just to the case without equal-
ity, but facilitates discussion of other issues, in particular the correspondence to
earlier works by Schröder, as shown by Behmann.
10 Notational Conventions and Preliminary Remarks
10.1 Syntax
We briefly write predicate, function and constant for predicate symbol, function
symbol and constant symbol, respectively. For second-order logic with equality,
that is first-order logic with equality and extended by quantification upon predi-
cates and functions, we use the following syntactic notation: An atomic formula,
or briefly atom, is either of the form pt1 . . . tn, where n ≥ 0 and where p is a
predicate of arity n, or of the form t1 = t2. In both cases, each subscripted t is a
term, that is an individual variable or of the form ft1 . . . tn, where n ≥ 0, the ti
are terms and f is a function of arity n.10 A nullary function is also called con-
stant. An atom of the form t1 = t2 is called equality atom. Formulas and classes
of formulas which may contain/may not contain equality atoms are called briefly
with equality or without equality, respectively. If we speak of first-order formulas,
unless explicitly indicated otherwise, we assume formulas with equality.
A formula is constructed from atoms, the constant operators > (true), ⊥
(false), and a finite number of applications of the unary connectives ¬ (nega-
tion), the binary connectives ∧ (conjunction) and ∨ (disjunction), as well as
10 This parenthesis-free notation for terms and atoms is used in the modern textbook
[EFT07].
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quantifications with ∀ (universal quantification) and ∃ (existential quantifica-
tion). Negated equality 6=, further binary operators →,←,↔, as well as n-ary
versions of ∧ and ∨ can be understood as meta-level notation. For these n-ary
versions, the cases n = 0, which are > and ⊥, respectively, are included. The
scope of ¬, the quantifiers, and the n-ary versions of ∧ and ∨ in prefix notation
is the immediate subformula to the right.
A subformula occurrence in a given formula is positive (negative) if it is in
the scope of an even (odd) number of negations. A literal is an atom or a negated
atom. For a formula F of the form ¬G, the complement F of F is G, if F has a
form different from ¬G, then the complement is ¬F .
A quantifier occurrence may be upon an individual variable (“first-order”) or
upon a predicate or function (“second-order”). We call the former also an individ-
ual quantifier and the latter predicate quantifier. An occurrence of an individual
variable, predicate or function that is not bound by a quantifier occurrence in
a formula is called free in that formula. As common in discussions of first-order
logic, we distinguish between constants and free occurrences of individual vari-
ables. However, we do not make an analogous distinction for predicates and
functions, since it would not be of relevance in the considered contexts. Thus,
an occurrence of a predicate or function in a formula is just free or bound by
a quantifier. In a first-order formula, all predicate and function occurrences are
free.
10.2 Boolean Combination of Basic Formulas
Following patterns suggested by early model theory (see e.g. [CK90, Sect. 1.5]), in
this presentation, several normal forms are characterized as Boolean combination
of basic formulas, that is, as the formulas that are obtained from certain basic
formulas, the constant operators >, ⊥ and repeated application of the operators
¬, ∧ and ∨.11
10.3 Considered Formula Classes
We use the following symbols for particularly considered formula classes: MON is
the class of relational monadic formulas (also called Löwenheim class), that is, the
class of first-order formulas with nullary and unary predicates, with constants
but no other functions, and without equality. MON= is MON with equality.
QMON and QMON= are MON and MON=, resp., extended by second-order
quantification upon predicates.
All of these classes are decidable. QMON= admits second-order quantifier
elimination, that is, there is an effective method to compute for a given QMON=
formula F an equivalent MON= formula F ′ in which all predicates are unquan-
tified predicates in F , as well as all constants and free variables are also in F .
11 This choice of operators has been made for convenience. Of course, technically it
would be sufficient to just permit e.g. ¬ and ∧, and express > and ⊥ as disjunction
and conjunction, respectively, of an arbitrarily picked basic formula and its negation.
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In this sense MON= is closed under second-order quantifier elimination, which
does not hold for MON, since elimination applied to a QMON formula might
introduce equality.
A quantified Boolean formula is a formula where all predicates are nullary
(called then also Boolean variables in the literature) and quantification is allowed
just upon predicates.
10.4 Remarks on the Presentation of Behmann’s Results
Theorems that Assert the Existence of Effective Methods. We formulate results
often as theorem statements that assert the existence of an effective method to
compute for a given formula an equivalent formula with certain properties. The
proof is then typically a description of such a method. An alternative would be
to just state the existence of an equivalent formula with certain properties as
theorem. This course has not been followed here, since in contexts where the
existence of a method is relevant, reference to the theorem alone (playing the
role of a “module interface”) would not be sufficient, but the underlying proof
(the “module implementation”) would have to be referenced.
Free Individual Variables and Constants. Many of the results of [Beh22a] ap-
ply to formulas – which may contain free variables – such that free variables
and constants are handled in exactly the same way. While these results are pre-
sented here explicitly as properties of formulas, they are presented in [Beh22a]
as properties of sentences (Aussagen), that is, formulas without free individual
variables, considering free individual variables just as constants (see [Beh22a,
footnote 25, p. 196]12).
Consideration of Duality. Methods based on equivalence preserving transfor-
mations of classical logic formulas typically come in two dual variants, where
the roles of conjunction and disjunction as well as the roles of existential and
universal quantification are switched (as made more precise with Prop. 7 in
Sect. 12.1). In [Beh22a], such methods are in general explicitly developed for
one of the variants and the dual variant is then indicated. In the presentation
here, the discussion of dual variants is completely neglected, with exception of
a few specific cases. Actually, from a technical point of view, the dual vari-
ants can be completely disregarded, since for inputs where they would seem
adequate, their behavior would be just simulated by the original variant with
the only difference that instead of atomic formulas (or basic formulas of other
forms) their complements are used. As an example, consider the equivalence
∃x (px ∨ qx) ≡ ∃x px ∨ ∃x qx and its dual ∀x (px ∧ qx) ≡ ∀x px ∧ ∀x qx. The
dual can be derived from the first variant with negated atoms in the following
12 Behmann’s footnote translates as: I thus call the basic components of an expression
“variable” („veränderlich“) or “constant” („konstant“), depending on whether it is
represented within the expression by quantifiers (Operatoren) or not. As far as I can
see, this is exactly the sense in which this distinction is actually made in mathematics.
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steps, which additionally only involve inward propagation of negation and ex-
pansion/contraction of universal quantifiers: ∀x (px ∧ qx) ≡ ¬∃x¬(px ∧ qx) ≡
¬∃x (¬px ∨ ¬qx) ≡ ¬(∃x¬px ∨ ∃x¬qx) ≡ ¬∃x¬px ∧ ¬∃x¬qx ≡ ∀x px ∧ ∀x qx.
11 Overview on Behmann’s Results and Methods
The final result of [Beh22a] can be stated as a theorem about MON= formulas
of a certain syntactic form. It allows to derive various results on second-order
quantifier elimination and decidability of monadic formulas, including the decid-
ability of MON. In this overview section we start with presenting this theorem
and sketch in a “top-down” manner the techniques used in [Beh22a] to prove it.
We then present the derived results, proven as corollaries of the theorem. More
in-depth proofs of the theorem itself and discussions of the involved techniques
will then be provided in a “bottom-up” manner in subsequent sections.
11.1 Elimination Method
The core result of [Beh22a] can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Predicate Elimination for MON=). There is an effective me-
thod to compute from a given predicate p and MON= formula F a formula F ′
such that
1. F ′ is a MON= formula,
2. F ′ ≡ ∃pF ,
3. p does not occur in F ′,
4. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
The proof given in [Beh22a] for Theorem 1 resides on the conversion of arbitrary
MON= formulas to a certain syntactic normal form that only allows restricted
use of quantification. In particular, the scopes of quantifier occurrences are not
permitted to overlap. To achieve this property, it is utilized that equality atoms
with quantified variables can be represented implicitly by counting quantifiers
∃≥n, which express existence of at least n individuals. Formulas with counting
quantifiers can be expanded into equivalent formulas of particular shapes with
standard first-order quantifiers and equality atoms, as discussed in more detail
below in Sect. 13.1. The standard quantifier ∃ can be equivalently expressed as
∃≥1. In the considered normal form, the argument formula of a counting quan-
tifier ∃≥n must be a conjunction of literals of applications of a unary predicate
to the quantified individual variable. The representability of MON= formulas in
this normal form can be stated as follows:
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Theorem 2 (Counting Quantifier Normal Form for MON=). There is an
effective method to compute from a given MON= formula F a formula F ′ such
that
1. F ′ is a Boolean combination of basic formulas of the form:
(a) p, where p is a nullary predicate,
(b) pt, where p is a unary predicate and t is a constant or an individual
variable,
(c) t = s, where each of t, s is a constant or an individual variable,
(d) ∃≥nx ∧1≤i≤m Li[x], where n ≥ 1, m ≥ 0 and the Li[x] are pairwise
different and pairwise non-complementary positive or negative literals
with a unary predicate applied to the individual variable x,
2. F ′ ≡ F ,
3. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
If the given formula F in Theorem 2 is without equality, the allowed basic for-
mulas can be strengthened by excluding the case t = s (c) and restricting the
case (d) to n = 1, such that the counting quantifier can be considered as stan-
dard quantifier. The method of [Beh22a] to compute the normal form according
to Theorem 2 proceeds by applying equivalence preserving formula rewritings
to move quantifiers inward such that their scopes do not overlap. All predicate
occurrences in the scope of a quantifier then have exactly the quantified variable
as argument.
To achieve this, aside from inexpensive transformations such as narrowing
quantifier scopes to subformulas where the quantified variables actually occur,
distribution of existential (universal, resp.) quantifiers over disjunction (conjunc-
tion, resp.), propagating negation inward, and rearranging binary connectives
according to associativity and commutativity, also expensive transformations, in
particular distribution of conjunction over disjunction and vice versa, as famil-
iar from conversion to disjunctive and conjunctive normal form, are required.
Consider the following example, where initially ∃y is in the scope of ∃x:
∃x (px ∧ (qx ∨ ∃y ry))
≡ ∃x ((px ∧ qx) ∨ (px ∧ ∃y ry))
≡ ∃x (px ∧ qx) ∨ ∃x (px ∧ ∃y ry)
≡ ∃x (px ∧ qx) ∨ (∃x px ∧ ∃y ry).
(1)
Equality literals require special handling, as described in the full exposition in
Sect. 13.2 below.
We now sketch a method as asserted by Theorem 1 for the case where the
input formula is without equality. Given is the formula ∃pF , where F is a MON
formula and p is a predicate. We only consider unary p here, nullary p could
be handled analogously as a particularly simple special case. The input formula
is first rewritten to an equivalent formula in which all occurrences of p are in
subformulas of a specific syntactic form, called Eliminationshauptform (main
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form for elimination) in [Beh22a]:
∃p (∧1≤i≤a ∀x (Ai[x] ∨ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤b ∀x (Bi[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c ∃x (Ci[x] ∧ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d ∃x (Di[x] ∧ ¬px)),
(2)
where a, b, c, d are natural numbers ≥ 0 and the Ai[x], Bi[x], Ci[x], Di[x]
are first-order formulas in which p does not occur. This can be achieved with
the following steps: Normalize with the method of Theorem 2 and convert to
disjunctive normal form, generalized such that the role of atoms is played by
the basic formulas. Rewrite occurrences of pt, where t is a constant or a variable
that is free in F , first with the equivalence ¬pt ≡ ∀x (x 6= t ∨ ¬px) and then
with pt ≡ ∀x (x 6= t ∨ px). This step introduces equality, which thus may also
be present in the result. If F is without equality, the counting quantifiers are
decorated with 1, directly corresponding to standard quantifiers. They can thus
be rewritten with the equivalence ¬∃≥1x ∧1≤i≤m Li[x] ≡ ∀x ∨1≤i≤m Li[x], and
then with ∃≥1x ∧1≤i≤m Li[x] ≡ ∃x ∧1≤i≤m Li[x]. After the predicate quantifier
upon p is then moved inward with the techniques outlined for individual variable
quantifiers in the context of Theorem 2, all occurrences of p are in subformulas
that match the Eliminationshauptform.
The Eliminationshauptform allows to move the existential individual quan-
tifiers and the constituents Ci and Di to the front of the predicate quantifier,
while the occurrences of p with existentially quantified arguments can be rewrit-
ten to universally quantified occurrences that match the forms ∀x (Ai[x]∨px) or
∀x (Bi[x]∨¬px), respectively, by applying the equivalences pt ≡ ∀x (x 6= t∨ px)
and ¬pt ≡ ∀x (x 6= t ∨ ¬px). (Notice that in this step again equality may be
introduced also in cases where the original formula F is without equality.) In
this way, a formula in Eliminationshauptform can be further converted such
that p only occurs in a subformula which is in a restricted form of the Elimina-
tionshauptform allowing only the two universally quantified constituents, that
is, c = d = 0. When restricted in this way, the Eliminationshauptform matches
the left side of the following Basic Elimination Lemma, which gives a first-order
equivalent for second-order formulas matching its left side:
Lemma 3 (Basic Elimination Lemma). Let p be a unary predicate and let
F,G be first-order formulas with equality in which p does not occur. It then holds
that
∃p (∀x (F ∨ px) ∧ ∀x (G ∨ ¬px)) ≡ ∀x (F ∨G).
Note that F and G in that proposition may contain free variables, in particular
free occurrences of x, which are then bound by the surrounding universal quan-
tifiers on the left as well as on the right side of the proposition. Rewriting all
subformulas headed with ∃p according to Lemma 3 then completes the method
asserted by Theorem 1.
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11.2 Applications to Predicate Elimination and Decidability
We now turn to applications of Theorem 1. Repeatedly running the method
ensured by that theorem allows to eliminate all predicate quantifiers in a MON=
formula. The result is first-order, but might be with equality even in cases where
the input is without equality, since a single run of the method already might
introduce equality. This transfer of Theorem 1 to formulas with several predicate
quantifiers is made precise with the following corollary:
Corollary 4 (Elimination in QMON=). There is an effective method to com-
pute for a given QMON= formula F of a formula F ′ such that
1. F ′ is a MON= formula,
2. F ′ ≡ F ,
3. Predicates that just occur bound by a second-order quantifier in F do not
occur in F ′,
4. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. Return the result of applying the following equivalence preserving rewrit-
ings to F : First, exhaustively13 rewrite subformula occurrences of the form ∀pG
where p is a predicate with the equivalent formula ¬∃p¬G. Second, exhaustively
rewrite subformula occurrences of the form ∃pG where p is a predicate and G
is first-order with (i.e. ∃pG is an innermost second-order quantification) to the
equivalent first-order formula obtained according to Theorem 1. uunionsq
Basic formulas of form (d) in Theorem 2 include the case where m = 0, that is,
∃≥nx>. If F is without constants, without free individual variables and such that
all predicate occurrences are quantified, then the result of applying the method
according to Corollary 4 followed by normalization according to Theorem 2 must
be a Boolean combination of basic formulas of just the form ∃≥nx>, where n
is a number ≥ 1. A formula ∃≥nx> is satisfied by exactly those interpretations
whose domain has at least n distinct members. A formula ¬∃≥nx> by those
whose domain has less than n members. As observed in [Beh22a], a Boolean
combination of formulas of the form ∃≥nx> with n ≥ 1 is either true for all
domain cardinalities with exception of a finite number or false for all domain
cardinalities with exception of a finite number. It is not hard to see that validity
and satisfiability of Boolean combinations of formulas of the form ∃≥nx> is
decidable. We discuss this in more depth in Sect. 13.1 below.
The decidability problem for QMON= can be reduced to the elimination
problem. Hence, the decidability of QMON=, and thus also of its subclasses
QMON, MON= and MON, follows from Corollary 4, and thus indirectly from
Theorem 1. The following corollary states this from two perspectives, validity
and satisfiability.
13 By rewriting exhaustively we mean that in each step a subformula occurrence of the
indicated form is replaced and the resulting overall formula is subjected again to
rewriting, until it does no longer contain a subformula of the indicated form.
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Corollary 5 (Decidability of QMON=).
(i) There is an effective method to decide whether a QMON= formula is valid.
(ii) There is an effective method to decide whether a QMON= formula is sat-
isfiable.
Proof. (5.i) Let F be the given QMON= formula. Let p1, . . . , pn be all predicates
with free occurrences in F , let x1, . . . , xm be the free individual variables in F ,
and let c1, . . . , ck be the constants in F . Let F ′ be the formula
∀p1 . . . ∀pn∀x1 . . . ∀xm∀c1 . . . ∀ck F.
The formula F ′ is valid if and only if F is valid. When applied to F ′, the method
according to Corollary 4 followed by normalization according to Theorem 2 then
yields an equivalent formula F ′′ which is a Boolean combination of formulas of
the form ∃≥nx>, where n ≥ 1. Validity of such Boolean combinations can be
decided.
(5.ii) Decidability of satisfiability follows trivially from the decidability of
validity, since a QMON= formula is satisfiable if and only if its negation, which
is also a QMON= formula, is not valid. However, it is also possible to express
the involved intermediate steps directly in terms of satisfiability: Let F be the
given formula. Let F ′ be the formula
∃p1 . . . ∃pn∃x1 . . . ∃xm∃c1 . . . ∃ck F,
where the quantified predicates, variables and constants are as specified in the
proof of Prop. 5.i Then F ′ is satisfiable if and only if F is satisfiable. As in the
proof for the decidability of validity, when applied to F ′, the method accord-
ing to Corollary 4 followed by normalization according to Theorem 2 yields an
equivalent formula F ′′ which is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form
∃≥nx>. Satisfiability of such Boolean combinations can be decided. uunionsq
12 Starting Points: Rewrite Rules and Deciding
Propositional Logic
The methodical approach of [Beh22a] essentially consists in developing effective
methods that operate by rewriting of formulas in an equivalence preserving way
to certain normal forms. The rewriting is done according to a set of rules, that is,
oriented equivalences. The involved normal forms are in particular Boolean com-
binations of certain basic formulas as well as disjunctive and conjunctive normal
form, generalized such that the role of atoms is played by certain basic formulas.
In this section, a collection of the relevant equivalences and entailments that are
used as rules is presented. In addition, the relationship between clausal normal
forms and decision methods is sketched for propositional logic and quantified
Boolean formulas, along with some comments on history.
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12.1 Equivalences and Entailments for Rewriting Formulas
Well-know equivalences and entailments between formulas are listed below as
labeled propositions, such that they can be referenced in the sequel. Their choice
is mainly motivated by their role in the methods of [Beh22a]. A concordance
with the rule labels used in [Beh22a] is provided with Table 12.1 at the end
of the section. The following Prop. 6 gathers equivalences between formulas. In
[Beh22a], such equivalences are used as rules for reversible inferences (Regeln
für umkehrbare Schlüsse): they can be applied oriented from left to right as
well oriented from right to left to obtain a formula that is equivalent to a given
formula, but has different syntactic properties.
Proposition 6 (Equivalences Useful for Rewriting). We consider second-
order logic with equality. For all formulas F,G,H, quantifiers Q ∈ {∀,∃}, indi-
vidual variables or predicates v, w and binary connectives ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨} the follow-
ing equivalences hold:
Interaction of negation with other operators
EQ 1 ¬¬F ≡ F .
EQ 2 ¬(F ∧G) ≡ ¬F ∨ ¬G.
EQ 3 ¬(F ∨G) ≡ ¬F ∧ ¬G.
EQ 4 ¬∀v F ≡ ∃v ¬F .
EQ 5 ¬∃v F ≡ ∀v ¬F .
Associativity, commutativity and idempotence of conjunction and disjunction
EQ 6 (F ⊗G)⊗H ≡ F ⊗ (G⊗H).
EQ 7 F ⊗G ≡ G⊗ F .
EQ 8 F ⊗ F ≡ F .
Interaction of truth values with other operators
EQ 9 ¬> ≡ ⊥.
EQ 10 ¬⊥ ≡ >.
EQ 11 > ∧ F ≡ F . F ∧ > ≡ F .
EQ 12 ⊥ ∧ F ≡ ⊥. F ∧ ⊥ ≡ ⊥.
EQ 13 > ∨ F ≡ >. F ∨ > ≡ >.
EQ 14 ⊥ ∨ F ≡ F . F ∨ ⊥ ≡ F .
EQ 15 Qv > ≡ >.
EQ 16 Qv ⊥ ≡ ⊥.
Cancellation of complementary formulas
EQ 17 F ∧ ¬F ≡ ⊥. ¬F ∧ F ≡ ⊥.
EQ 18 F ∨ ¬F ≡ >. ¬F ∨ F ≡ >.
Distribution among conjunction and disjunction
EQ 19 F ∧ (G ∨H) ≡ (F ∧G) ∨ (F ∧H).
(F ∨G) ∧H ≡ (F ∧H) ∨ (G ∧H).
EQ 20 F ∨ (G ∧H) ≡ (F ∨G) ∧ (F ∨H).
(F ∧G) ∨H ≡ (F ∨H) ∧ (G ∨H).
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Quantifier shifting
EQ 21 ∀v F ∧ ∀v G ≡ ∀v (F ∧G).
EQ 22 ∃v F ∨ ∃v G ≡ ∃v (F ∨G).
EQ 23 Qv F ⊗G ≡ Qv (F ⊗G), if v does not occur free in G.
F ⊗QvG ≡ Qv (F ⊗G), if v does not occur free in F.
Vacuous quantifiers, quantifier switching and variable renaming
EQ 24 Qv F ≡ F , if v does not occur free in F .
EQ 25 QvQwF ≡ QwQv F .
EQ 26 QvF [v] ≡ QwF [w], if F [v] and F [w] are identical with the exception
that F [w] is obtained from F [v] by replacing all free occurrences of v
with w, and vice versa, F [v] from F [w] by replacing all free
occurrences of w with v.
Absorption of entailed conjuncts and entailing disjuncts
EQ 27 F ∧G ≡ F , if F |= G.
EQ 28 F ∨G ≡ G, if F |= G.
Clausal simplifications: tautology reduction, subsumption and unit reduction
Here we consider a matrix (conjunction or disjunction with arity ≥ 0) of clauses
(disjunctions or conjunctions, respectively, with arities ≥ 0) of basic formulas or
negated basic formulas. Corresponding to the setting in [Beh22a], basic formulas
are not restricted to atoms but can be arbitrary formulas (see also footnote 16
on p. 28). The indicated operations preserve equivalence of the matrix.
EQ 29 A clause that contains a basic formula and its complement can be
removed.
EQ 30 A clause whose members are all contained in another clause can be
removed.
EQ 31 A member of a clause can be removed if its complement is
the sole member of another clause in the matrix.
Circumlocution of argument terms14
Let x be an individual variable, let F [x] be a formula, let t be a term that does
contain neither x nor a variable that is bound in F [x] (and thus is itself also
different from x and from any variable bound in F [x]), and let F [t] be F [x] with
all free occurrences of x replaced by t. It then holds that
EQ 32 F [t] ≡ ∀x (x 6= t ∨ F [x]).
EQ 33 F [t] ≡ ∃x (x = t ∧ F [x]).
Proposition 7 below also provides a basis for reversible inferences, but does not
state an equivalence of formulas. Instead, it states an equivalence of statements
about formulas. Let dual(F ) denote the dual of a first- or second-order formula F
(whose only operators are >, ⊥, ¬, ∧, ∨, ∃, and ∀), that is, the formula obtained
from F by switching > with ⊥, ∧ with ∨, and ∀ with ∃. The dual of F is
equivalent to the negation of F after negating each atom occurrence.
14 In Behmann’s later manuscripts, the term Umschreibung, which might be translated
as circumlocution, appears for the right sides of these equivalences.
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Proposition 7 (Preservation of Equivalence under Duality). Let F and
G be first- or second-order formulas. It then holds that
F ≡ G if and only if dual(F ) ≡ dual(G).
Proposition 8 shows entailments between formulas that are considered as rules
for inferences that are not reversible (Regeln für nicht umkehrbare Schlüsse).
Rewriting with them oriented from left to right yields a formula that is weaker
than or equivalent to the original formula. This can be useful, for example, since
validity is preserved by weaker formulas, since establishing the entailment rela-
tionship can give rise to equivalence preserving rewritings where the entailment
is a precondition, and in the context of methods like resolution that proceed by
enriching a given formula with entailed formulas.
Proposition 8 (Entailments Useful for Rewriting). We consider formulas
of first- and second-order logic.
For formulas F,G,H and first-order variable x it holds that
(EN 34) (F ∨G) ∧ (H ∨ ¬G) |= F ∨H.
(EN 35) ∀x (F ∨G) ∧ ∀x (H ∨ ¬G) |= ∀x (F ∨H).
Let F [+G] (F [−G], resp.) be a formula with a positive (negative, resp.) occur-
rence of subformula G. Let F [+H] (F [−H], resp.) denote F with the occurrence
of G replaced by formula H. It then holds that
(EN 36) F [+G] ∧ (¬G ∨H) |= F [+H].
(EN 37) F [−G] ∧ (G ∨ ¬H) |= F [−H].
Let F [+G], F [−G], G, H be as specified before, with the exception that the first-
order variables x1, . . . , xn possibly occur free in G, H and also elsewhere in
F [+G] or F [−G], respectively. It then holds that
(EN 38) F [+G] ∧ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn (¬G ∨H) |= F [+H].
(EN 39) F [−G] ∧ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn (G ∨ ¬H) |= F [−H].
Table 12.1 provides a concordance of the equivalences and entailments stated
as propositions in this section and the computation rules (Rechenregeln) of
[Beh22a]. Rules I–IV∗, VI, VII and IX–XI are equivalences of formulas. Rule VIII
is an equivalence of statements about formulas. Rules V–V
∗
are entailments. The
starred rules concern quantifiers. The correspondence given here is not in all cases
one-to-one: The specification in [Beh22a] is only informal, such that we have to
interpret some details in a specific way or quietly apply generalizations that are
straightforward from today’s point of view. Also, in [Beh22a] conjunction and
disjunction are understood directly as n-ary operators, such that in some cases
the effect of the rules from [Beh22a] can only be achieved by repeated applica-
tion of the listed corresponding equivalences. Equivalences EQ 9–EQ 14 which
concern embedded truth-value operators are not labeled in [Beh22a], but listed
on p. 182 and 188.
15 The description of V∗ in the appendix of [Beh22a] might suggest also the entailment
∃x (F ∨G) ∧ ∃x (H ∨ ¬G) |= ∃x (F ∨H), which does not hold in general.
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Label Correspondence Explanation
I EQ 1 double negation
II EQ 6 associativity of conjunction and disjunction
II∗ EQ 23 modifying the scope of quantifiers
III EQ 7 commutativity of conjunction and disjunction
III∗ EQ 25 permuting quantifiers of the same type
IV EQ 8 idempotence of conjunction and disjunction
IV∗ EQ 21, EQ 22 merging quantifiers over conjunctions and disjunctions
V EN 34 generalized propositional resolvent
V∗ EN 35 generalized propositional resolvent, with quantification15
V EN 36, EN 37 substitution of subformula by implied/implying formula
V? EN 38, EN 39 like V, with quantification over the implication
VI EQ 2, EQ 3 De Morgan’s laws
VI∗ EQ 4, EQ 5 negated quantifications
VII EQ 20, EQ 19 distribution among conjunction and disjunction
VIII Prop. 7 preservation of equivalence under duality
IX EQ 30, EQ 31 subsumption and unit reduction in clausal forms
X EQ 27, EQ 28 absorption of entailed conjuncts and entailing disjuncts
XI EQ 32, EQ 33 circumlocution of argument terms
Table 1. Concordance with the rule labels in [Beh22a].
12.2 Deciding Propositional Logic
As outlined in [Beh22a], a propositional formula F whose atoms are p1, . . . , pn
is valid if and only if the quantified Boolean formula
∀p1 . . . ∀pn F
is true, and satisfiable if and only if
∃p1 . . . ∃pn F
is true. The Boolean quantifiers immediately indicate the substitution method
(Einsetzungsverfahren) to decide propositional validity and satisfiability: Let
F [p 7→ G] denote F under substitution of all occurrences of atom p by G. Then
∀pF is true if and only if for all truth value constants G ∈ {>,⊥} it holds
that F [p 7→ G] ≡ >, while ∃pF is true if and only if there exists a truth value
constant G ∈ {>,⊥} such that F [p 7→ G] ≡ >. For nested quantifiers, the
corresponding combined substitutions have to be evaluated.
A second method to decide propositional validity, attributed in [Beh22a]
to Bernays [Ber18], consists in producing a conjunctive normal form, which is
valid if and only if each of its clauses is valid, that is, contains a literal and
its complement. In [Beh22a] it is noticed that propositional satisfiability can be
analogously decided by conversion to disjunctive normal form:16 A disjunctive
16 Actually, the names konjunktive Normalform and disjunktive Normalform as well as
the precise realization of their duality seem due to [Beh22a] – see [Chu56, p. 166].
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normal form is satisfiable if and only if at least one of its (conjunctive) clauses is
satisfiable, that is, does not contain a literal and its complement. As indicated in
[Beh22a], quantified Boolean formulas that contain universal as well as existential
quantifiers then could be evaluated by successive use of both normal forms. A
third method to decide quantified Boolean formulas by moving quantifiers inward
is also shown in [Beh22a]. It is sketched below in Sect. 17.
13 Counting Quantifier Normal Form for MON=
Formulas
The method of [Beh22a] for the elimination of second-order quantifiers in QMON=
formulas, stated here as Corollary 4, based on Theorem 1, involves rewriting
MON= formulas to equivalent formulas that are constructed from a restricted
set of basic formulas. In the target format, the only quantifiers permitted are
counting quantifiers, and only in occurrences where their scopes are not nested.
The development of methods to express a class of formulas by Boolean com-
binations of certain basic formulas, typically with respect to a given background
theory, is the core of elimination of quantifiers, the prevailing program of model
theory in the 1920s (see e.g. [CK90, Sect. 1.5], [Hod97, Sect. 2.7]). Although
[Beh22a] does not explicitly reference works clearly associated with that pro-
gram, we present here the method to solve the “problem of normal form” (Prob-
lem der Normalform) given in [Beh22a, § 20] as instance of such a quantifier
elimination method – with respect to the empty theory – following the template
given in [CK90, Sect. 1.5].
The presentation in this section proceeds “bottom-up”. First, counting quan-
tifiers, which are important as constituents of the basic formulas, are discussed,
then the construction of the normal form is shown.
In [Ber18], the work referenced by [Beh22a], Bernays just speaks of Normalform, in
the sense of conjunctive normal form. Footnote on p. 13 in [Ber18] suggests that the
duality with disjunctive normal form was not common knowledge at that time: Es
wäre ein Irrtum, nach Analogie [...] zu vermuten, dass ein Produkt-Ausdruck dann
und nur dann eine beweisbare Formel ist, wenn mindestens eines der Glieder eine
beweisbare Formel ist. (Can be paraphrased as: It would be an error to conjecture
in analogy that a disjunction is a valid formula if and only if at least one of its
disjuncts is a valid formula.) See also [Chu56, Note 299]. In [MZ15] it is observed that
Hilbert considered conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms as well as decidability of
propositional logic already in 1905. As further noted in [MZ15], Behmann writes on
27 December 1927 to Scholz [BehNL, Kasten 3, I 63] that, as far as he remembers, he
had learned about the solution of the decision problem for propositional logic using
normal forms directly from Hilbert.
As explained in [Beh22a, p. 185, footnote 19], Behmann uses normal form also
more generally for a conjunction of disjunctions of arbitrary formulas, not necessary
literals, or a disjunction of conjunctions of arbitrary formulas, respectively.
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13.1 Counting Quantifiers
As already indicated, formulas with counting quantifiers belong to the basic
formulas of the envisaged target format. A counting quantifier ∃≥nx, where n
is a natural number ≥ 1, expresses existence of at least n individuals x. It is
well known that these quantifiers can be defined in terms of standard first-order
quantifiers and equality literals. There are two obvious possibilities to do so,
which are both used in [Beh22a], as we will see below in Sect. 14. The following
proposition lists them as equivalences:
Proposition 9 (First-Order Expansions of Existential Counting Quan-
tifiers). Let F [x] be a first-order formula which possibly has free occurrences of
variable x and let n be a natural number ≥ 1. Let x1, . . . , xn be distinct vari-
ables that are fresh (that is, different from x and not occurring in F [x]), and,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let F [xi] denote F [x] with the free occurrences of x replaced
by xi. It then holds that
(i) ∃≥nxF [x] ≡ ∃x1 . . . ∃xn (
∧
1≤i≤n F [xi] ∧
∧
i<j≤n xi 6= xj).
(ii) ∃≥nxF [x] ≡ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn−1∃x (F [x] ∧
∧
1≤i<n x 6= xi).
The statement ∃≥nx> expresses that the domain has at least n members. Fur-
ther properties of ∃≥n are gathered in the following proposition:
Proposition 10 (Properties of Existential Counting Quantifiers). For
all first-order formulas F and natural numbers n,m ≥ 1 it holds that
(i) ∃≥nx⊥ ≡ ⊥.
(ii) ∃≥1xF ≡ ∃xF .
(iii) ∃≥1x> ≡ >.
(iv) ∃≥nxF |= ∃≥mxF , if m ≤ n.
Let ∀<nx, where n is a natural number ≥ 1, be further counting quantifiers,
defined as shorthand for ¬∃≥nx¬ . They express “for all with the exception of
less than n individuals x it holds that”. In analogy to Prop. 9, they can be
expanded in two way as follows:
Proposition 11 (First-Order Expansions of Universal Counting Quan-
tifiers). Let F [x], n, x1, . . . xn, F [xi] be as specified in Prop. 9. It then holds that
(i) ∀<nxF [x] ≡ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn (
∨
1≤i≤n F [xi] ∨
∨
i<j≤n xi = xj).
(ii) ∀<nxF [x] ≡ ∃x1 . . . ∃xn−1∀x (F [x] ∨
∨
1≤i<n x = xi).
The statement ∀<nx⊥ expresses that the domain has less than n members.
Further properties of ∀<n are gathered in the following proposition, analogously
to Prop. 10:
Proposition 12 (Properties of Universal Counting Quantifiers). For all
first-order formulas F and natural numbers n,m ≥ 1 it holds that
(i) ∀<nx> ≡ >.
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(ii) ∀<1xF ≡ ∀xF
(iii) ∀<1x⊥ ≡ ⊥.
(iv) ∀<nxF |= ∀<mxF , if n ≤ m.
In [Beh22a] a dedicated symbolic notation that expresses counting quantifiers
for numbers n with n stacked arcs is introduced. It covers basic formulas of form
(d.) in Theorem 2 and their negations. For example, if α[x] and β[x] are formulas
with free variable x, then
αβ˙︸ ︸︸ ︸
stands for ∀<2x (α[x] ∨ ¬β[x]) (or, equivalently, ¬∃≥2x (¬α[x] ∧ β[x])) and
︷ ︷︷ ︷
αβ˙
for ∃≥2x (α[x] ∧ ¬β[x]). The role of > and ⊥ for the empty conjunction and
disjunction, respectively, is played in [Beh22a] by symbols V and
V
for the
universal and the empty class, which would correspond to versions of > and ⊥
that are notated like unary predicates.
As discussed in Sect. 11.2, elimination of all predicate quantifiers in a formula
without constants, without free individual variables and without free predicate
occurrences yields formulas that can be represented by a Boolean combination
of basic formulas of just the form ∃≥nx> with n ≥ 1. We call such a Boolean
combination a pure counting formula. A straightforward way to decide validity
of pure counting formulas is by conversion to conjunctive normal form, replacing
literals ¬∃≥nx> with the equivalent formula ∀<nx⊥ (which we now also accept
as basic formulas) and simplifying each clause by Prop. 10.iv and 12.iv such
that each clause is either empty (that is, is ⊥), contains a single basic formula
or contains exactly two basic formulas, one with existential and the other with
universal counting quantifier. The formula is then valid if and only if each clause
is valid, that is, (i) is not empty, or (ii) contains just ∃≥1x>, or (iii) contains
∃nx> and ∀<mx⊥, where n ≤ m.
Dually, satisfiability of pure counting formulas can be decided by analogous
transformation to disjunctive normal form. The formula is then satisfiable if and
only if each (conjunctive) clause is satisfiable, that is, (i) is empty, or (ii) contains
just a single basic formula that is different from ∀<1x⊥, or (iii) contains two
basic formulas ∃nx> and ∀<mx⊥, where n < m.
Following [Beh22a], this disjunctive form illustrates how domain cardinalities
are constrained by a pure counting formula: Each (conjunctive) clause justifies
a series of numbers with a lower limit or with lower as well as upper limits as
domain cardinalities. A pure counting formula is thus either true for all domain
cardinalities with exception of a finite number or false for all domain cardinalities
with exception of a finite number. For sufficiently large domains, in particular for
all infinite domains, a pure counting formula is then either valid or unsatisfiable.
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13.2 Conversion to Counting Quantifier Normal Form
We now approaching the proof of Theorem 2. It is helpful to isolate the following
key step as a lemma on its own:
Lemma 13 (Auxiliary Elimination Lemma for First-Order Logic with
Equality). For all first-order formulas F [x], where x is an individual variable
that possibly occurs free in F [x], for all sequences T = {t1, . . . , tn} of n ≥ 0
distinct constants or variables which are different from x and do not occur in
F [x] and for all integers m ≥ 1 let NDTF [x],T (m) be the formula
NDTF [x],T (m)
def=
∧
S⊆T
|S|=m
(
∨
t∈S
¬F [t] ∨
∨
ti,tj∈S
i<j
ti = tj),
where F [t] denotes F [x] with all free occurrences of x replaced by t. Then
∃x (F [x] ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
x 6= ti)
is equivalent to
(i) ∨
1≤m≤n
∃≥mx (F [x] ∧ NDTF [x],T (m)) ∨ ∃≥n+1xF [x].
(ii) ∃≥1xF [x] ∧
∧
1≤m≤n
∃≥m+1x (F [x] ∨ NDTF [x],T (m)).
The shorthand NDTF [x],T (m) in Lemma 13 (suggesting No m are Denoted by a
Term) expresses that it is false that F applies to m different individuals denoted
by terms t ∈ T , which is immediate from the following alternate way to write
its definition:
NDTF [x],T (m) ≡
∧
S⊆T
|S|=m
¬(
∧
t∈S
F [t] ∧
∧
tj ,tk∈S
j<k
tj 6= tk). (3)
Propositions 13.i and 13.ii show a disjunctive form and a conjunctive form in
which the existential first-order quantifier in ∃x (F [x] ∧ ∧1≤i≤n x 6= ti) can be
“eliminated” in favor of counting quantifiers whose scopes do not include the dis-
equalities x 6= ti. One form can be obtained from the other by distributing con-
nectives and simplifying. As remarked in [Beh22a], Lemma 13 can be proven on
the basis that the left side of the proposition, that is, ∃x (F [x]∧∧1≤i≤n x 6= ti),
is implied by each disjunct of the right side of the disjunctive form (Lemma 13.i)
and implies each conjunct of the right side of the conjunctive form (Lemma 13.ii).
Based on Lemma 13, we now prove Theorem 2, the main theorem of “quanti-
fier elimination” for monadic first-order formulas with equality, following roughly
the template from [CK90, Sect. 1.5]. As explained in Sect. 10.4, we explicitly as-
sert the existence of an effective method in the theorem.
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Theorem 2 (Counting Quantifier Normal Form for MON=). There is an
effective method to compute from a given MON= formula F a formula F ′ such
that
1. F ′ is a Boolean combination of basic formulas of the form:
(a) p, where p is a nullary predicate,
(b) pt, where p is a unary predicate and t is a constant or an individual
variable,
(c) t = s, where each of t, s is a constant or an individual variable,
(d) ∃≥nx ∧1≤i≤m Li[x], where n ≥ 1, m ≥ 0 and the Li[x] are pairwise
different and pairwise non-complementary positive or negative literals
with a unary predicate applied to the individual variable x,
2. F ′ ≡ F ,
3. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. Existence of a method that meets items (1.) and (2.) of the theorem
statement follows if (i) every atomic formula of the input class is a basic formula,
and (ii) there is an effective method to compute for all formulas of the form ∃v F
where v is an individual variable and F a Boolean combination of basic formulas
an equivalent Boolean combination of basic formulas. The overall method to
compute for a given formula in the input class an equivalent Boolean combination
of basic formulas then consists in exhaustively rewriting (as explained in the
proof of Corollary 4) subformula occurrences of the form of case (ii) to a Boolean
combination of basic formulas.
Property (i) is easy to see: Every atomic MON= formula is clearly a basic
formula of the specified form (a.), (b.) or (c.).
We now prove (ii): Let F be a Boolean combination of basic formulas and let
v be a variable. We show how the formula ∃v F can be converted with equivalence
preserving formula rewritings to a Boolean combination of basic formulas. Unless
indicated otherwise, the referenced equivalences are applied there from left to
right.
1. Convert F to a disjunction F1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fn, where n ≥ 0, of conjunctions of
basic formulas or negated basic formulas (EQ 1–EQ 3, EQ 19). The result
is a generalization of disjunctive normal form, where basic formulas play
the role of atoms.
2. Distribute the existential quantifier over the disjunction to obtain ∃v F1 ∨
. . . ∨ ∃v Fn, which is equivalent to ∃v F (EQ 22 right to left).
3. Convert each disjunct ∃v Fi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, separately to a Boolean combi-
nation F ′i of basic formulas and disjoin the results. The resulting formula
F ′1 ∨ . . . ∨ F ′n is a Boolean combination of basic formulas which is equiva-
lent to ∃vF . The following equivalence preserving transformation steps are
applied to each disjunct ∃v Fi:
3.1. In case there are two complementary conjuncts return with F ′i = ⊥ (EQ 6–
EQ 7, EQ 17, EQ 12, EQ 16).
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3.2. In case t 6= t is a conjunct, where t is a term, return with F ′i = ⊥ (EQ 12,
EQ 16).
3.3. Remove conjuncts of the form t = t, where t is a term (EQ 11).
3.4. Orient conjuncts t = v and t 6= v, where t is a term (different from v, as
ensured by the previous steps) to the forms v = t and v 6= t, respectively.
3.5. Reorder the conjuncts, remove duplicate conjuncts, and propagate the ex-
istential quantifier inward such that exactly those conjuncts are in its scope
in which v does occur as a free variable (EQ 6–EQ 8, EQ 23 from right to
left). The resulting formula then has the form
G ∧ ∃v (
∧
1≤i≤k
Li[v] ∧
∧
1≤i≤l
v 6= ti ∧
∧
1≤i≤m
v = ui),
where k, l,m ≥ 0, the Li[v] are pairwise different positive or negative
literals with an unary predicate applied to v and the ti and ui are terms.
In particular, the ti are pairwise different and also different from v. The
subformula G is contains the conjuncts with no free occurrences of v.
3.6. In case k = l = m = 0, return with F ′i = G.
3.7. In case m > 0, return with
F ′i = G ∧
∧
1≤i≤k
Li[u1] ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
u1 6= ti ∧
∧
1<i≤m
u1 = ui,
where the Li[u1] are obtained from the literals Li[v] by replacing their ar-
gument variable v with u1. This transformation step is justified by applying
EQ 33 from right to left.
3.8. Finally, in the remaining case m = 0, return with
F ′i = G ∧G′,
where G′ is a Boolean combination of basic formulas that is equivalent to
∃v (
∧
1≤i≤k
Li[v] ∧
∧
1≤i≤l
v 6= ti),
as obtained according to either Lemma 13.i or 13.ii.
Item (3.) of the theorem statement, that is, all free individual variables, constants
and predicates in F ′ do occur in F , follows since in the transformations involved
to compute F ′ at no point bound variables are moved outside the scope of
their binding quantifier, the only variables introduced in the transformations are
bound by counting quantifiers, and neither constants nor predicates are newly
introduced. uunionsq
We conclude this subsection with some examples that illustrate the conversion of
equality literals to counting quantifiers performed by the method of Theorem 2.
In the following example the input formula contains positive equality atoms:
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∃x (px ∧ x 6= a ∧ x 6= b ∧ x = c ∧ x = d)
≡ pc ∧ c 6= a ∧ c 6= b ∧ c = d. (4)
The following two sequences of equivalences show results obtained if NDT is
expanded according to Lemma 13.i:
∃x (px ∧ x 6= a)
≡ (∃≥1x px ∧ NDTpx,{a}(1)) ∨ ∃≥2x px
≡ (∃≥1x px ∧ ¬pa) ∨ ∃≥2x px.
(5)
∃x (px ∧ x 6= a ∧ x 6= b)
≡ (∃≥1x px ∧ NDTpx,{a,b}(1)) ∨
(∃≥2x px ∧ NDTpx,{a,b}(2)) ∨
∃≥3x px
≡ (∃≥1x px ∧ ¬pa ∧ ¬pb) ∨
(∃≥2x px ∧ (¬pa ∨ ¬pb ∨ a = b)) ∨
∃≥3x px.
(6)
For the same input formulas, if NDT is expanded according to Lemma 13.ii, then
we obtain the following results:
∃x (px ∧ x 6= a)
≡ ∃≥1x px ∧ (∃≥2x px ∨ NDTpx,{a}(1))
≡ ∃≥1x px ∧ (∃≥2x px ∨ ¬pa).
(7)
∃x (px ∧ x 6= a ∧ x 6= b)
≡ ∃≥1x px ∧
(∃≥2x px ∨ NDTpx,{a,b}(1)) ∧
(∃≥3x px ∨ NDTpx,{a,b}(2))
≡ ∃≥1x px ∧
(∃≥2x px ∨ (¬pa ∧ ¬pb)) ∧
(∃≥3x px ∨ ¬pa ∨ ¬pb ∨ a = b).
(8)
14 Predicate Elimination for MON=
In this section Theorem 1, the core result of [Beh22a], is proven. It is first shown
that an existential predicate quantification of a formula in the counting quanti-
fier normal form (as produced by the method of Theorem 2) can be converted
such that all occurrences of predicate quantification are in subformulas of a par-
ticular form, which we call here Generalized Eliminationshauptform because it
generalizes the Eliminationshauptform ((2) on p. 22), by the use of counting
quantifiers instead of standard quantifiers. Like the proper Eliminationshaupt-
form, the Generalized Eliminationshauptform can be converted to an equivalent
formula that allows to eliminate the second-order quantification upon p with
Lemma 3.
It is possible to convert the Generalized Eliminationshauptform first to a for-
mula with a subformula of the proper Eliminationshauptform and then perform
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elimination just based on the latter. However, following [Beh22a], elimination
is shown here directly for the Generalized Eliminationshauptform. The proof
actually involves a conversion such that the predicate quantification has the
form of the special case of the proper Eliminationshauptform where the con-
stituents
∧
1≤i≤c ∃x (Ci[x] ∧ px) and
∧
1≤i≤d ∃x (Di[x] ∧ ¬px) are “empty”, that
is, c = d = 0, which allows to perform elimination directly with Lemma 3. Al-
though technically covered by the general case with equality, we will discuss the
simpler handling of the proper Eliminationshauptform in the next section. The
proof of Theorem 1 is split up into several lemmas. First, the construction of the
Generalized Eliminationshauptform is shown.
Lemma 14 (Constructing the Generalized Eliminationshauptform for
MON= Formulas). There is an effective method to compute for a given unary
predicate p and MON= formula F formula F ′ such that
1. F ′ is a QMON= formula,
2. F ′ ≡ ∃pF ,
3. p is the only quantified predicate in F ′,
4. All occurrences of p in F ′ are in positive occurrences of subformulas of the
form
∃p (∧1≤i≤a ∀x<ai (Ai[x] ∨ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤b ∀x<bi (Bi[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c ∃x≥ci (Ci[x] ∧ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d ∃x≥di (Di[x] ∧ ¬px)),
where a, b, c, d are natural numbers ≥ 0 and for the referenced values of i
the ai, bi, ci, di are natural numbers ≥ 1, and the Ai[x], Bi[x], Ci[x], Di[x]
are first-order formulas in which p does not occur,
5. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. The result formula F ′ is obtained from ∃pF by a sequence of transfor-
mations that preserve equivalence and do neither introduce fresh constants nor
predicates nor variables without a binding quantifier. First, transform F ac-
cording to Theorem 2 to counting quantifier normal form, that is, to a Boolean
combination of basic formulas in the sense of Theorem 2. Convert the result to a
disjunction of conjunctions of such basic formulas or negated such basic formulas
(like a disjunctive normal form, but with basic formulas in the role of atoms).
Remove disjuncts that contain complementary conjuncts (EQ 29).
Let F ′′ be this intermediate result, which is equivalent to F . Proceed with
transforming ∃pF ′′. Distribute the existential quantifier upon p over the dis-
juncts (EQ 22 right to left), remove it from disjuncts in which p does not occur
(EQ 24), reorder disjuncts and move the quantifier upon p inward (EQ 6–EQ 8,
EQ 23 right to left) such that its argument is a conjunction of basic or negated
basic formulas in which p occurs. Let F ′′′ be the intermediate result obtained so
far.
In F ′′′, replace all subformulas of the form ¬∃≥nx ∧1≤i≤m Li[x] with the
equivalent formula ∀<nx ∨1≤i≤m Li[x]. Replace all subformulas of the form ¬pt
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where t is a constant or an individual variable that is free in F with the equivalent
formula ∀<1x (x 6= t ∨ ¬px) (EQ 32, 12.ii). Replace all subformulas of the form
pt where t is a constant or an individual variable that is free in F with the
equivalent formula ∀<1x (x 6= t ∨ px). Reorder disjuncts and conjuncts in the
scope of ∃p such that form (4) in the lemma statement is matched (EQ 6–EQ 7).
The formula has now all properties asserted about F ′ by the lemma to prove. uunionsq
If the quantified predicate is nullary, the first steps of the method of Lemma 14
already yield a particularly simple form:
Lemma 15 (Normalizing Quantification Upon Nullary Predicates).
There is an effective method to compute for a given nullary predicate p and
MON= formula F formula F ′ such that
1. F ′ is a QMON= formula,
2. F ′ ≡ ∃pF ,
3. p is the only quantified predicate in F ′,
4. All occurrences of p in F ′ are in positive occurrences of subformulas of the
forms ∃p p and ∃p¬p,
5. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. The intermediate result F ′′′ computed described in the proof of Lemma 14
has all properties asserted about F ′ by the lemma to prove. uunionsq
The following Lemma shows for quantification upon a unary predicate the con-
version of the Generalized Eliminationshauptform to a form that allows to per-
form elimination directly by application of Lemma 3.
Lemma 16 (From Generalized Eliminationshauptform to the Basic
Elimination Lemma). Let p be a unary predicate and let F be a formula
of the form
∃p (∧1≤i≤a ∀x<ai (Ai[x] ∨ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤b ∀x<bi (Bi[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c ∃x≥ci (Ci[x] ∧ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d ∃x≥di (Di[x] ∧ ¬px)),
where a, b, c, d are natural numbers ≥ 0, for the referenced values of i the ai, bi,
ci, di are natural numbers ≥ 1, and the Ai[x], Bi[x], Ci[x], Di[x] are first-order
formulas in which p does not occur. Then F is equivalent to
Q (G ∧ ∃p (∀x (A[x] ∨ px) ∧ ∀x (B[x] ∨ ¬px))),
where Q is a quantifier prefix that existentially quantifies upon the following
individual variables which are fresh, that is, do not occur in F :
xi1 . . . xi(ai−1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ a
yi1 . . . yi(bi−1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ b,
ui1 . . . uici , for 1 ≤ i ≤ c,
vi1 . . . vici , for 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
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where G is the formula∧
1≤i≤c, 1≤j≤ci(Ci[uij ] ∧
∧
j<k≤ci uij 6= uik) ∧∧
1≤i≤d, 1≤j≤di(Di[vij ] ∧
∧
j<k≤di vij 6= vik),
with Ci[uij ] and Di[vij ] denoting Ci[x] and Di[x] after replacing all free occur-
rences of x by uij and vij, respectively,
where A[x] is the formula∧
1≤i≤a(Ai[x] ∨
∨
1≤j<ai x = xij) ∧
∧
1≤i≤c, 1≤j≤ci x 6= uij ,
and where B[x] is the formula∧
1≤i≤b(Bi[x] ∨
∨
1≤j<bi x = yij) ∧
∧
1≤i≤d, 1≤j≤di x 6= vij .
Proof. Universal and existential counting quantifiers in F can be expanded in
alternate ways (Prop. 11.ii and 9.i) such that in both cases existential variables
are produced which can be moved (by EQ 23, EQ 25) in front of the existential
predicate quantifier. The particular expansions of universal counting quantifiers
applied there are:
∀x<ai (Ai[x] ∨ px)
≡ ∃xi1 . . . ∃xi(ai−1)∀x (Ai[x] ∨ px ∨
∨
1≤j<ai x = xij) by Prop. 11.ii
≡ ∃xi1 . . . ∃xi(ai−1)∀x ((Ai[x] ∨
∨
1≤j<ai x = xij) ∨ px), by EQ 6, EQ 7
and analogously
∀x<bi (Bi[x] ∨ ¬px)
≡ ∃yi1 . . . ∃yi(bi−1)∀x ((Bi[x] ∨
∨
1≤j<bi x = yij) ∨ ¬px).
The involved expansions of existential counting quantifiers are:
∃≥cx (Ci[x] ∧ px)
≡ ∃ui1 . . . ∃uic
∧
1≤j≤c(Ci[uij ] ∧ puij ∧
∧
j<k≤c uij 6= uik) by Prop. 9.i
≡ ∃ui1 . . . ∃uic (
∧
1≤j≤c(Ci[uij ] ∧
∧
j<k≤c uij 6= uik) ∧ by EQ 6, EQ 7∧
1≤j≤c puij)
≡ ∃ui1 . . . ∃uic (
∧
1≤j≤c(Ci[uij ] ∧
∧
j<k≤c uij 6= uik) ∧ by EQ 32∧
1≤j≤c ∀x (x 6= uij ∨ px)),
and analogously
∃≥dix (Di[x] ∧ ¬px)
≡ ∃v′i1 . . . ∃v′idi (
∧
1≤j≤di(Di[v
′
ij ] ∧
∧
j<k≤di v
′
ij 6= v′ik) ∧∧
1≤j≤di ∀x (x 6= v′ij ∨ ¬px)).
The formulas A[x] and B[x] are obtained from the universally quantified con-
juncts in the shown expansions by merging universal quantifiers (EQ 21) and
factoring the disjuncts px and ¬px, respectively (EQ 20 left to right). uunionsq
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We can now combine the lemmas of this section to the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Predicate Elimination for MON=). There is an effective
method to compute from a given predicate p and MON= formula F a formula F ′
such that
1. F ′ is a MON= formula,
2. F ′ ≡ ∃pF ,
3. p does not occur in F ′,
4. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. If p is nullary, then apply the method according to Lemma 15 to p and F ,
followed by replacing all occurrences of ∃p p and of ∃p¬p with the equivalent >.
In case p is unary, apply the method according to Lemma 14 to p and F , fol-
lowed by replacing all subformulas starting with ∃p with the equivalent formulas
according to Lemma 16. In the intermediate result, replace all subformulas start-
ing with ∃p with the equivalent formulas obtained by eliminating ∃p according
to Lemma 3. uunionsq
15 Predicate Elimination for Formulas without Equality
Theorem 1 and the material leading to that theorem applies to formulas with
equality. In [Beh22a], a simpler variant that only applies to formulas without
equality is described first and in more detail, along with a direct comparison
to an earlier result by Schröder and with a restructuring of the result as a
postprocessing operation after elimination. In this section we adapt the essential
steps of this variant and discuss aspects that become apparent more clearly with
that simpler method.
As already mentioned in Sect. 11.1, even if the input formula is without
equality, the steps involved in predicate quantifier elimination can possibly in-
troduce equality if the predicate to be eliminated occurs with an argument that
is not a universally quantified variable. Thus, if there are several predicates to
be eliminated one by one, an input formula without equality can only be safely
assumed for elimination of the first predicate.
However, as can be seen from the proofs in this section, the equality literals
introduced for inputs without equality actually either have a constant or two
existential variables as arguments, implying that the simpler variant without
dedicated equality handling is sufficient for elimination in formulas ∃p1 . . . ∃pn F
where F is a MON formula. For this case, and the dual elimination of a sequence
of universal predicate quantifiers, Behmann [Beh22a] sketches a generalization of
the variant for formulas without equality, which, however, involves a translation
whose size is exponential in the number of predicate quantifiers. The core idea
for Behmann’s generalization is described below at the end of this section.
The following proposition shows a method to compute a normal form for
monadic first-order logic without equality, which is like the counting quantifier
normal form of Theorem 2, but with certain further restrictions on the allowed
basic formulas. In particular, it involves no counting quantifiers.
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Proposition 17 (Normal Form for MON). There is an effective method to
compute for a given MON formula F a formula F ′ such that
1. F ′ is a Boolean combination of basic formulas of the form:
(a) p, where p is a nullary predicate,
(b) pt, where p is a unary predicate and t is a constant or individual variable,
(c) ∃x ∧1≤i≤m Li[x], where the Li[x] are pairwise different and pairwise
non-complementary positive or negative literals with a unary predicate
applied to the individual variable x,
2. F ′ ≡ F ,
3. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. If the proof of Theorem 2 is instantiated with a formula F without equal-
ity, the resulting formula is a Boolean combination of basic formulas of the
forms (a), (b) as shown above and of the form (d) from Theorem 2 with n in-
stantiated to 1. The latter formulas can be converted to the form (c) shown
above by replacing the counting quantifier ∃≥1x with the equivalent standard
quantifier ∃x (Prop. 10.ii). uunionsq
The remaining two propositions and lemmas in this section give, based on the
normal form of Prop. 17, the ingredients for a method to eliminate predicate
quantification on MON formulas, in analogy to Lemma 14 and 15. The construc-
tion of the Eliminationshauptform from arbitrary such formulas is ensured with
the following lemma.
Lemma 18 (Constructing the Eliminationshauptform for MON). There
is an effective method to compute for a given unary predicate p and MON for-
mula F a formula F ′ such that
1. F ′ is a MON= formula,
2. F ′ ≡ ∃pF ,
3. p is the only quantified predicate in F ′,
4. All occurrences of p in F ′ are in positive occurrences of subformulas of the
form
∃p (∧1≤i≤a ∀x (Ai[x] ∨ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤b ∀x (Bi[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c ∃x (Ci[x] ∧ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d ∃x (Di[x] ∧ ¬px)),
where a, b, c, d are natural numbers ≥ 0 and the Ai[x], Bi[x], Ci[x], Di[x] are
formulas in which p does not occur,
5. All free individual variables, constants and predicates in F ′ do occur in F .
Proof. Compute the intermediate F ′′′ as described in the proof of Lemma 14.
Continue in analogy to that proof: In F ′′′, replace all subformulas of the form
¬∃x ∧1≤i≤m Li[x] with the equivalent formula ∀x ∨1≤i≤m Li[x]. Replace all sub-
formulas of the form ¬pt where t is a constant or an individual variable that is
free in F with the equivalent formula ∀x (x 6= t ∨ ¬px). Replace all subformulas
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of the form pt where t is a constant or an individual variable that is free in F
with the equivalent formula ∀x (x 6= t ∨ px). Reorder disjuncts and conjuncts
in the scope of ∃p such that form (4) in the lemma statement is matched. The
formula has now all properties asserted about F ′ by the lemma to prove. uunionsq
The method described in the proof of Lemma 18 introduces equality atoms in
case there are occurrences of the quantified predicate where the argument is a
constant or an individual variable that is free in the original input formula.
The following Lemma renders the elimination result as given in [Beh22a].
It combines conversion from Eliminationshauptform to a form that allows di-
rect elimination with Lemma 3, in analogy to Lemma 16, with performing the
elimination and restructuring the result.
Lemma 19 (Elimination on the Eliminationshauptform). Let F be a for-
mula of the following form:
∃p (∧1≤i≤a ∀x (Ai[x] ∨ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤b ∀x (Bi[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c ∃x (Ci[x] ∧ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d ∃x (Di[x] ∧ ¬px)),
where p is a unary predicate, a, b, c, d are numbers ≥ 0 and the Ai[x], Bi[x],
Ci[x], Di[x] are first-order formulas in which p does not occur. Then F is equiv-
alent to the following formula MON= formula F ′:
∀x (∧1≤i≤aAi[x] ∨ ∧1≤i≤bBi[x]) ∧
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd
(
∧
1≤i≤c, 1≤j≤d ui 6= vj ∧∧
1≤i≤c(Ci[ui] ∧
∧
1≤j≤bBj [ui]) ∧∧
1≤i≤d(Di[vi] ∧
∧
1≤j≤aAj [vi])),
where u1, . . . , uc and v1, . . . , vd are distinct individual variables that are fresh,
that is, do not occur free in F , and if t is one of these variables, then Ai[t],
Bi[t], Ci[t], Di[t] denote Ai[x], Bi[x], Ci[x], Di[x], respectively, with all free
occurrences of x replaced by t.
Proof. The proof shows equivalence preserving transformations that lead from
F to F ′: First, F is converted to a form that matches the left side of Lemma 3.
That lemma is then applied to eliminate the existentially quantified p. Finally,
the formula that results from applying the lemma is postprocessed to yield F ′.
We define two shorthands A[x] =
∧
1≤i≤aAi[x] and B[x] =
∧
1≤i≤bBi[x].
Then F is equivalent to
∃p (∀x (A[x] ∨ px) ∧
∀x (B[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c (∃xCi[x] ∧ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d (∃xDi[x] ∧ ¬px)).
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By renaming the existential individual variables (EQ 26), moving the existential
quantifiers outward (EQ 23) and reordering them (EQ 25) we obtain:
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd∃p (∀x (A[x] ∨ px) ∧
∀x (B[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c (Ci[ui] ∧ pui) ∧∧
1≤i≤d (Di[vi] ∧ ¬pvi)).
Reordering conjuncts (EQ 7, EQ 6) and moving the quantifier upon p inward
(EQ 23 from right to left) yields:
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd (
∧
1≤i≤c Ci[ui] ∧
∧
1≤i≤dDi[vi] ∧
∃p (∀x (A[x] ∨ px) ∧
∀x (B[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c pui ∧∧
1≤i≤d ¬pvi)).
Next “pull out” the existentially quantified arguments from p (EQ 32):
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd (
∧
1≤i≤c Ci[ui] ∧
∧
1≤i≤dDi[vi] ∧
∃p (∀x (A[x] ∨ px) ∧
∀x (B[x] ∨ ¬px) ∧∧
1≤i≤c(∀xx 6= ui ∨ px) ∧∧
1≤i≤d(∀xx 6= vi ∨ ¬px))).
By merging universal quantifiers (EQ 21) and factoring the occurrences of px
and ¬px (EQ 20 from right to left) we get:
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd (
∧
1≤i≤c Ci[ui] ∧
∧
1≤i≤dDi[vi] ∧
∃p (∀x ((A[x] ∧∧1≤i≤c x 6= ui) ∨ px) ∧
∀x ((B[x] ∧∧1≤i≤d x 6= vi) ∨ ¬px))).
The subformula starting with ∃pmatches the left side of Lemma 3, which justifies
to rewrite it by a first-order formula that does no longer contain p, resulting in:
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd (
∧
1≤i≤c Ci[ui] ∧
∧
1≤i≤dDi[vi] ∧
∀x ((A[x] ∧∧1≤i≤c x 6= ui) ∨
(B[x] ∧∧1≤i≤d x 6= vi))).
By distributing disjunction over conjunction (EQ 20), distributing universal
quantification into conjunction (EQ 21 from right to left), “pulling in” argu-
ment terms (EQ 32 from right to left) and reordering conjuncts (EQ 6, EQ 7)
we obtain:
∀x (A[x] ∨B[x]) ∧
∃u1 . . . ∃uc∃v1 . . . ∃vd (
∧
1≤i≤c, 1≤j≤d ui 6= vj ∧∧
1≤i≤c(Ci[ui] ∧B[ui]) ∧∧
1≤i≤d(Di[vi] ∧A[vi])),
Predicate Elimination for Formulas without Equality 43
where, in analogy to the previously used notation, A[vi] and B[ui] denotes A[x]
and B[x] with all free occurrences of x replaced by vi or ui, respectively. Ex-
panding the shorthands A[x], B[x], A[vi], B[ui] then yields the formula F ′ from
the proposition statement. uunionsq
The method described in the proof of Lemma 19 introduces equality to handle
occurrences of the quantified predicate with an existentially quantified argument.
With the method described in Lemma 18 this is the second place where equality
is introduced in the overall method to eliminate predicates from formulas without
equality.
Behmann remarks [Beh22a, p. 201f] that the first division of the second vol-
ume of Schröder’s Algebra der Logik [Sch91, p. 400 2] concludes with recommend-
ing the problem solved with Lemma 19 as an open issue for future research. That
Schröder failed to solve the problem is attributed by Behmann to the insufficient
means of representation in the Algebra der Logik. In the proof of Lemma 19 after
the elimination step a further equivalence preserving transformation is applied,
where occurrences of A[x] and B[x] are instantiated with existentially quantified
variables. (To the proof of Theorem 1 given above, the analogous step could be
added.) This step facilitates to compare the result of Lemma 19 with an earlier
incomplete result by Schröder: Behmann [Beh22a, p. 203f] remarks that the fol-
lowing formula, related to the last displayed formula in the proof of Lemma 19,
is what Schröder calls „crude resultant” („Resultante aus dem Rohen“) [Sch91,
§41] (see also [Cra08] for a modern discussion of Schröder’s work on elimination):
∀x (A[x] ∨B[x]) ∧∧
1≤i≤c ∃x (Ci[x] ∧B[x]) ∧∧
1≤i≤d ∃x (Di[x] ∧A[x]).
(9)
This formula is obtained from the last displayed formula in the proof by dropping
the conjunct
∧
1≤i≤c, 1≤j≤d ui 6= vj , which leads to a weaker formula, followed
by the equivalence preserving inward propagation of existential quantifiers and
renaming of variables.
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, in [Beh22a, § 17] a gener-
alization of the techniques for formulas without equality to the simultaneous
elimination of a sequence of predicate quantifiers that are all existential or all
universal is outlined. It can be based on the following adaption of Lemma 3 to
the simultaneous elimination of n existentially quantified unary predicates from
a conjunction of 2n disjunctions:
∃p1 . . . ∃pn
∧
S⊆{1,...,n}
∀x (FS ∨
∨
i∈S
pix ∨
∨
i∈{1,...,n}−S
¬pix) ≡ ∀x
∨
S⊆{1,...,n}
FS , (10)
which holds if the predicates p1, . . . , pn do not occur in the formulas FS (subsets
S of {1, . . . , n} are used in FS as index subscript).
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Part III
Further Issues Addressed in
and Related to Behmann’s
Habilitation Thesis
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16 Introduction to Part III
In this part various issues that are addressed by Behmann in [Beh22a] aside
of the main results as well as specific connections with related techniques are
discussed. For a further discussion of Behmann’s elimination technique in relation
to modern second-order quantifier elimination methods following the direct or
Ackermann approach we refer to [Wer15].
17 Innex and Related Forms
Recall that the key technique of [Beh22a] is propagating quantifiers inward, also
for the price of expensive operations such as distribution of conjunction over
disjunction and vice versa.17 This inward propagation is applied to quantifiers
upon individual variables (Theorem 2, Prop. 17) as well as to quantifiers upon
predicates (Lemma 14, 15 18).
As remarked in [Beh22a, p. 193], just propagating Boolean quantifiers inward
in this manner already yields a decision method for quantified Boolean formu-
las that have no free predicates (that is, in other terminology, no free Boolean
variables), and hence also for propositional logic. This can be easily seen from
Corollary 4: If the method asserted in the corollary is applied to a quantified
Boolean formula, by the underlying lemmas, in particular Lemma 15, inward
propagation of ∃p yields a formula in which all occurrences of Boolean quantifi-
cation are in formulas of the form ∃p p and ∃p¬p.
Given the decidability of the Bernays-Schönfinkel class [BS28] (published
six years after [Beh22a]), monadic first-order logic can be decided essentially
just by propagating all individual quantifiers inward in the manner indicated
above with possibly expensive distribution operations. From the result formula,
a prenex formula in the Bernays-Schönfinkel class can then be obtained by first
propagating existential quantifiers outward and then the universal quantifiers.
This conversion has been sketched in [DG79, p. 36].
Techniques to propagate quantifiers upon individual variables inward are
known for a long time in automated theorem proving, under the names mini-
scope form and antiprenexing. They are typically considered as preprocessing
operations [Lov78; NW01], without taking potentially expensive steps like dis-
tribution of connectives into account. Exceptions are early works by [Wan60] –
according to [Ern71, footnote 2]18 – and [Bib74], where the possibility to take
advantage of distribution is mentioned in the conclusion. The commonly consid-
ered preprocessing methods might terminate inward propagation with a formula
17 On formulas that are not in negation normal form, distribution of conjunction over
disjunction alone or distribution of disjunction over conjunction alone is sufficient,
because either one can then express the other, consider for example: F ∨ (G∧H) ≡
¬(¬F ∧ (¬G ∨ ¬H)) ≡ ¬((¬F ∧ ¬G) ∨ (¬F ∧ ¬H)) ≡ (F ∨G) ∧ (F ∨H).
18 The definition of miniscope form in [Wan60], however, does not imply this and would
accept, for example, ∃x (px ∧ (qx ∨ rx)).
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where a potentially expensive step would allow further inward propagation. As
a consequence, these methods are in general not sufficient to decide MON.
Two variants to propagate individual quantifiers inward have been discussed
in the literature. To describe them, we assume quantifiers ∃ and ∀ as they ap-
pear in a formula in negation normal form, obtained by propagating negation
inward with (EQ 1–EQ 5) such that negated existential quantification is ex-
pressed by universal quantification. In the first variant, often called miniscope
form, existential as well as universal quantifiers are both propagated inward
[Wan60; Bib74; Lov78]. The main motivation is there to reduce the number of
arguments of Skolem functions by reducing the number of universal variables
that have a given existential quantifier in their scope. In the second variant,
termed antiprenexing in [Egl94],19 both types of quantifiers are handled differ-
ently: only universal quantifiers are propagated inward, existential quantifiers
are propagated outward (EQ 22, EQ 23). Aside of reducing the number of argu-
ments of Skolem functions, the motivation is there to reduce also the number of
Skolem functions: Applying EQ 22 from right to left would effect duplication of
existential quantifiers, each requiring a different Skolem function.
As observed in [Beh22a], the elimination technique for monadic formulas of
Lemma 16 and 19 involves propagating predicate quantifiers and universal in-
dividual quantifiers inward, while propagating existential individual quantifiers
outward. A systematic investigation of quantifier propagation schemes with re-
spect to elimination of predicate quantifiers seems still an open issue.
18 Quine’s Expansion
In [Qui45] Quine presents in a decision method for MON that is, as remarked
in [Chu56, pp. 253, 293], a variant of Behmann’s method. Like the latter, it is
based on producing the normal form of Prop. 17 by propagating quantifiers upon
instance variables inward. However, instead of performing distribution of con-
junction over disjunction to enable inward propagation of quantifiers, rewriting
with the following equivalence Prop. 20.ii is applied. This equivalence is shown
first in a dual version as Prop. 20.i that corresponds to the setting of Prop. 17.
Proposition 20 (Quine’s Expansion). Let F [G] is a first-order formula with
occurrences of a subformula G in which x does not occur free and whose free
variables are not in scope of a quantifier within F [G]. Formulas F [>] and F [⊥]
denote F [G] with all the occurrences of G replaced by > or ⊥, respectively. Then
(i) ∃xF [G] ≡ (G ∨ ∃xF [⊥]) ∧ (¬G ∨ ∃xF [>]).
(ii) ∀xF [G] ≡ (G ∧ ∀xF [>]) ∨ (¬G ∧ ∀xF [⊥]).
Obviously, applying the expansions according to Prop. 20 could be immediately
followed by truth-value simplification (EQ 9–EQ 16), which is actually assumed
in the original presentation by Quine. The version of Prop. 20.ii given in [Qui45],
is actually a generalization of the well-known propositional Shannon expansion.
19 Antiprenex form has been used in [Bib74] for the first variant.
Other Methods for Deciding Relational Monadic Formulas 49
The method of [Qui45] proceeds by exhaustively rewriting innermost subformu-
las that match the precondition of the expansion.
19 Other Methods for Deciding Relational Monadic
Formulas
Alternative decision methods for MON formulas include resolution: Equipped
with an appropriate ordering and condensation, it decides MON formulas, al-
though the associated Herbrand universe might be infinite due to Skolemization
[Fer+01]. A superposition-based decision method forMON= is given in [BGW93].
Deciding satisfiability is for MON and for MON= NEXPTIME-complete, as
presented in [BGG97, Sect. 6.2] along with more fine-grained results. Upper
bounds makes use of the fact that a satisfiable MON= (MON, resp.) formula has
a model whose cardinality is a most q2m (2m, resp.), where q is the quantifier
rank and m is the number of predicates. The underlying method of [Lew80] for
decidingMON verifies a given interpretation by repeatedly constructing an innex
form with respect to a single innermost quantifier occurrence and then replac-
ing the corresponding obtained quantified subformulas with > or ⊥ according
to the interpretation. The processing of an existential (universal, resp.) inner-
most quantifier proceeds by conversion of its argument formula to disjunctive
(conjunctive, resp.) normal form, followed by distributing the quantifier over the
conjunctive clauses (clauses, resp.) and then, in each conjunctive clause (clause,
resp.), narrowing the quantifier scope to those literals that contain the quantified
variable. Determination of the upper bound makes use of the fact that all atoms
occurring in the intermediate formulas are already present in the input formula.
20 Normal Form with Respect to a Predicate
Behmann notes that for practical application it is not necessary to construct
the Eliminationshauptform ((2) on p. 22), via the fully developed disjunctive
normal form (as done in the methods described in the proofs of Theorem 2 and
Lemma 14 and their correspondents for the case without equality), but that
it suffices if just the predicate to eliminate is separated from other predicates
with respect to the associated variables [Beh22a, p. 201]. Although Behmann
remarks that the corresponding forms, developed just with respect to a given
predicate, observe a number of strange laws and are of not much less theoretical
and practical importance than normal forms, he does not pursue this issue in
[Beh22a],20 but just gives an example:
∃p ∃x ((qx ∨ rx) ∧ px) (11)
immediately matches the Eliminationshauptform with a = b = d = 0, c = 1 and
C1[x] = qx ∨ rx such there is no point in distributing the conjunction with px
over qx ∨ rx.
20 So far, there has been no publication or manuscript by Behmann identified where
he would present the indicated material.
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There seem at least superficial relationships with predicate elimination tech-
niques that involve concepts like standardized and in good scope which are pa-
rameterized with a predicate to eliminate [Con06] or the conversion to formulas
where conjuncts are linkless outside a set of predicates, a property that permits
to distribute existential quantification upon predicates not in the set (“outside”
the set) over conjunction [Wer09].
21 An Application of Elimination: Modeling Syllogistic
Reasoning
As noted in [Cra08], the view of syllogisms as instances of elimination prob-
lems where the conclusion is the result of eliminating the middle term from
the conjunction of the premises is due to Boole [Boo54]. Also Schröder pursues
this representation of syllogisms [Sch91, § 42–44]. If the three terms involved
in syllogisms are expressed as unary predicates, the premises and conclusions
correspond to sentences of first-order logic in the relational monadic fragment.
Behmann [Beh22a, § 17] exemplarily demonstrates his second-order quantifier
elimination method with modeling some syllogisms and related statements by
Schröder. Here, these examples are shown with some intermediate steps that
indicate the involved rewritings.21
Syllogism Ferio.
∃q (∀x (¬qx ∨ ¬px) ∧ ∃x (rx ∧ qx))
≡ ∃u (ru ∧ ∃q (∀x (¬qx ∨ ¬px) ∧ ∀x (x 6= u ∨ qx)))
≡ ∃u (ru ∧ ¬pu).
(12)
Syllogism Darapti. Here the implicitly understood non-emptiness of q is added
as a third auxiliary premise ∃x qx.
∃q (∀x (¬qx ∨ px) ∧ ∀x (¬qx ∨ rx) ∧ ∃x qx)
≡ ∃u∃q (∀x (¬qx ∨ px) ∧ ∀x (¬qx ∨ rx) ∧ ∀x (x 6= u ∨ qx))
≡ ∃u pu ∧ ru.
(13)
Behmann shows the following example from [Sch91, p. 361], with the premises
“Some p are not q. Some q are not r.” Since the first conjuncts of both premises
are particular and negative no conclusions would be expected in the sense of
traditional syllogistic reasoning. Elimination, however, allows to conclude that
there exist two distinct individuals, one in p and the other not in r:
∃q (∃x (px ∧ ¬qx) ∧ ∃x (qx ∧ ¬rx))
≡ ∃u∃v (pu ∧ ¬rv ∧ ∃q (∀x (x 6= u ∨ ¬qx) ∧ ∀(x qx ∨ x 6= v)))
≡ ∃u∃v (pu ∧ ¬rv ∧ u 6= v).
(14)
21 In addition, in [Beh22a] a “singular” reading of syllogisms is discussed, where the
middle term is understood as individual instead of a predicate and elimination is
not involved in modeling.
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The following example given by Behmann is a “composed syllogism” from Schrö-
der [Sch91, p. 283], which involves elimination of two predicates q1 and q2.
∃q1∃q2 (∀x (¬q1x ∨ px) ∧ ∀x (¬q2x ∨ rx) ∧ ∃x (q1x ∧ q2x))
≡ ∃q1 (∀x (¬q1x ∨ px) ∧ ∃q2 (∀x (¬q2x ∨ rx) ∧ ∃x (q1x ∧ q2x)))
≡ ∃q1 (∀x (¬q1x ∨ px) ∧ ∃u (q1u ∧
∃q2 (∀x (¬q2x ∨ rx) ∧ ∀x (x 6= u ∨ q2x))))
≡ ∃q1 (∀x (¬q1x ∨ px) ∧ ∃u (q1u ∧ ru))
≡ ∃u (ru ∧ ∃q1 (∀x (¬q1x ∨ px) ∧ ∀x (x 6= u ∨ q1x)))
≡ ∃u (ru ∧ pu).
(15)
22 Polyadic Formulas Allowing Monadic Elimination
Techniques and Handling of Auxiliary Definitions
The elimination properties of monadic logic also apply in certain cases where
involved predicates have more than one argument, for example, if arguments
except of one are instantiated with a constant or with a variable that is free
in the scope of the respective predicate quantifiers. Behmann gives in [Beh22a,
§ 19] several examples for applying his elimination method to such formulas. His
first example is from [Sch95, p. 491]:
∃p (∀z (fxz ∨ pzy ∨ hzy) ∧ ∀z (gxz ∨ ¬pzy ∨ hzy))
≡ ∃p′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z ∨ h′z) ∧ ∀z (g′z ∨ ¬p′z ∨ h′z))
≡ ∀z (f ′z ∨ g′z ∨ h′z)
≡ ∀z (fxz ∨ gxz ∨ hzy),
(16)
where the following shorthands are used to hide the free variables from view:
f ′z = fxz, g′z = gxz, h′z = hzy, p′z = pzy. The next example is from [Sch95,
p. 308]:
∀p (∃u (pxu ∧ fuy) ∨ ∀v (¬pxv ∨ gvy))
≡ ¬∃p′ (∀u (¬p′u ∨ ¬f ′u) ∧ ∃v (p′v ∧ ¬g′v))
≡ ¬∃v (¬g′v ∧ ∃p′ (∀u (¬p′u ∨ ¬f ′u) ∧ ∀u (u 6= v ∨ p′u)))
≡ ¬∃v (¬g′v ∧ ¬f ′v)
≡ ∀v (gvy ∨ fvy),
(17)
where the following shorthands are used (for arbitrary variables z): f ′z = fzy,
g′z = gzy, p′z = pxz. The following formula from [Sch95, p. 510] is shown as
an example where elimination with the method of [Beh22a] fails, since a proper
relation between u and v is involved.
∀p (pxy ∨ ∃v (∀u (¬pxu ∨ fuv) ∧ gvy)).
The final example given in [Beh22a, § 19] is from [Sch95, p. 545] and involves
two instances of the binary predicate p to eliminate where the bound variable
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occurs in different argument positions:
∃p (∀z (fxz ∨ pzy) ∧ ∀z (¬pxz ∨ gzy))
≡ ∃p′∃q′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ ∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ ((p′x ∧ q′y) ∨ (¬p′x ∧ ¬q′y))) ∗
≡ ∃p′∃q′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ ∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ p′x ∧ q′y) ∨
∃p′∃q′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ ∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ ¬p′x ∧ ¬q′y)
≡ (∃p′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ p′x) ∧ ∃q′ (∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ q′y)) ∨
(∃p′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ ¬p′x) ∧ ∃q′ (∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ ¬q′y))
≡ ∃q′ (∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ q′y) ∨ ∗∗
∃p′ (∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ ¬p′x)
≡ ∃q′(∀z (¬q′z ∨ g′z) ∧ ∀z (z 6= y ∨ q′z)) ∨
∃p′(∀z (f ′z ∨ p′z) ∧ ∀z (z 6= x ∨ ¬p′z))
≡ ∀z (z 6= y ∨ g′z) ∨ ∀z (f ′z ∨ z 6= x)
≡ g′y ∨ f ′x
≡ gyy ∨ fxx,
(18)
where the following shorthands are involved: f ′z = fxz, g′z = gzy, p′z = pzy,
q′z = pxz. The two instances of p are represented by different shorthands p′ and
q′ that are related by the equivalence p′x↔ q′y, which is added (expressed with
disjunction and conjunction) in step (*). Step (**) is obtained by deleting two
subformulas for which elimination yields >.
So far, the contraction and expansion with the shorthand predicates has
been handled on the meta level. Second-order quantification would allow to
understand the introduction and elimination of such definitions as equivalence
preserving transformations, with Ackermann’s Lemma [Ack35a], a foundation of
modern elimination methods such as [DŁS97; CGV06; Sch12; KS13], as a special
case. The basis for this understanding of introducing and expanding of auxiliary
definitions is the following property, which easily follows from Lemma 3:
Proposition 21 (Eliminability of Expandable Definitions). Let p be a
unary predicate and let F be a first-order formula in which p does not occur. It
then holds that
∃p ∀x (px↔ F ) ≡ >.
With Prop. 21, the following proposition can be derived, which explicates the
handling of auxiliary definitions by means of equivalence preserving formula
transformations:
Proposition 22 (Introduction and Elimination of Definitions). Let p be
a unary predicate, let x be an variable and let G[x] be a first-order formula in
which p does not occur. For a constant or variable t, let G[t] denote G[x] with
all free occurrences of x replaced by t. Let F [G[t1], . . . , G[tn]] be a first-order
formula in which p does not occur and which has n occurrences of subformulas,
instantiated with G[t1], . . . , G[tn], respectively, neither of them in a context where
a variable that occurs free in G[x] is bound. Let F [pt1, . . . , ptn] denote the same
formula with the indicated occurrences G[ti] replaced by pti. Then
F [G[t1], . . . , G[tn]] ≡ ∃p (∀x (px↔ G[x]) ∧ F [pt1, . . . , ptn]).
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Prop. 22 can be applied from left to right to introduce auxiliary predicates p and
from right to left to expand them, by replacing all occurrences of p with their
definientia and then dropping the definition.
In [Beh22a, § 19], the shorthand predicates are not explicitly handled in this
way, although the notation, where they are specified with the equivalence symbol
↔, might suggest that this could be the underlying intuition. In later works
he explicitly applies a variant of Prop. 22 to introduce definitions of nullary
predicates, presented in the manuscript [Manuscript M12] as a second-order
adaption of EQ 32 and EQ 33 (see also (35) in Sect. 27).
In the case where in F [pt1, . . . , ptn] all occurrences of atoms with predicate p
are, say, positive, it holds that
∃p (∀x (px↔ G[x]) ∧ F [pt1, . . . , ptn])
≡ ∃p (∀x (px→ G[x]) ∧ F [pt1, . . . , ptn, ]) (19)
which leads to Ackermann’s Lemma [Ack35a], shown here for unary predicates p:
Proposition 23 (Ackermann’s Lemma). Assume the setting of Prop. 22 and
that the indicated subformula occurrences in F [G[t1], . . . , G[tn]] (or, equivalently,
in F [pt1, . . . , ptn]) are either all positive or are all negative.
(i) If the indicated subformula occurrences are positive, then
∃p (∀x (px→ G[x]) ∧ F [pt1, . . . , ptn]) ≡ F [G[t1], . . . , G[tn]].
(ii) If the indicated subformula occurrences are negative, then
∃p (∀x (px← G[x]) ∧ F [pt1, . . . , ptn]) ≡ F [G[t1], . . . , G[tn]].
The Basic Elimination Lemma (Lemma 3) is obviously an instance of Acker-
mann’s Lemma. Vice versa, Ackermann’s Lemma can be proven such that the
only elimination step is performed according to the Basic Elimination Lemma,
or according to Prop. 21.
23 Ackermann’s Quantifier Switching
In [Ack35b], a short sequel to [Ack35a], Ackermann shows a precondition which
allows to move existential predicate quantification to the right of universal indi-
vidual quantification, where the arity of the quantified predicate is reduced:
Lemma 24 (Ackermann’s Quantifier Switching). Let p be a predicate with
arity n+1, where n ≥ 0. Let F = F [pxt11 . . . t1n . . . pxtm1 . . . tmn], where m ≥ 1,
be a formula of second-order logic in which p has the exactly m indicated occur-
rences. Assume further that p and x occur only free in F . Let q be a predicate
with arity n that does not occur in F and let F [qt11 . . . t1n, . . . , qtm1 . . . tmn] de-
note F with each occurrence pxtij . . . tij of p replaced by qtij . . . tij, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
1 ≤ j ≤ m. Under the assumption of the axiom of choice it then holds that
∃p∀xF [pxt11 . . . t1n, . . . , pxtm1 . . . tmn]
≡ ∀x∃q F [qt11 . . . t1n, . . . , qtm1 . . . tmn].
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Van Benthem [Ben83, p. 211] mentions this equivalence with application from
right to left to achieve prenex form with respect to second-order quantifiers.
Church discusses it in [Chu56, § 56] in the context of well-ordering of the in-
dividuals. On its basis decidability of the description logic ALC and related
modal logics can be shown by constructions of equi-satisfiable relational monadic
second-order formulas [Wer15]. Ackermann applies this equivalence in [Ack35b]
to avoid Skolemization and to convert formulas such that monadic techniques or
Ackermann’s Lemma become applicable. He shows five examples from [Sch05].
The first of these rewrites the input formula such that elimination methods for
MON becomes applicable. The formula to which these are applied contains bi-
nary predicates, but as for Behmann’s examples in Sect. 22, in all occurrences
of binary predicates one of the arguments is free in the scope of the predicate
quantifier to eliminate. The example proceeds in the following steps:
∃f (∀x∃y (axy ∧ fxy) ∧ ∀x∃z (bxz ∧ ¬fxz))
≡ ∃f∀x (∃y (axy ∧ fxy) ∧ ∃z (bxz ∧ ¬fxz)) EQ 21
≡ ∀x∃g (∃y (axy ∧ gy) ∧ ∃z (bxz ∧ ¬gz)) Lemma 24
≡ ∀x∃y∃z (axy ∧ bxz ∧ y 6= z). Lemma 19
(20)
Ackermann notes in [Ack35b] that he has discussed this example already in
[Ack35a] to illustrate another method: Applying the variant of resolution-based
elimination from [Ack35a] (of which the modern SCAN [GO92] is a refinement
– see [NOS99]), which involves conversion to a universal formula by means of
Skolem functions and un-Skolemization after elimination.
Indeed, Ackermann motivates his quantifier switching technique by the fact
that the introduction of Skolem functions (Belegungsfunktionen) leads to such
intricate tasks that one would like to avoid these functions for those special cases
where the results can also be obtained in other ways. In this sense, he also writes
to Behmann in October 1934 that he does no longer consider Skolem functions
as an advantage.22
22 Im übrigen halte ich neuerdings die Einführung der Belegungsfunktionen für keinen
Vorteil mehr; die mit Hilfe der Belegungsfunktionen auszudrückenden Probleme, so
einfach sie sich auch symbolisch ausdrücken lassen, werden so schwierig, dass ich
da kein Weiterkommen sehe. Andererseits lassen sich in speziellen Fällen, wie bei
meinem Beispiel (26), erzielten Resultate ebensogut durch Anwendung der Formel
∀x∃y gxy ≡ ∃f (∀x∃y fxy ∧ ∀x∀y (¬fxy ∨ gxy))
und entsprechender Formeln für mehr Variable gewinnen. Letter from Wilhelm Ack-
ermann to Heinrich Behmann, 29 October 1934 [Letter L7]. Formulas are rendered
in modern notation. The mentioned Beispiel (26) is the example reproduced above
as (20). The shown equivalence follows from Lemma 24 and 19, but it does not
immediately match with the referenced example.
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24 Introduction to Part IV
In this part Behmann’s follow-up works to [Beh22a], his related correspondence
with Ackermann and his presentation of the resolution-based elimination method
by Ackermann [Ack35a] are summarized. The topic is the decision problem for
relations (Entscheidungsproblem für Beziehungen), that is, the decision problem
for formulas in which predicates of arity two or more occur. The approach is, as
for the monadic case in [Beh22a], to apply second-order quantifier elimination
techniques.
In [Beh22a, p. 226f], Behmann conjectures that for the extension of the deci-
sion problem to arbitrary relations and higher concepts it is questionable whether
the elimination problem can serve further as a suitable basis, justified on the fol-
lowing considerations: “If two classes α and β satisfy a condition that can be
specified purely logical and involves some variable classes – for example, that
there is a third class which contains α as subclass and is itself contained in β
as subclass –, then we know indeed that we can express such a condition cer-
tainly also without mentioning such variable classes. The matter is, however, as
it seems, much more intricate if a variable relation23 is allowed, as, for example,
at the statement that two classes α and β have the same cardinality, that is, that
by a certain relation the elements of one class can be mapped in a one-to-one
correspondence to that of the other one. Here one does not see a possibility to
express the condition that two classes have the same cardinality in general and
without reference to such a variable relation. Presumable, again a completely
new idea is required here.”24
Behmann gave in September 1926 at the Jahresversammlung der Deutschen
Mathematiker-Vereinigung a talk on the decision problem and the logic of rela-
tions (Entscheidungsproblem und Logik der Beziehungen). Its abstract, published
23 As pointed out later by Ackermann [Ack35a, p. 393], it is, however, not essential
that the predicate to eliminate has an arity larger than one – the same difficulties
arise if the predicate to eliminate is unary but other predicates with two or more
arguments do occur.
24 Was die Erweiterung des Entscheidungsproblems auf beliebige Beziehungen und hö-
here Begriffe angeht, so erscheint es immerhin fraglich, ob auch hier das Elimina-
tionsproblem weiterhin als geeignete Grundlage dienen können wird, und zwar auf
Grund der folgenden Überlegung: Genügen etwa zwei Klassen α und β einer rein
logisch angebbaren Bedingung, innerhalb deren irgendwelche veränderliche Klassen
vorkommen – sagen wir z. B. derjenigen, daß es eine dritte Klasse gibt, die α als
Teilklasse enthält und ihrerseits als Teilklasse in β enthalten ist –, so wissen wir aller-
dings, daß wir eine solche Bedingung gewiß auch ohne Erwähnung derartiger verän-
derlicher Klassen auszudrücken vermögen. Die Sache liegt indessen, wie es scheint,
wesentlich verwickelter, sobald eine veränderliche Beziehung in Frage kommt, wie
z. B. bei der Aussage, daß die Klassen α und β gleichzahlig sind, d. h. daß durch
eine gewisse Beziehung die Elemente der einen denen der anderen umkehrbar ein-
deutig zugeordnet werden. Hier sieht man durchaus keine Möglichkeit, die Bedingung
der Gleichzahligkeit zweier Klassen allgemein ohne einen Hinweis auf eine derartige
veränderliche Beziehung auszudrücken. Vermutlich wird es hier also wiederum eines
ganz neuen Gedankens bedürfen. [Beh22a, p. 226f].
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as [Beh27a], aroused the curiosity of Ackermann, who wrote in August 1928 to
Behmann, initiating a correspondence that lasted to November 1928 and com-
prises five letters. Related topics were discussed later in two letters, the first sent
by Behmann upon receiving the offprint of [Ack35a], the second by Ackermann
in reply. Their correspondence, as far as archived in [BehNL], then only contin-
ues in January 1953, with five more letters until December 1955, where different
topics are discussed (a complete register of their correspondence in [BehNL] is
provided in Sect. 31).
Further sources of this presentation include a manuscript [Manuscript M11]
for the abstract [Beh27a] and an unpublished manuscript from December 1934
[Manuscript M12] Ein wichtiger Fortschritt im Entscheidungsproblem der Ma-
thematischen Logik (An Important Progress in the Decision Problem of Mathe-
matical Logic with subtitle (Ackermann Math. Annalen 110 S.390), referring to
[Ack35a].
The addressed topics include the use of Skolemization as well as the early form
of resolution by Ackermann [Ack35a], applied to express results of second-order
quantifier elimination on universal formulas by a possibly infinite set of formu-
las. Resolution-based second-order quantifier elimination has been considered
in modern times with the SCAN algorithm [GO92]. The use of logics extended
with a fixpoint operator to express possibly infinite elimination results has been
investigated in [NS98] and is today one of the core techniques for second-order
quantifier elimination (or “forgetting”) in description logics [KS13]. So far, how-
ever, the fixpoint approach is based not on Ackermann’s resolution method, but
on Ackermann’s Lemma, another result from [Ack35a] (see Prop. 23 on p. 53).
A further work that explicitly relates to Ackermann’s resolution-based method
is [Cra60]. In his manuscript from 1934 and his letter to Ackermann, Behmann
suggests a graph representation for the possibly infinite set of resolvents.
We use the same modern syntax for the presentation as in the other parts,
but keep the Greek letters ϕ, χ, ψ, and α, β, γ from the original documents.
Ackermann originally writes predicates in upper case, which are rendered here
in lower case. Detailed information about the consulted manuscripts and letters,
as well as a summary of other topics discussed in the correspondence is provided
in Sect. 30 and Sect. 31.
25 First Considerations on Elimination for Universal
Formulas
In the abstract [Beh27a] of his talk Entscheidungsproblem und Logik der Bezie-
hungen (Decision Problem and Logic of Relations) given on 23 September 1926
at the Jahresversammlung der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung in Düssel-
dorf, Behmann considers elimination of an existential second-order quantifier
upon a predicate ϕ with arity two or larger applied to a universal first-order
formula, that is, elimination in
∃ϕ∀x1 . . . ∀xn F, (21)
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where ϕ is a predicate with arity ≥ 2 and F is a first-order formula. Behmann
states in [Beh27a], that this problem allows reduction to the following sequence
of problems:
∃ϕ∀xF [ϕx, x],
∃ϕ∃χ∀x∀y F [ϕx, χy, x, y],
∃ϕ∃χ∃ψ∀x∀y∀z F [ϕx, χy, ψz, x, y, z],
. . . 25
(22)
where the quantified predicates are unary and the formulas F [. . .] are first-order
and such that all occurrences of the quantified predicates have the indicated
variable as argument. In addition, the individual variables themselves are listed
in the square brackets, indicating that they might also have further occurrences
in the formula.26 Behmann further claims in [Beh27a] that formulas of that form
would allow elimination of the predicate quantifiers.
The draft [Manuscript M11] of [Beh27a] gives some further details: The so-
lution of the first component of the sequence is
∀x∃pF [p, x], (23)
or
∀x (F [⊥, x] ∨ F [>, x]), (24)
respectively, where p is a fresh nullary predicate and F [G] denotes F [ϕx] with
all occurrences of ϕx replaced by G. The equivalence of the first component
to (23) can indeed be obtained by Ackermann’s arity reduction, Lemma 24,
which seems implicitly applied here by Behmann. The following formula is then
shown in [Manuscript M11] as intended solution of the second component:
∀x∃p∀y∃q F [p, q, x, y] ∧ ∀y∃q∀x∃pF [p, q, x, y]. (25)
For the second component, Behmann’s claim is false. On 16 August 1928 Acker-
mann writes to him [Letter L1], requesting clarification by giving the following
example:
∃ϕ∀x∀y ((ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy ∨ αxy) ∧
(ϕx ∨ βx) ∧
(¬ϕx ∨ γx)),
(26)
which can be written as instance of the second component of (22):
∃ϕ∃χ∀x∀y ((ϕx ∨ ¬χy ∨ αxy) ∧
(ϕx ∨ βx) ∧
(χy ∨ γy) ∧
(ϕx ∨ χy ∨ x 6= y) ∧
(¬ϕx ∨ ¬χy ∨ x 6= y)).
(27)
25 In a letter to Alonzo Church, dated 15 April 1937, Behmann refers in a broader
context to this sequence of formulas. See Sect. 32.4.
26 [Beh27a] contains some obvious printing errors that have been quietly corrected here
– see discussion of manuscript [Manuscript M11] in Sect. 30.
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Ackermann continues that he believes to have thought through for some simple
expressions of that kind that they can be replaced by no logically equivalent
expression that is constructed only from individual quantifiers, α, β, γ and iden-
tity.
Behmann replies on 21 August 1928 [Letter L2] from the holiday island Föhr
at the German North Sea coast that some years ago he had achieved a certain
point in his investigations of the decision problem for relations but had to leave
it unattended since then. He announces to send his results to Ackermann as soon
as he returns to Halle. Behmann continues that he became aware only between
the talk and the correction that his claim to have settled the case of elimination
for universal individual quantifiers was false. He had informed Bieberbach27 but
decided to keep the statement for historic accuracy in essence in the abstract,
with the intention of addressing the issue later in a publication. Behmann notes
that after many void attempts to find a satisfying proof, he came to a specific
example where his conjectured solution was in fact weaker, that is, implied but
not equivalent to the given second-order formula. He remarks that Ackermann’s
example would be of great interest, since it might show that the schema of
progressive concept elimination would not be sufficient and a fundamentally
different way has to be searched. Ackermann gave later in [Ack35a, Section 3] a
proof that the considered elimination problems on formulas with only universal
individual quantifiers can not be solved in general.
On 1 September 1928 [Letter L3] Ackermann thanks Behmann for his infor-
mative reply. He notes that it took a load from his mind since he had already
struggled a lot with the elimination problem in the case where all individual
quantifiers are universal.28 He continues that the probability that an elimination
is not always possible had emerged for him at first from the following example:
∃f∀x∀y (axy ∨ ((fx ∨ fy) ∧ (¬fx ∨ ¬fy))). (28)
The following formulas are then obtained as consequences:
∀x axx,
∀x∀y∀z (axy ∨ ayz ∨ axz),
∀x∀y∀z∀u∀v (axy ∨ ayz ∨ azu ∨ auv ∨ axv),
. . .
(29)
but one searches in vain for an expression that contains all of these as conse-
quences. Ackermann writes that he does not yet have an exact proof that the
elimination can not be performed, but hopes to find one within some weeks, even
if he expects it to be quite complicated.
The example (28) is also used later by Ackermann, as Example (20) on p. 410
in [Ack35a], to illustrate his resolution-based elimination method and discussed
in his letter to Behmann from October 1934 [Letter L7].
27 Ludwig Bieberbach (1886–1982) was the editor of the respective number of the Jah-
resbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung.
28 Mir ist dadurch ein Stein vom Herzen gefallen, da ich mich mit dem Eliminationspro-
blem in dem Falle, daß alle Dingoperatoren allgemein sind, schon viel herumgequält
hatte. [Letter L3].
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26 Involvement of Skolemization and Un-Skolemization
In the abstract [Beh27a] of the Düsseldorf talk Behmann goes beyond the case
of universal individual quantifiers to cases where universal and existential quan-
tifiers alternate, as for example in formulas of the form
∃ϕ∀x∃y F [ϕx, ϕy, x, y]. (30)
The problem would be solved, if the order of ∀x and ∃y could be switched, which
would then allow to move ∃y further left, in front of the predicate quantifier ∃ϕ.
Behmann remarks that this can be achieved indeed by what today is called
Skolemization, introduced in [Beh27a] as a new view on a trick (Kunstgriff )
described by Schröder in [Sch95, p. 512ff].29 Behmann writes that instead of
predicate quantifiers, now quantifiers upon the Skolem functions (Belegungsope-
ratoren) do appear, which can not be undone in general – at least with known
means (what today is called un-Skolemization). He mentions that a peculiar
extension of his representation schema succeeds in undoing Skolemization, es-
sentially by allowing aside of the so far solely known and applied succession
of quantifiers ∀ and ∃ more entangled linkages of them, associated with specific
meanings.30 This seems to anticipate that un-Skolemization after predicate elim-
ination can in some cases only obtained with Henkin quantifiers [GO92]. In the
manuscript [Manuscript M11], he adds that these linkages concern in particular
cycles, which, for example, do no longer comply with the transitivity of sooner
of later. He concludes the talk abstract with the remark that control of the deci-
sion problem for the considered class of formulas then appears as equivalent to
control of this extended representation schema.
After reading the elaborate transcript of the Düsseldorf talk sent to him by
Behmann,31 Ackermann expresses in his letter dated 1 November 1928 [Letter
L5] doubts about Behmann’s use of Skolemization and un-Skolemization, conjec-
turing that it amounts to a re-expression of the decision problem with functions,
which can be used to encode predicates: That fx holds can be expressed as
ϕx = 0, where ϕ is a function with range {0, 1} associated with f .32
29 Second-order Skolemization allows to convert an existential individual quantifier in
the scope of universal quantifiers to an existential function quantifier that is left of
the universal quantifiers. The underlying equivalence is
∀x1 . . . xn∃yF [y] ≡ ∃f∀x1 . . . xnF [fx1 . . . xn],
where f is a n-place function symbol that does not occur in F [y] and F [fx1 . . . xn]
is obtained from F [y] by replacing all free occurrences of y with fx1 . . . xn.
30 Such generalized forms of quantification play a key role in works of Jakko Hintikka,
e.g., [Hin96].
31 So far, that transcript could not be located – see remarks on [Letter L4] in Sect. 31
and on [Manuscript M10] in Sect. 30. In 1934 Behmann also gave a detailed account
of his earlier work on the decision problem for relations in letter [Letter L6] and
manuscript [Manuscript M12], which is discussed below in Sect. 27.
32 Glauben Sie aber nicht, daß das Problem, das sich als Schlußproblem Ihrer Untersu-
chung darstellt, ebenso schwierig ist wie das allgemeine Entscheidungsproblem? Die
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In that letter, Ackermann also reports that he got notice that Löwenheim
in Berlin has exact proofs that elimination can not be performed on certain
logic expressions, and that it would be desirable that Löwenheim would publish
these because it would demonstrate that the existing way does not lead further
on.33 After remarking that the investigation of a more modest question seems
to him most promising, Ackermann sketches an idea for a method to verify valid
universal formulas (see discussion of [Letter L5] in Sect. 31).
27 Behmann’s Representation of Ackermann’s
Resolution-Based Method
Today, the two prevailing approaches to second-order quantifier elimination are
the so-called direct methods, based on Ackermann’s Lemma [Sza93; DŁS97],
and the resolution-based approach of the SCAN algorithm [GO92]. Both can
be traced back to [Ack35a], where the lemma underlying the direct approach is
defined and a variant of the – seemingly rediscovered [NOS99] – resolution-based
approach is elaborated. Further works related to Ackermann’s resolution-based
method have been already mentioned in Sect. 24.
Aside of the correspondence with Behmann, a published selection from the
correspondence of Wilhelm Ackermann edited by his son Hans-Richard Acker-
mann [Ack83] gives further hints on the “pre-history” of Ackermann’s important
paper [Ack35a]: He sent the manuscript in 1933 to Bernays (Letter from Bernays
to Ackermann, 24 December 1933), who then recommended it to Hilbert for pub-
lication in Mathematische Annalen. Bernays sent six large pages with remarks
about the manuscript, regarding content as well as presentation, to Ackermann,
which he considered for the version submitted to Blumenthal34 (Letter from Ack-
ermann to Bernays, 14 January 1934). Accordingly, the submission date given
in the publication is 13 January 1934.
After receiving the offprint of Ackermann’s paper, Behmann writes on 22 Oc-
tober 1934 to Ackermann [Letter L6], congratulating him to his success, noting
that the work shows to him that the proper access was quite hidden. Behmann
mentions that he perceived the existing research line, which aimed at a general-
ization of the method of substitution (Verallgemeinerung des Einsetzungsverfah-
rens) as unsatisfying. He admires Ackermann’s methodical-technical generality
by posing only little requirements on normalization (Normierung) of the given
kompliziertesten Verkettungen von Operatoren, die dabei auftreten, kommen doch
schließlich darauf hinaus, daß man statt der Prädikate und Relation Funktionen im
Sinne der Mathematik enführt, d.h. eindeutige Zuordnungen von Individuen zu In-
dividuen. Man kann dann aber gleich jedes Entscheidungsproblem in dieser Form
geben, indem man ein Prädikat F (x) ersetzt durch eine derartige Funktion ϕ(x), wo
ϕ(x) entweder den Wert 0 oder 1 hat, und ϕ(x) = 0 mit dem Bestehen von F (x)
äquivalent ist. [Letter L5].
33 Löwenheim’s remarks in [Löw07, p. 336] might refer to these results.
34 Otto Blumenthal (1876–1944) was the editor of the Mathematische Annalen respon-
sible for Ackermann’s paper.
Behmann’s Representation of Ackermann’s Resolution-Based Method 63
problem, however, as Behmann remarks, this entails the disadvantage that it
then seems not possible to clearly overview in general the totality of the resol-
vents that are free from the predicate to eliminate (die Gesamtheit der Zählaus-
drücke II allgemein zu übersehen) and to symbolize the resultant in a suitable
transparent way. Behmann proceeds with a technical presentation which relates
Ackermann’s results to his own earlier work and suggests alternative more nor-
malized representations of the elimination resultants obtained by Ackermann’s
resolution-based method.
In his reply of 29 October 1934 [Letter L7], Ackermann expresses his pleasure
about Behmann’s acknowledgment, in particular because Behmann’s work from
1922 [Beh22a] was, at its time, the impetus for his investigation of the problem.35
He then discusses the issue of getting a complete overview on the resultants
(vollkommene Übersicht über die Resultanten), raised by Behmann.
Following the exchange with Ackermann, Behmann prepared a manuscript
[Manuscript M12], titled Ein wichtiger Fortschritt im Entscheidungsproblem der
Mathematischen Logik (An Important Progress in the Decision Problem of Math-
ematical Logic, with subtitle (Ackermann Math. Annalen 110 S.390), dated
14 December 1934, where the technical material in part overlaps with the let-
ter [Letter L6]. Here he gives a more detailed presentation of his suggestions to
represent the resultants obtained by Ackermann’s method.
Behmann’s manuscript [Manuscript M12] begins with a comprehensive intro-
ductory part. After specifying notation and introducing the decision problem,
Behmann sketches two methods to decide propositional validity: the method
of truth-tables (Verfahren der Einsetzungsproben) and the method of conver-
sion to a conjunctive normal form (Verfahren der konjunktiven Normalform),
which is valid if and only if each of its clauses contains a literal and its comple-
ment. He then summarizes his method for second-order quantifier elimination
in relational monadic formulas with equality, attributed by him to Löwenheim,
Skolem, Behmann. Quantified predicates are eliminated successively from the
inside of the formula by equivalence preserving transformations by a system of
deterministic computation rules (durch äquivalente Umformung durch ein Sys-
tem zwangsläufiger Rechenvorschriften). Behmann speaks there also of “logic
algorithm” (logischer Algorithmus). The result expresses “the sentence to test is
true (or false) for all domain cardinalities with exception (when appropriate) of
the finite number of cardinalities m,n, . . .”. For sufficiently large finite and for
all infinite domains the value of the sentence is the same.
A second approach to decide a sentence is then sketched: It can be tested for
particular cardinalities of the individual domain, based on the fact that there
are theorems that allow to determine a suitable upper bound from its symbolic
structure. The sentence is then repeatedly evaluated for each domain cardinality,
35 Für Ihren Brief und die freundlichen Worte über meine Arbeit meinen besten Dank.
Ich freue mich über die Anerkennung um so mehr, als Ihre Arbeit in den Math.
Ann. 86 seiner Zeit mir den Anstoss gegeben hat, mich mit dem Problem näher
zu beschäftigen [Letter L7]. In 1922 Ackermann finished his basic studies (Grund-
studium) at Göttingen [Göt22; Ack83].
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up to the previously determined bound. Behmann gives a short example, but
concludes that this method will never be applied in practice.
Behmann now turns to adding predicates with arities larger than one, in
his words, variable relations between individuals (variable Beziehungen zwischen
Individuen). He discusses the possibility to generalize the method of successive
elimination of quantified predicates, which lead to success in the monadic case.
Duality justifies to consider just ∃ϕ as innermost predicate quantifier. Quantified
predicates other than ϕ are then free in the argument formula and behave in the
elimination process just like unquantified predicates. The formula considered for
the elimination problem thus has the form
∃ϕF, (31)
where in F is a first-order formula. The argument formula F can be assumed
in prenex form. Behmann now restricts his considerations to the special case
where in the quantifier prefix no existential quantifier is following a universal
quantifier. Since the existential individual quantifiers can then be moved in front
of the existential predicate quantifier, this restriction amounts to requiring the
individual quantifier prefix of the argument of predicate quantification to be just
universal. The considered elimination problem can then be brought into one of
the following forms:
∃ϕ∀xF [ϕx, x],
∃ϕ∀x∀y F [ϕx, ϕy, x, y],
∃ϕ∀x∀y∀z F [ϕx, ϕy, ϕz, x, y, z],
. . .
(32)
where the F [. . .] are first-order and all occurrences of ϕ have the indicated vari-
ables as argument. In addition, the individual variables themselves are listed in
the square brackets, indicating that they might also have further occurrences in
the formula. (This series is like (22), p. 59, except that there a different predicate
is used for each argument variable.) It suffices to consider predicate quantifica-
tion just upon unary predicates, because quantification upon predicates with
larger arity can be modeled by a new domain whose individuals are tuples of the
original individuals. The solution of the first problem in the sequence (32) is
∀x (F [⊥, x] ∨ F [>, x]), (33)
where F [G, x] denotes F [ϕx, x] with all occurrences of ϕx replaced by G.
Behmann proceeds to discusses just the second problem in the sequence (32),
because in his view there is no principal additional complication at the passage
to the third and later problems. In analogy to EQ 32 and EQ 33 (Umschrei-
bungssatz ), the following second-order equivalences hold:
F [p] ≡ ∀q (¬(q ↔ p) ∨ F [q]) ≡ ∃q ((q ↔ p) ∧ F [q]). (34)
Behmann remarks that this holds for an extensional property of sentences ((ex-
tensionale!) Eigenschaft von Aussagen). Equivalence (34), given by Behmann, is
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an instance of a version of Prop. 22 for nullary predicates. The equivalence actu-
ally applied by Behmann in the sequel can accordingly be expressed as follows,
for formulas G under preconditions analogously to those in Prop. 22:
F [G] ≡ ∀p (¬(p↔ G) ∨ F [p]) ≡ ∃p ((p↔ G) ∧ F [p]). (35)
With (35), the following equivalences can be justified:
(1.) ∃ϕ∀x∀y F [ϕx, ϕy, x, y]
(2.) ≡ ∃ϕ∀x∀y∀p∀q (¬(p↔ ϕx) ∨ ¬(q ↔ ϕy) ∨ F [p, q, x, y])
(3.) ≡ ∃ϕ∀x∀y ((F [⊥,⊥, x, y] ∨ ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
(F [⊥,>, x, y] ∨ ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy) ∧
(F [>,⊥, x, y] ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
(F [>,>, x, y] ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy)),
(36)
where F [G,H, x, y] denotes F [ϕx, ϕy, x, y] with all occurrences of ϕx replaced
by G and all occurrences of ϕy replaced by H. Step (3.) is obtained by expanding
the Boolean quantifiers upon p and q, considering that ¬(⊥ ↔ ϕx) ≡ ϕx and
¬(> ↔ ϕx) ≡ ¬ϕx. Behmann now introduces the following form as shorthand
for formulas of the form (3.) in (36):
∃ϕ∀x∀y ((fxy ∨ ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
(gxy ∨ ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy) ∧
(hxy ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
(kxy ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy)),
(37)
where f, g, h, k can be arbitrary binary relations on the underlying domain of in-
dividuals. In themselves, f, g, h, k are not subjected to any restrictions, however,
certain constraints on them can be enforced. Formula (37) is equivalent to
∃ϕ(∀x∀y ((fxy ∨ ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
(gxy ∨ ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy) ∧
(hxy ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
(kxy ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy)) ∧
∀x∀y ((fyx ∨ ϕy ∨ ϕx) ∧
(gyx ∨ ϕy ∨ ¬ϕx) ∧
(hyx ∨ ¬ϕy ∨ ϕx) ∧
(kyx ∨ ¬ϕy ∨ ¬ϕx)) ∧
∀x∀y (x 6= y ∨ ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy) ∧
∀x∀y (x 6= y ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy)),
(38)
where last two lines are necessarily true, and thus further equivalent to
∃ϕ∀x∀y (((fxy ∧ fyx) ∨ ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
((gxy ∧ hyx ∧ x 6= y) ∨ ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy) ∧
((hxy ∧ gyx ∧ x 6= y) ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy) ∧
((kxy ∧ kyx) ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy)).
(39)
Behmann arguments that the form (39) justifies to assume that in a problem
expression of the form (37)
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– the relations f and k are symmetric, and
– the relations g and h are irreflexive and inverse to each other.36
In his reply of 20 October 1934 [Letter L7], Ackermann notes that the compo-
nent (hxy ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy) in (37) is not necessary, since it can be united with the
component (gxy ∨ ϕx ∨ ¬ϕy) by switching variables. Accordingly, Behmann in-
dicates in his manuscript [Manuscript M12] with pencil a second way of reading,
where the component (hxy ∨ ¬ϕx ∨ ϕy) is dropped and g is just constrained by
irreflexivity.
In [Manuscript M12], Behmann concludes the section with remarking that
this was the point where he arrived several years before, but without seeing a
prospect to make decisive progress. Before discussing Ackermann’s result, he re-
capitulates the intermittent research on the decision problem for relations. He
remarks that any reduction to the monadic case with equality is precluded, since
a sentence like There exists an infinite number of individuals can for sure not
be expressed by a sentence without predicates, such as, for example ∃x∃y x 6= y.
Hence, Bernays, Ackermann, Schönfinkel, and Schütte in Göttingen passed on to
exploring with the much more primitive method of testing for particular domain
cardinalities. The issue was to derive from the structure of the given sentence a
suitable bound for the domain cardinality for which the test has to be made to
get a result that applies to arbitrarily large domain cardinalities. However, this
is not sufficient to manage a sentence that is as simple as There exists an infinite
number of individuals, because tests can only be made for finite domain cardi-
nalities, and even there only in theory and not practically. Behmann continues
to summarize Schütte’s result [Sch34, p. 603], which specifies for equality free
sentences with quantifier prefix ∀ϕ1 . . . ∀ϕh∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃y1∃y2∀z1 . . . ∀zl a num-
ber such that for all domain cardinalities that are larger or equal the truth value
is the same. Behmann annotates that the result could have well been extended
to consider also the case with equality. He proceeds to note that, in addition,
Schütte has shown that for the case of more the two existential variables in the
prefix such a number is no longer determinable in general. Behmann concludes
this section with some acknowledging words on the effort and persistence of those
working in these research directions, in awareness that the way would not lead
to any practically usable results and that they would get stuck irrevocably at a
rather early point.37
36 Although intuitively convincing, it seems still from a modern point of view not
straightforward how a system that just gets (39) as input automatically utilizes
these properties.
37 Es handelt sich bei den Bearbeitungen in diesen Forschungsrichtungen um sehr
schwierige, aber mathematisch schöne und tiefe Untersuchungen. Und man muß die
darauf verwandte Mühe und Ausdauer um so mehr bewundern, wenn man bedenkt,
daß ja den Bearbeitern selbt nicht unbekannt sein konnte, daß sie auf diesem Wege
überhaupt zu keinem irgendwie praktisch auswertbaren Ergebnis gelangen konnten
und obendrein schon an einem ziemlich frühen Punkte endgültig stecken bleiben
mußten. [Manuscript M12], p.13f.
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Behmann now turns in [Manuscript M12] to Ackermann’s result in [Ack35a],
noting that Ackermann’s starting point was an example that was as simple as
possible but for which he could show that the known means of representation
failed. The axiom of induction (Satz von der vollständigen Induktion) can be
expressed as the following second-order sentence
∀ϕ ((ϕ0 ∧ ∀m∀n ((ϕm ∧m+ 1 = n)→ ϕn))→ ∀r ϕr), (40)
where domain of the individual quantifiers is the set of natural numbers. The
quantifier ∀r can be moved in front of ∀ϕ. If the constant 0 and free variable
r are written as a and b, respectively, and m + n = 1 is abbreviated as fmn,
then the elimination problem can be expressed as the first line in the following
equivalences:
∀ϕ ((ϕa ∧ ∀x∀y ((ϕx ∧ fxy)→ ϕy))→ ϕb)
≡ ∀ϕ (¬ϕa ∨ ∃x∃y (ϕx ∧ fxy ∧ ¬ϕy) ∨ ϕb)
≡ ∀ϕ (∃x (x = a ∧ ¬ϕx) ∨ ∃x∃y (ϕx ∧ fxy ∧ ¬ϕy) ∨ ∃y (y = b ∧ ϕy))
≡ ∀ϕ∃x∃y ((y = a ∧ ¬ϕx) ∨ (ϕx ∧ fxy ∧ ¬ϕy) ∨ (y = b ∧ ϕy)).
(41)
The last two steps in (41) are obtained by EQ 33 and EQ 22, respectively. The
dual or the negation of the last step matches the problem specification (37).
As Behmann recapitulates, Ackermann has proven in [Ack35a] that a predi-
cate free formulation of the induction axiom is not possible, but Ackermann also
says that in a certain new sense the elimination can nevertheless be performed.
The induction axiom (in the form of the first line of (41)) expresses that one of
the following sentences holds:
a = b,
fab,
∃x1 (fax1 ∧ fx1b),
∃x1∃x2 (fax1 ∧ fx1x2 ∧ fx2b),
. . .
(42)
That is, the induction axiom is equivalent to the disjunction of the infinite
number of these sentences. With the notation f0xy ↔ x = y, f1xy ↔ fxy,
f2xy ↔ ∃z1 (fxz1 ∧ fz1y), etc., the resultant of the elimination can be written
as
∃n fnab, (43)
where the domain of variable n is the set of natural numbers. The originally
given sentence has then be brought into a form that is free from ϕ, contains on
the one hand the numeric variable n as exponent, but, on the other hand, is very
transparent.
Behmann proceeds that the question is now, whether this is not also possible
in the general case, that is, for the formulas in (32). He says that Ackermann
really succeeded there, giving a schema that generally characterizes the totality
of the partial resultants from which the total resultant is disjunctively (or in the
case ∃ϕ . . . conjunctively) composed. However, as Behmann remarks, on the basis
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of a recursion that is not quite easy to see through and thus lets the result appear
somewhat intransparent. Refraining from summarizing Ackermann’s result in
its original form, Behmann develops a presentation in a normalized form, as
continuation of his own earlier work, starting from the normalized form (37),
considered dually as:
∀ϕ∃x∃y ((fxy ∧ ϕx ∧ ϕy) ∨
(gxy ∧ ϕx ∧ ¬ϕy) ∨
(hxy ∧ ¬ϕx ∧ ϕy) ∨
(kxy ∧ ¬ϕx ∧ ¬ϕy)),
(44)
where fxy, gxy, hxy and kxy abbreviate F [>,>, x, y], F [>,⊥, x, y], F [⊥,>, x, y]
and F [⊥,⊥, x, y], respectively. The properties that can be assumed are symmetry
of f and k as well as that g and h are inverse to each other and are reflexive (in the
original: totalreflexiv), thus containing equality as sub-relation. As before (see
p. 66), pencil annotations in [Manuscript M12] indicate a second way of reading,
where the component (hxy∨¬ϕx∨ϕy) is dropped. In [Manuscript M12] Behmann
claims that his representation has for the shown case of two individual variables
the same (sachliche) generality as Ackermann’s, who – Behmann seems to refer
here to Ackermann’s letter [Letter L7] – intentionally refrains from assuming that
the given formula is normalized in the described way. He views the difference as
only technical, where the preparatory work done by the normalization allows to
express the resultant in a discernible more transparent way.
Following Behmann, the application of Ackermann’s general recursive defini-
tion (Rekursionsvorschrift) to (44) yields a resultant of the form:
∃w∃x∃y∃z (gwx ∧ fxy ∧ hyz ∧ kzw ∧
¬∧x1∈{w,x}, x2∈{y,z} x1 6= x2)
∨ ∃s∃t∃u∃v∃w∃x∃y∃z (gst ∧ ftu ∧ huv ∧ kvw ∧
gwx ∧ fxy ∧ hyz ∧ kzw ∧
¬∧x1∈{s,t,w,x}, x2∈{u,v,y,z} x1 6= x2)
∨ . . .
(45)
In [Manuscript M12], a second variant of (45) without h is indicated in pencil:
h is replaced there with g˜, the inverse of g.38
Before we continue with following Behmann’s presentation, we take a closer
look at his representation (45) of the resultant. For
∧
x1∈{w,x}, x2∈{y,z} x1 6= x2
Behmann has the dedicated notation (wx, yz). Expanding disequalities in the
first disjunct of (45) shows that it stands for the disjunction of the following
four (conjunctive) clauses:
∃w∃x∃z (gwx ∧ fxw ∧ hwz ∧ kzw)
∨ ∃w∃x∃y (gwx ∧ fxy ∧ hyw ∧ kww)
∨ ∃w∃x∃z (gwx ∧ fxx ∧ hxz ∧ kzw)
∨ ∃w∃x∃y (gwx ∧ fxy ∧ hyx ∧ kxw).
(46)
38 In the manuscript [Manuscript M12], but not in the letter [Letter L6], the variables
z are universally quantified. Obviously a mistake in writing.
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It is easy to see that some (conjunctive) clauses that do not contain ϕ can be
obtained by (dual) resolution from (44), but are not subsumed by any disjunct
of (45). For example
∃x (fxx ∧ kxx). (47)
Thus, it seems that reflexivity of g and h needs to be considered such that
also disjuncts obtained by removing one or more atoms with predicates g and h
while unifying the left and right argument of each removed atom are considered
as implicitly represented by (45).39
Behmann gives a second characterization of the resultant (45) as graph: “The
resultant now means the following: If we consider the 4 relations f, g, h, k as arrow
schemas (with different colors) inscribed into the same figure, then, according to
the resultant, there is at least once a closed chain of arrows such that a g-arrow,
an f -arrow, an h-arrow and a k-arrow follow once or a finite number of times
cyclically in sequence, where, however, at least once in the chain a (starting or
ending) point of a g-arrow coincides with a point of an h-arrow. I.e., there is
at least one closed 8-course because of the cycle g, f, h, k with one or several
rounds.”
“If the symmetry conditions are omitted, that is, f, g, h, k are not submitted
to any constraints, then this means for the chain of arrows stipulated by the
resultant that the arrows from f, g, h, k may independently from each other be
represented by f˜ , h˜, g˜, k˜, and, moreover, the arrows from g and h may (again in-
dependently) be represented by identity (that is, by circular arrows), i.e. omitted
in the chain.”40
39 Ackermann [Ack35a] provides a precise characterization of the clauses that can be
obtained by resolution for his Example (21), a generalization of his Example (20),
shown above as (28). Example (21) can be written dually as (44) with the two
disjuncts containing g and h, respectively, dropped:
∀ϕ∃x∃y ((fxy ∧ ϕx ∧ ϕy) ∨
(kxy ∧ ¬ϕx ∧ ¬ϕy)). (48)
Thus, all (conjunctive) clauses that can be obtained by (dual) resolution from (48)
must also be obtainable from (44). That is, all clauses satisfying Ackermann’s char-
acterization for his Example (21) should also be (in dual form) represented in
Behmann’s presentation of the resultant. The (conjunctive) clause (47) is an ex-
ample.
40 Die Resultante besagt nun folgendes: Denken wir uns die 4 Beziehungen f, g, h, k als
Pfeilschemata (mit verschiedenen Farben) in dieselbe Figur eingetragen, so gibt es
gemäß der Resultante mindestens einmal eine geschlossene Kette von Pfeilen derart,
daß ein g-Pfeil, ein f-Pfeil, ein h-Pfeil und ein k-Pfeil einmal oder endlich oft hin-
tereinander zyklisch folgen, wobei aber mindestens einmal in der Kette ein (Anfangs-
oder End-)Punkt eines g-Pfeils mit einem Punkt eines h-Pfeils zusammenfällt. D.h.
es gibt mindestens eine geschlossene 8-Bahn auf Grund des Zyklus g, f, h, k mit einer
oder mehreren Runden.
Verzichtet man auf die Symmetriebedingungen, unterwirft man also f, g, h, k kei-
ner Beschränkung, so besagt dies für die durch die Resultante geforderte Pfeilkette,
daß die Pfeile aus f, g, h, k unabhängig von einander durch f˜ , h˜, g˜, k˜ vertreten sein
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In the letter [Letter L6] to Ackermann, Behmann continues to explain his
description and shows for Example (15) from [Ack35a] the resultant in his rep-
resentation.41 In our notation this is:
∀x∀y∀z∀u∀v∀p (F [⊥,⊥, x, y] ∨
F [⊥,>, z, y] ∨
F [>,>, z, v)] ∨
F [⊥,>, v, p] ∨
F [⊥,⊥, p, v] ∨
F [⊥,>, u, v] ∨
F [>,>, x, u]),
(49)
where F [G,H, x1, x2] denotes F [ϕx, ϕy, x, y] with all occurrences of ϕx replaced
by G, of ϕy by H, of x by x1 and of y by x2.
In the manuscript [Manuscript M12], Behmann suggest that the cycle g, f, h, k
can be better understood if it is already considered in the underlying problem
specification, by writing (44) as:
∀ϕ∃x∃y ((gxy ∧ ϕx ∧ ¬ϕy) ∨
(fxy ∧ ϕx ∧ ϕy) ∨
(hxy ∧ ¬ϕx ∧ ϕy) ∨
(kxy ∧ ¬ϕx ∧ ¬ϕy)),
(50)
It can then be seen that in the cycle
(ϕx,¬ϕy), (ϕx, ϕy), (¬ϕx, ϕy), (¬ϕx,¬ϕy),
dürfen und obendrein die Pfeile aus g und h (wiederum unabhängig) durch die Iden-
tität (also durch Rückkehrpfeile) vertreten sein, d.h. in der Kette wegbleiben, dürfen.
From [Manuscript M12], p. 18. Similarly in the letter [Letter L6]. The alternate
reading of h as inverse of g is indicated in pencil at two places in the first paragraph:
Beziehungen f, g, k and g-Pfeil, ein f-Pfeil, ein g˜-Pfeil und ein k-Pfeil. In the second
paragraph, d.h. in der Kette wegbleiben has been added in pencil. In the version from
the letter [Letter L6], the corresponding text ends with durch die Identität vertreten
sein, also ganz ausfallen dürfen.
41 Schreibe ich für Fggxy kurz (gg) usf., so besagt die erste Bedingung, daß die Pfeile
stets so aneinander zu fügen sind, daß für irgend zwei benachbarte Symbole (pq) und
(rs) die Aussagewerte p q und r entgegengesetzt sind, und die zweite Bedingung, daß
die Kette derart zu einer 8 zusammengebogen ist, daß jeder der beiden Bogen der 8
für sich genommen von zwei gleichartigen Symbolen begrenzt ist. Man sieht deutlich,
wie durch die schärfere Normierung der Aufgabe die Durchsichtigkeit und anschau-
liche Erfaßbarkeit der Resultante wesentlich erhöht wird. Durch das Mitführen der
Aussagewertzeichen g und uprise wird der Sinn des Hoch- und Tiefstellens der Argumen-
te aufgeklärt und dieses zugleich entbehrlich gemacht. So lautet Ihr Beispiel (15):
xyzuvp(upriseuprisexy)(uprisegzy)(ggzv)(uprisegvp)(upriseuprisepv)(upriseguv)(ggxu),
schematisch: (upriseuprise)(upriseg)(gg)?(upriseg)(upriseuprise)?(upriseg)(gg), wo die Unterstreichung den Er-
satz von h durch g˜, d.h. von Fguprisexy durch Fuprisegyx und die Zeichen ? die zu identifi-
zierenden Variablen andeuten. From [Letter L6], p. 2.
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adjacent components of neighboring pairs have complementary signs.
Behmann recalls in [Manuscript M12] that his presentation can not be found
in that form in Ackermann’s paper [Ack35a], but – seemingly referring to letters
[Letter L6] and [Letter L7] – that he was told by Ackermann upon request that
he had actually been aware of it, but did not show it explicitly just for the reason
that he did not succeed in finding an analogous representation for the case of
three or more individual quantifiers.
In his letter [Letter L7], Ackermann writes that he was well aware that for
the case of two universal quantifiers a complete overview on the resultants can
be obtained and that this result indeed formed the basis of his work. The first
outcome that he found was the resultant of
∃f∀x∀y ((axy ∨ fx ∨ fy) ∧ (dxy ∨ ¬fx ∨ ¬fy))42 (51)
in the clear form (in der übersichtlichen Form). (Actually this is Example (21)
from [Ack35a], shown – up to different predicate names – already as (48) in
footnote 39 on p. 69.) Ackermann then found that the resultant of
∃f∀x∀y ((axy ∨ fx ∨ fy) ∧
(bxy ∨ fx ∨ ¬fy) ∧
(dxy ∨ ¬fx ∨ ¬fy))
(52)
is not much different from the resultant of (51); the cycles and chains have
just to be extended in a suitable way by inserting b and b˜. The general case
with two variables can be brought into form (52), which has also been discussed
in Behmann’s letter – as Ackermann remarks, the conjunct (cxy ∨ ¬fx ∨ fy)
considered in addition by Behmann can be united with the middle component
(see also p. 66). Passing on to more universal quantifiers, Ackermann found that a
corresponding normalization (Normierung) can be easily achieved. For example,
for three universal quantifiers it is
∃f∀x∀y∀z ((axyz ∨ fx ∨ fy ∨ fz) ∧
(bxyz ∨ fx ∨ fy ∨ ¬fz) ∧
(cxyz ∨ fx ∨ ¬fy ∨ ¬fz) ∧
(dxyz ∨ ¬fx ∨ ¬fy ∨ ¬fz)),
(53)
where certain symmetry conditions hold for a, b, c, d. However, this normalization
did not help Ackermann in getting an overview on the resultants at three and
more universal quantifiers, such that he had dropped it again and had to confine
himself in the general case to the recursion method for forming the resultant.
To prevent that the gained overview for two universal quantifiers would go com-
pletely by the board, Ackermann included Example (20) [Ack35a, p. 410], which
admits a simple interpretation of meaning. At the discussion of the example, the
clear resultant for (51) is given [Ack35a, p. 411].
It seems that the apparently distinguished features of elimination of an exis-
tential predicate quantifier upon a first-order formula with at most two universal
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individual quantifiers have so far not got attention beyond the mentioned corre-
spondence and examples in [Ack35a], and thus might be of interest for further
research.
Manuscript [Manuscript M12] concludes with relating Ackermann’s result to
the general decision problem: “Actually, we just can say that under favorable
conditions, that is, in so far as the assumed preconditions on individual vari-
ables are satisfied, the innermost eliminations can be performed, but not yet
the further ones, since we do have the first obtained resultants not in closed
form. Thus, there are two issues to solve: 1. the liberation from the condition
for the individual quantifiers and 2. the representation of the respective resul-
tant in a closed symbolic representation that is suitable for further eliminations.”
Behmann suggests that the first issue can be addressed by Skolemization, with
the difficulties already described in Sect. 26. On the second issue, he remarks
that in the case where all predicate quantifiers are universal (or existential) and
at the front of the sentence, the problem can be considered as question of validity
of a sentence that is free of predicate quantifiers.
42 We use here the predicate names from Ackermann’s letter, which differ from that
used by Behmann, but the correspondence is easy to see. Symbolic notation and
capitalization are coherent with the rest of this paper, different from that used by
Ackermann.
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28 Introduction to Part V
This part provides commented lists of Behmann’s publications and unpublished
material from his bequest [BehNL], such as manuscripts and correspondences,
as far as they are immediately relevant to the problem of second-order quantifier
elimination.
Accounts of contributions by Behmann in a historic context have been given
in Church’s book Introduction to Mathematical Logic [Chu56], papers by Man-
cosu [Man99] and Zach [Zac99], a more recent presentation by Zach [Zac07] and
the scholarly edition [MZ15] of Behmann’s 1921 talk on the Entscheidungspro-
blem. In Craig’s paper on the history on elimination problems in logic [Cra08],
Behmann’s work [Beh22a] is briefly mentioned.
A recent English biography of Behmann can be found in [MZ15]. The most
comprehensive publication of biographic material is in a dedicated chapter in
[SM02, pp. 105–170] (in German), which also contains a selection of texts by
Behmann.43 He is positioned between Cantor and Husserl in this compilation
about philosophical thinking in Halle (Saale), where he was professor of mathe-
matics from 1925 to 1945. The investigation [Ebe02] (in German) of the Martin-
Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg during Nazism includes a short biography
of Behmann, but no further references to him. Behmann is peripherally men-
tioned in the treatise about logics in Nazi Germany in the context of Gentzen’s
life [Men01] (English translation: [Men07]). Behmann’s personal file [BehAUH]
at Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg is preserved in the university’s
archive in Halle. Excerpts from the personal file, which include an 8-page type-
script dated 20 October 1945 by Behmann about his activities in the NSDAP
(Zusammenstellung der für die Beurteilung wesentlichen Tatsachen), are pub-
lished in [SM02].
Behmann’s scientific bequest [BehNL] is located in the department for auto-
graphs of Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. It has been registered by Peter Bernhard
and Christian Thiel [BT00], after a first registration by Gerrit Haas and Elke
Stemmler [HS81]. So far, it seems that there are only three publications of ma-
terial from the bequest: The aforementioned talk on the Entscheidungsproblem
from 1921 [MZ15], the correspondence with Gödel (from 1931) with English
translation and an introduction by Charles Parsons [Göd03, pp. 12–39], and,
from [BehAUH], a report about Behmann’s participation at the 1937 Congress
for the Unity of Science in Paris [SM02, p. 105–108].
29 Publications by Behmann Related to Second-Order
Quantifier Elimination
This compilation lists the publications by Behmann with immediate relevance to
second-order quantifier elimination. These are the Habilitation thesis [Beh22a]
43 There are some errata in [SM02]: P. 109: The birth name of Behmann’s mother is
Knübel (not Kübel). P. 111 and 123: The quoted letter by Runge is dated 28 February
1926 (not November).
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with some related documentary publications and abstracts surrounding it, as
well as the abstract [Beh27a] of Behmann’s 1926 talk on the decision problem
for relations. In addition, a later work [Beh50; Beh51] on the solution problem
(Auflösungsproblem), where techniques from [Beh22a] are applied, is listed. Also
two further major publications [Sch24; Beh27b] by Behmann, or with involve-
ment of Behmann, respectively, are included, because they fall in the time span
between 1921 and 1927, although they are not directly concerned with elimina-
tion or the decision problem.
As already noted on p. 8, Behmann’s extensive investigations of the paradoxes
are not considered here, although one may speculate whether his underlying idea
that paradoxes emerge from unjustified elimination of shorthands is somehow
related to elimination of second-order quantifiers.
[Guz21] (1921) The annual report of the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung
shows in a listing of the activities of the Mathematische Gesellschaft
in Göttingen that Behmann gave on 10 May 1921 at the Mathema-
tische Gesellschaft a talk Das Entscheidungsproblem der mathema-
tischen Logik, which can be translated as The Decision Problem of
Mathematical Logic. As noted in [Zac99, p. 363], this seems the first
documented use of Entscheidungsproblem. The manuscript [Manu-
script M1] Entscheidungsproblem und Algebra der Logik, published
recently in [MZ15], bears the date of the talk and thus seems to
underlie it.
[Beh22a] (1922, received by the journal on 16 July 1921) Heinrich Behmann:
Beiträge zur Algebra der Logik, insbesondere zum Entscheidungspro-
blem. This is the published version of the thesis for Behmann’s Ha-
bilitation at Göttingen on 9 July 1921. Some corrections of printing
errors have been published as [Beh22b]. A carbon copy of the the-
sis typescript with handwritten corrections that have been consid-
ered for the printed version is preserved as [Manuscript M3]. Docu-
ment [Manuscript M4] is an author’s offprint of the published version
with later handwritten corrections.
[Beh22b] (1922)Druckfehlerberichtigung zu dem Aufsatz von H. Behmann „Bei-
träge zur Algebra der Logik, insbesondere zum Entscheidungspro-
blem“ in Band 96, S.163–239. 1922. Corrections of nine wrongly
printed symbols in [Beh22a].
[Beh23] (1923) Heinrich Behmann: Algebra der Logik und Entscheidungspro-
blem. Abstract of a talk given on 21 September 1923 at the Jahres-
versammlung der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung in Marburg
a. d. Lahn. A manuscript for the abstract is preserved as [Manuscript
M7]. The talk seems in essence a summary of the results published
in [Beh22a]. In the subsequent discussion, L. E. J. Brouwer (who
gave a talk in the same session) expressed concerns about the phrase
usw. (and so on) and the concept of finite number within the pre-
sented theory. These concerns have been rebutted by remarks that
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the debated concepts do not play a role on their own in the consid-
ered statements but can there be reduced unobjectionable to basic
concepts and that the theory about these statements is just a theory
within mathematics, not intended as foundation of mathematics.
[Sch24] (1924, received by the journal on 15 March 1924) Moses Schönfinkel:
Über die Bausteine der mathematischen Logik. In this paper logic
combinators have been introduced. As noted in the paper, it is based
on a talk by Schönfinkel given in 1920 at the Mathematische Ge-
sellschaft in Göttingen and has been prepared for publication and
supplemented by Behmann. William Craig asks Behmann in a letter
dated 16 March 1952, upon advice of Haskell Curry, about an error
in the supplementary part by Behmann. In his reply dated 7 April
1952, Behmann remarks that he did the preparation for publication
on behalf of Hilbert, without a particularly strong interest and that
he considers the new direction that emerged from that work as too
formalistic. He was aware of the error, which had been pointed out to
him in 1928 by Alfred Boskovitz [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 13 and I 14].44
See also [CFC58, p. 8, p. 184].
[Beh27a] (1927). Heinrich Behmann: Entscheidungsproblem und Logik der Be-
ziehungen. Abstract of a talk given on 23 September 1926 at the Jah-
resversammlung der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung in Düs-
seldorf. This abstract motivated Ackermann to write to Behmann in
1928 [Letter L1], which initiated their correspondence on elimination
for relations. A draft manuscript is preserved as [Manuscript M11].
[Beh27b] (1927) Heinrich Behmann: Mathematik und Logik. A small intro-
ductory textbook on mathematical logic, showing Gottlob Frege on
the cover. The twofold connection between mathematics and logics
is emphasized: Mathematical representation and notation allows to
make logic possible as an “exact” science, like mathematics, and, on
44 Alfred Boskovitz was a student in Göttingen when Behmann was lecturer. In the mid
1920s Boskovitz moved back to Budapest, his home town. He carefully reviewed and
extended the Prinicpia Mathematica, where he is mentioned in the second edition
in an acknowledging footnote together with Behmann [WR27, p. xiii]. Respective
manuscripts by Boskovitz are in [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 08]. Behmann uses the oppor-
tunity of Curry’s request for information about Boskovitz [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 08]
on 12 July 1957 to draw attention to Boskovitz’s work and sends to Curry on 13 Au-
gust 1957 [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 08] a characterization of Boskovitz as well as typed
transcripts of a selection of his letters until 1937. Those letters and transcripts are
now in [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 08]. On 21 June 1936 Boskovitz writes to Behmann
that he expects danger of life and asks Behmann to store his mathematical works.
In his letter to Curry, Behmann states that he did not have heard from Boskovitz
since 1937 and gives to Curry the address in Budapest from that time. However, in
[BehNL, Kasten 1, I 08] there is also a short letter from 1939 by Boskovitz as well
as a postcard dated 11 November 1942 with a different address in Budapest.
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the other hand, the insight that, conversely, pure mathematics is
nothing else than logic in disguise.
[Beh50]
[Beh51]
(1950/51). Heinrich Behmann: Das Auflösungsproblem in der Klas-
senlogik. Behmann develops an approach to solve the “logic solu-
tion problem” (logisches Auflösungsproblem). See [Wer17a; Wer17b]
for a modern technical account on the solution problem on the ba-
sis of predicate logic. A comprehensive presentation in the context
of modern Boolean algebra that includes material by Schröder and
Löwenheim as well as historical notes is provided in [Rud74]. In a
somewhat different phrasing but similar in spirit than as presented
by Behmann, the problem can be described as follows: Given is a
formula where the set of predicates occurring in it is partitioned into
two disjoint subsets. The objective of the solution problem is to find
a representation of the relation of predicate valuations from the first
subset to those valuations from the second subset for which the for-
mula is true. In addition, conditions on the predicates from the first
subset are sought, under which solution valuations for those from
the second subset exist at all.
Behmann relates the solution problem to the elimination problem,
discusses earlier works by Schröder, Jevons and Boole and extends
Boole’s approach to MON=. Behmann’s method is based on a nor-
malization: Assume that the predicates under consideration are par-
titioned into {p1, . . . , pn} and {p}. A MON formula without individ-
ual constants over these predicates can be converted into a disjunc-
tion of conjunctions in which each conjunct has one of the following
basic forms:
(a) ¬∃x (L1[x] ∧ . . . ∧ Ln[x] ∧ px),
(b) ¬∃x (L1[x] ∧ . . . ∧ Ln[x] ∧ ¬px),
(c) ∃x (L1[x] ∧ . . . ∧ Ln[x] ∧ px),
(d) ∃x (L1[x] ∧ . . . ∧ Ln[x] ∧ ¬px),
(54)
where each Li[x] is either pix or ¬pix. This form can be obtained
with the techniques used in [Beh22a] for elimination, followed by
conversion to the “fully developed” form, where each basic formula
contains exactly one literal with each predicate in p1, . . . , pn, p. The
fully developed form can be achieved by rewriting with
¬∃xF [x] ≡ ¬∃x (F [x] ∧ qx) ∧ ¬∃x (F [x] ∧ ¬qx) (55)
and
∃xF [x] ≡ ∃x (F [x] ∧ qx) ∨ ∃x (F [x] ∧ ¬qx). (56)
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the conjunctions
of formulas of forms in (54) do not contain contradicting conjuncts.
Such a conjunction then corresponds to a solution set, represented
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by the mapping from the the 2n formulas L1[x] ∧ . . . ∧ Ln[x], where
each Li[x] is either pix or ¬pix to one of nine values depending on
which of the forms (a)–(d) containing L1[x]∧ . . .∧Ln[x] are present.
For given L1[x] ∧ . . . ∧ Ln[x], there are nine such combinations of
(a)–(d) whose conjunction is not contradicting. The total solution
is a set of such mappings, one for each disjunct of the normalized
formula.
30 Manuscripts and Other Archival Documents by
Behmann Related to Second-Order Quantifier
Elimination
This section provides a commented listing of the manuscripts and other archival
documents in Behmann’s scientific bequest [BehNL] that are related to second-
order quantifier elimination, in chronological order. Of these, the manuscripts
[Manuscript M1], [Manuscript M6], and [Manuscript M10] were in the bequest
originally in the so-called “brown box” (braune Box ), a cuboid cardboard fold-
ing box covered with brown-black marbled paper with a handwritten note by
Behmann “Important records for own lectures in Göttingen and Halle! H. Beh-
mann” (“Wichtige Aufzeichnungen für eigene Vorlesungen in Göttingen und Hal-
le! H. Behmann”) [BT00, p.2, p. 78] which included what is now registered as
Kasten 9, Einheit 1–45 and Kasten 10, Einheit 46–91 of [BehNL].
Aside of the individual manuscripts listed below, further documents that con-
cern the elimination and decision problem can be found in [BehNL, Kasten 11]
which contains among other documents about 200 pages of notes that are not
registered in [BT00]. Most of these notes are inscribed almost purely with formu-
las, occasionally with graphical visualizations. Some of them evidently concern
the variant of Ackermann’s resolution-based elimination method as presented
in 1934 by Behmann in manuscript [Manuscript M12] and letter [Letter L6],
which is summarized in Sect. 27. For others it may be conjectured that they
relate to the elimination and decision problem for relations and to Skolemiza-
tion. A particular ordering of the notes is not immediate. Some of them bear
explicit dates, including particular days in February, March and April 1924, July
1926, March 1928 and August 1934 (some are just dated August 1934, without
specification of a day). The respective folders in [BehNL, Kasten 11] where they
are contained are hsl. Aufzeichnungen mathematischer u. physikalischer Art and
Logik I, Logik II hsl. Aufzeichnungen.
M1 Entscheidungsproblem und Algebra der Logik. 1921. In [BehNL, Kasten 9,
Einheit 37], see [BT00, p. 88]. Handwritten manuscript. 17 numbered pages.
Dated 10 May 1921. Written in ink with red underlines and side notes,
corrections and addenda in pencil, some in shorthand. Starts after the title
with “Von Kronecker stammt, soviel ich weiß, ein Distichon, das ungefähr
so lautet:”.
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Summarizes the material in [Beh22a]. Seems to be the manuscript for the
talk on 10 May 1921 at Mathematische Gesellschaft in Göttingen listed in
[Guz21] as Das Entscheidungsproblem der mathematischen Logik. A tran-
script has been published along with an introduction and English transla-
tion as [MZ15].
M2 Das Problem der Axiomatik vom Standpunkt der Algebra der Logik. 1922.
In [BehNL, Kasten 9, Einheit 33], see [BT00, p. 87]. Handwritten manu-
script. Dated 28 November 1922. 4 pages on 1 folded double sheet. Starts
after the title with “Bemerkungen zu dem Vortrag von H. Neues und be-
merkenswertes Problem aufgeworfen. Allerdings recht speziell.”
M3 Beiträge zur Algebra der Logik, insbesondere zum Entscheidungsproblem.
1921. In [BehNL, Kasten 7, 1922], see [BT00, p. 61]. Typescript (carbon
copy) of the thesis of Behmann’s Habilitation at Universität Göttingen
with handwritten mathematical symbols and corrections that have been
considered in the published version [Beh22a]. 79 numbered pages plus two
initial pages for title and table of contents.
M4 Author’s offprint of [Beh22a]. 1922. In [BehNL, Kasten 6, 1921.1], see
[BT00, p. 110]. With handwritten notes and corrections. On top of the
title page a handwritten dedication in English “With the author’s compli-
ments.” and fragments of a postmark.
M5 Algebra der Logik und Entscheidungsproblem. 1923?. In [BehNL, Kasten 6,
V 23], see [BT00, p. 53, also p. 44]. Handwritten manuscript. 39 pages in
a checkered notebook containing also other texts on other topics.
The notebook also contains various other long and short texts, some seem-
ingly related to lectures given by Behmann, such as Darstellende Geo-
metrie. Further texts include drafts for the letter dated 10 May 1923 to
Bertrand Russell [BehNL, Kasten 2, I 60] and an excerpt from the article
on Calculating Machines in Encyclopedia Britannica.45
The manuscript Algebra der Logik und Entscheidungsproblem starts after
the title with “Vortragstext (stellenweise weiter ausgeführt) bis [bei?] S. 4”.
A paragraph header “Aufgabe der Vorlesung” on the first page suggest that
this text is a draft manuscript for a lecture.
M6 Algebra der Logik und Entscheidungsproblem. 1923/1924. In [BehNL, Kas-
ten 9, Einheit 45], see [BT00, p. 91]. Handwritten manuscript. 60 numbered
sheets, with p. 6, p. 32–35, p. 47, p. 50, p. 57 inscribed also recto. One ad-
ditional sheet inserted after the page 1. Ink with pencil additions. Dated
45 The excerpt corresponds in the online edition of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
to the span from “Machines of far greater powers” to “published by his son, Gen-
eral Babbage.”. See http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_
Britannica/Calculating_Machines (accessed 17 August 2015). Behmann also an-
notates the author of the article as “Henrici”, with “1792–1871” added in pencil. In
fact, the author was Olaus Magnus Friedrich Erdmann Henrici (1840–1918).
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“W. S. 1923–24”. Starts after the title with “Kronecker (Mathematiker),
Distichon:”
Seems to be the manuscript for Behmann’s lecture with the same title
listed in the register of lectures at Göttingen university for winter semester
1923/24 (Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen der Universität Göttingen Winter-
halbjahr 1923/24 ).46
In [BT00] it is conjectured that the untitled 30-page document [BehNL,
Kasten 10, Einheit 90] might be a continuation of [Manuscript M6]. How-
ever, consideration of three-valued logic and notation of existential quanti-
fiers as ∃ in [BehNL, Kasten 10, Einheit 90] suggests that it stems from a
later period.
M7 Entscheidungsproblem und Algebra der Logik. 1923. In [BehNL, Kasten 7,
1923], see [BT00, p. 61]. Typescript (carbon copy) with handwritten cor-
rections. 3 pages. Manuscript for the talk abstract [Beh23].
M8 Entscheidungsproblem für Beziehungen. 1926?. In [BehNL, Kasten 8, 1925/
26.1], see [BT00, p. 58]. Handwritten draft. 4 pages. Starts after the title
with “Wir haben als Bestandteil einer Aussage den folgenden:”.
M9 Entscheidungsproblem und Logik der Beziehungen. 1926?. In [BehNL, Kas-
ten 8, 1925/26.2], see [BT00, p. 58]. Handwritten draft. 4 pages. Starts after
the title with “Wer über ein Problem der mathematischen Logik vorzutragen
gedenkt”.
Seems to be a draft for the talk on 23 September 1926 in Düsseldorf, whose
abstract has been published as [Beh27a]. The document [Manuscript M10]
seems to be a later but incomplete version.
M10 Entscheidungsproblem und Logik der Beziehungen. 1926?. In [BehNL, Kas-
ten 10, Einheit 46], see [BT00, p. 91, also p. 57]. Handwritten manuscript.
11 pages (9 numbered sheets with text on verso only, 1 sheet with formulas
inscribed verso and recto). Filed together with an additional seemingly un-
related double sheet that is inscribed on 3 pages. Starts after the title with
“Wer die Absicht hat, über ein Thema aus dem Gebiet der mathematischen
Logik vorzutragen”.
Seems to be a later but incomplete version of [Manuscript M9]. The text on
page 9 ends abruptly, where [Manuscript M9] continues after the matching
position. As noted in Sect. 31 about [Letter L4], Behmann has sent in
1928 the technical second part of an elaborate transcript of his talk on
23 September 1926 in Düsseldorf to Ackermann, which suggests that this
incomplete manuscript might be the first part of this transcript. The later
46 Behmann regularly gave lectures in mathematics, 1921–26 as doctor in Göttin-
gen and 1926–45 as professor in Halle. Only very few of these were on logic or
related topics: WS 1921/22 Set Theory, SS 1922 Mathematical Logic (Also for Non-
Mathematicians), WS 1923/24 Algebra of Logic and Decision Problem, SS 1927
Mathematics and Logic.
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manuscript [Manuscript M12] also includes a presentation of Behmann’s
work on elimination for relations around 1926.
M11 Entscheidungsproblem und Logik der Beziehungen. 1926. In [BehNL, Kas-
ten 8, VII 01–VII 06]. Not registered in [BT00] (see [BT00, p. 61]). The
document is the last one in the aforementioned folder. Handwritten draft
manuscript of the talk abstract published as [Beh27a]. 2 pages on a 4 page
double sheet, along with a draft of a short letter from Rome, dated 23 Oc-
tober 1926, to accompany the submission of the manuscript and parts of
an unrelated manuscript. The draft letter is addressed to a professor, prob-
ably Bieberbach as editor, but does not contain any discussion regarding
content (compare p. 60).
The following two portions of the draft manuscript do not appear in the
published version: (1.) “[. . . Elimination in der Tat vollziehen läßt.] So hat
das erste die bekannte Lösung x(p)Fxp bzw. xFuprisex Fgx, während z.B. für
das zweite [XXX] die Lösung
x(p) y(q)Fpq xy . y(q)x(p)Fpq xy
ermittelt wurde. [So lange . . . ]”. (Transcript with the symbolic notation
in the manuscript. [XXX] marks a word that could not be identified.) (2.)
“[. . . auch verwickeltere Verkettungen] dieser Operationen, insbesondere Zy-
klen, die etwa nicht mehr der Transitivität des Früher oder Später genü-
gen, [zuzulassen. . . ].” Behmann uses in this text “Dingoperator” for quan-
tified variable, “Begriffsoperator” for quantified predicate and “Operation”
for quantifier. In the published version, the overline indicating existential
quantification has been erroneously omitted at some occurrences of ϕ: two
occurrences in the displayed row of formulas in the center of p. 17 and
in the first line of the last paragraph of p. 17. This manuscript is further
discussed in Sect. 25 and 26.
M12 Ein wichtiger Fortschritt im Entscheidungsproblem der Mathematischen
Logik (Ackermann Math. Annalen 110 S.390). 1934. In [BehNL, Kasten 8,
1934], see [BT00, p. 59]. Handwritten manuscript. Dated 14 December 1934.
21 numbered pages. Written in ink with some variants and corrections
added in pencil.
For a summary, see Sect. 27. The technical part concerning the elimination
problem for relations overlaps with [Letter L6]. A few phrases could be
interpreted as suggesting that the manuscript was intended as basis for a
talk (on p. 17: “Ich möchte darauf verzichten, [. . . ] in der von ihm gegebe-
nen Allgemeinheit vorzutragen”, on p. 19: “Sie werden nun genauer wissen
wollen”).
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31 The Correspondence between Heinrich Behmann and
Wilhelm Ackermann
The complete correspondence between Heinrich Behmann and Wilhelm Acker-
mann, as far as preserved in [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 01], see [BT00, p. 3], is listed
here with English abstracts. Some technical content beyond second-order quan-
tifier elimination is also summarized, however, the discussion of Behmann’s ideas
for the resolution of the paradoxes and related issues such as restricted (limi-
tierte) variables and ultrafinite logic is only briefly indicated here, since it would
form a major topic on its own.
The letters by Behmann archived in [BehNL] are handwritten copies or car-
bon copies of typescripts, respectively. Seemingly, there is an erratum in [BT00]:
Instead of the two letters from Ackermann to Behmann dated 29 October 1934
[Letter L7] and 9 January 1953 [Letter L8], a single letter dated 29 October 1953,
not present in the bequest, is listed there.
Upon request by Christian Thiel, Ackermann’s son Hans-Richard Ackermann
writes on 23 August 1981 [BehNL, Kasten 12] that, as far as Behmann is con-
cerned, in a first sighting of his father’s correspondence, he could only find a
carbon copy of the letter to Behmann from 29 October 1934 [Letter L7], whose
original is already present in Behmann’s bequest. In the selection from the cor-
respondence of Wilhelm Ackermann [Ack83] published in 1983 by Hans-Richard
Ackermann, the correspondence with Paul Bernays concerns the elimination
problem (see p. 62).
For a general introduction to the correspondence between Behmann and Ack-
ermann as well as technical summaries of the content regarding second-order
quantifier elimination see Part IV.
L1 Ackermann to Behmann, Lüdenscheid, 16 August 1928, handwritten, 2 pa-
ges.
See Sect. 25.
L2 Behmann to Ackermann, Nieblum auf Föhr, 21 August 1928, handwrit-
ten, 2 pages. In addition to answering [Letter L1], this letter refers to an
unidentified preceding mail from Ackermann with the copy of the book
[HA28].
See Sect. 25 for the content regarding elimination. Behmann wishes Ack-
ermann success on this way, emphasizing the importance of the decision
problem for strengthening the reputation of symbolic logic in wider cir-
cles, mentioning Heinrich Scholz, who had to experience combating against
symbolic logic with unpleasant means. In addition, Behmann thanks Ack-
ermann for transmitting a copy of his book [HA28] and indicates that he
does not agree with all details, in particular regarding the Hilbert-Bernays
symbolism, but admires it as a whole.
L3 Ackermann to Behmann, Münster i. W., 1 September 1928, handwritten,
2 pages.
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See Sect. 25 for the content regarding elimination. Ackermann further re-
ports that he just sent off the corrections for his paper [Ack28] (decidabil-
ity of the class called today Ackermann class), motivated by the work of
Bernays and Schönfinkel [BS28], who, in Ackermann’s view, take too much
effort for simple special cases. Ackermann requests more information about
the details in his book [HA28] with which Behmann disagrees (see [Letter
L2]). In a possible second edition some changes would be made. Among
other things, Ackermann intends to include a presentation of the results of
Behmann’s Habilitation thesis [Beh22a].
L4 Behmann to Ackermann, Halle (Saale), 29 September 1928, typescript,
2 pages. The letter originally enclosed two manuscripts by Behmann.
Behmann writes that he had not found the time to compile his results
on the decision problem in a well arranged way (as he had announced in
[Letter L3], see also p. 60). Thus he encloses the transcript of his talk in
Düsseldorf, which, he writes, is much more elaborated than the talk itself
could be. He sends only the part that would be interesting to Ackermann,
omitting the introductory sections. What turned out incorrect is with red
pencil put into parentheses or struck out. Behmann writes that there is no
rush to return the transcript, if he would need it in foreseeable time, he
would give notice.
So far, the part of the transcript sent to Ackermann could not be located
in Behmann’s bequest. Possibly [Manuscript M10] is the first part that
retained with Behmann and [Manuscript M9] is an early version.
Another topic discussed at length in the letter is Behmann’s work on the
resolution of the paradoxes. He encloses a carbon copy of a manuscript
about this, which he had sent to Hilbert a few days before.47 Behmann
concludes the letter with announcing that he will sent his comments on
the details in the book [HA28] (see [Letter L3]) as soon as he has looked
through it for these.
L5 Ackermann to Behmann, Münster i. W., 1 November 1928, handwritten,
4 pages.
See Sect. 26 for the content regarding elimination. Ackermann further con-
siders the question of what formulas can be proven and what can not be
proven from the axioms on p. 53 in [HA28]. He sketches an idea for a
method to verify formulas that are valid for all domains which operates
by successively strengthening formulas by melting quantifiers until their
47 There are just two letters from Behmann to Hilbert in Behmann’s bequest [BehNL],
carbon copies of typescripts dated 18 September 1928 and 25 September 1928
[BehNL, Kasten I 32], both of them with technical discussions of paradoxes, the
latter with corrections to the first. Behmann also sent these on 29 September 1928
to Frank P. Ramsey, who gave a detailed reply on 4 October 1928, leading to a fur-
ther letter by Behmann dated 9 October and by Ramsey dated 16 October [BehNL,
pp. I 56]. Behmann refers briefly to that correspondence in [Beh37a, p. 220].
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matrix is propositionally valid. He gives two examples, presented here in
tabular form and modern notation:
(1.) ∀x∃y (fxx ∨ ¬fxy)
(2.) =| ∀x (fxx ∨ ¬fxx)
(3.) ≡ >.
(57)
(1.) ∃x∀y (fxx ∨ ¬fyy ∨ fxy)
(2.) ≡ ∃x∀y (fxx ∨ ¬fyy ∨ fxy) ∨ ∃u∀v (fuu ∨ ¬fvv ∨ fuv)
(3.) ≡ ∃x∀y∃u∀v (fxx ∨ ¬fyy ∨ fxy ∨ fuu ∨ ¬fvv ∨ fuv)
(4.) =| ∃x∀y∀v (fxx ∨ ¬fyy ∨ fxy ∨ fyy ∨ ¬fvv ∨ fyv)
(5.) ≡ >.
(58)
Step (2.) of (58) is formed by disjoining (called “multiplizieren” by Acker-
mann) the given expression with itself. Step (4.) is obtained by melting ∀y
and ∃u, that is, the ∃u is “sucked up” by the preceding universal quantifier.
The difficulty is, according to Ackermann, that an expression has to be
first disjoined with itself a finite number of times before the finite number
of possible variable meltings can be investigated, and the number of dis-
joined copies has to be set in advance. Ackermann notes that the method
is certainly insufficient for formulas with quantifier prefixes
∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃y1 . . . ∃ym
and
∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃y∃z1 . . . ∃zm,
but that so-far he could not provide a general proof.
The letter further discusses Behmann’s idea about the resolution of the
paradoxes (see [Letter L4]). Ackermann writes that some issues did not
become fully clear to him and gives an example to clarify.
L6 Behmann to Ackermann, Halle (Saale), 22 October 1934, typescript with
handwritten insertions at formulas, 3 pages. Behmann sends at the same
time some offprints. Reference to an unidentified previous mail in which
Ackermann had sent an offprint of the paper [Ack35a] to Behmann.
See Sect. 27 for the content regarding elimination. Behmann gives some
remarks on notation and presentation: He suggests to replace the confus-
ing terms “Summe” and “Produkt” by “Konjunktion” and “Disjunktion”
and recommends to call f, g, h, k constants instead of variables, referring
to [Beh22a, footnote 25, p. 196] (see also Sect. 10.4). In a postscript he
proposes to proceed with simplifying Hilbert’s symbolism by removing ev-
erything that is dispensable until the differences to Behmann’s notation
are no longer worth mentioning. In particular, the large extent of the for-
mulas and the clutter of the many parentheses (“das Gestrüpp der vielen
Klammern”) are considered by Behmann as quite perturbing at practical
work.
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Behmann writes that references to sources, wherever appropriate, would be
desirable, giving [Sch95, pp. 512–516] for p. 412 (which actually concerns
Skolemization) as an example. In particular, he does not see to what extent
Ackermann has made explicit use of Behmann’s earlier communications (in
relation to his talk in Düsseldorf), or came to the same findings already
independently.
Behmann concludes with asking Ackermann to send an offprint of [Letter
L6] to Boskovitz.48
This letter is the only one in the Behmann-Ackermann correspondence in
[BehNL] that ends with a Nazi salutation, mit deutschem Gruß, common
in Germany at that time for official letters [Ehl12].
L7 Ackermann to Behmann, Burgsteinfurt, 29 October 1934, typescript with
handwritten formulas, 5 pages.
See Sect. 27 and also 26 for the content regarding elimination. Ackermann
replies to Behmann’s points of criticism, kindly remarking that, as can
already be seen at the formulas in the letter, he has adopted Behmann’s
notation for the universal and existential quantifiers for his own practical
work, and referring to Behmann’s small book [Letter L7] as a rich source
in this respect.49 However, he considered himself as bound to the notation
he and Hilbert used in their introduction to logic [HA28].
Schröder’s idea underlying the “Belegungsfunktionen” (known today as
Skolem functions) has, according to Ackermann, become such common
knowledge of logicians that in his view there would be no need to cite
Schröder. As an example he refers to Skolem’s use and simplified nota-
tion in 1920. He writes that he had investigated the decision problem and
elimination problem in the case where Skolem functions do occur already in
1925: he found an excerpt of [Sch95] from that time where he has proven for
nine of ten resultants that have in part just been conjectured by Schröder
and brought somehow into connection with Peirce (Ackermann is only in
possession of this excerpt of Schröder’s book) the correctness of Schröder’s
conjectures. The method is the same as Example (26) in [Ack35a], which
actually belongs to the mentioned ones by Schröder. Thus, Ackermann
believes to be independent of Behmann’s communications in his remarks
in Section 6 of [Ack35a] (where existential quantifiers are discussed), the
only section to which Behmann’s comment in [Letter L6] might refer. Ack-
ermann notes that he obviously could have mentioned Behmann’s talk in
Düsseldorf and their correspondence that followed. He writes that the large
temporal distance might be an excuse and announces to make up for it at
the next occasion.
48 Alfred Boskovitz, see footnote 44 on p. 77.
49 Was die Symbolik anbetrifft, so sehen Sie schon an den hingeschriebenen Formeln,
dass ich mir für meine praktischen Arbeiten auch Ihre Schreibweise für das All- und
das Seinszeichen angeeignet habe, wie überhaupt Ihr Büchlein über “Mathematik und
Logik” eine wahre Fundgrube in dieser Beziehung ist.
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Skolem functions are no longer considered as an advantage by Ackermann
(see Sect. 23). His alternative approach is elaborated later in [Ack35b] (also
see Sect. 23), where, in a footnote he explains – related to the suggestions
by Behmann in [Letter L6] – the history of Skolemization and mentions
that Behmann has brought the advantages of the introduction of Skolem
functions for the elimination problem to attention already in his talk at the
Mathematikerversammlung in Düsseldorf 1926.
Concerning Behmann’s ultrafinite logic (seemingly the topic on an offprint
or manuscript sent by Behmann with [Letter L6]), Ackermann urges him
to elaborate a precise formulation and brings the evidently similar theory
by Church [Chu32; Chu33] to attention.
Ackermann confirms that he had sent an offprint of [Ack35a] to Boskovitz
(see [Letter L6]). In a postcard to Behmann dated 17 June 1935 [BehNL,
Kasten 1, I 08], Boskovitz writes that he received the offprint in fall and
thanks Behmann, conjecturing that the address and probably the idea are
due to him. However, technical aspects of [Ack35a] are not discussed by
Boskovitz.
The letter concludes with Ackermann remarking that he has heard from
Arnold Schmidt50 that Behmann had been on the congress in Pyrmont
(Jahrestagung der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 1934 ) and thus
regrets to have dropped his original intention to also go there.
L8 Ackermann to Behmann, Lüdenscheid, 9 January 1953, typescript, 1 page.
Reference to an unidentified previous postcard and mail by Behmann,
where Behmann sent a copy of his treatise “Deskription und limitierte Va-
riable” [Beh52] and requested the address of Sören Halldén51.
Ackermann thanks Behmann for his treatise, and writes that it had inter-
ested him very much – as well as a continuation (Weiterführung) would
do. He cites it later in [Ack58] with just 1944 and extended 1952 as bibli-
ographic details. He does not know the full address of Sören Halldén but
says that mails with just Universität Uppsala as address arrived. As Amer-
ican experts that would be interested in [Beh52], he mentions Church and
Quine.
L9 Ackermann to Behmann, Lüdenscheid, 22 October 1954, handwritten, 2 pa-
ges. Reference to a previous mail by Behmann with copies of the treatises
Zur Technik des Schließens und Beweisens [Beh54b] and Ein neuer Vor-
schlag für eine einheitliche logische Symbolik [Beh54a].
Ackermann discusses the standardization of logic symbolism, referencing
also to Behmann’s earlier works on the subject, one from 1935 and [Beh37b].
He suggests that Behmann should submit [Beh54a] to the Journal of Sym-
bolic Logic.
50 Hermann Arnold Schmidt (1902–1967), German mathematician.
51 Sören Halldén (1923–2010), Swedish philosopher and logician.
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L10 Behmann to Ackermann, Bremen-Aumund, 6 October 1955, typescript,
2 pages. Carbon copies of a draft manuscript Die Besetzungskette und der
widerspruchsfreie Prädikatenkalkül are originally enclosed.
Planning to submit a revision of his manuscript to the Journal of Symbolic
Logic (which was published there indeed as [Beh59]), Behmann asks Ack-
ermann for his judgment regarding content as well as form, and to forward
copies to Hermes, Scholz and probably Hasenjaeger.52 Behmann intends to
visit Münster for a week and give a talk. He stresses the importance of the
problem of a contradiction-free predicate calculus. He would have also sent
copies of his talk [Beh55], which he had submitted but not given, but the
proceedings did not yet appear. Finally, he asks Ackermann again about
his judgment on the previously sent treatise [Beh54b].
L11 Ackermann to Behmann, Lüdenscheid, 27 October 1955, typescript, 3 pages.
Ackermann discusses Behmann’s manuscript Die Besetzungskette und der
widerspruchsfreie Prädikatenkalkül sent with [Letter L9]. He has not yet
talked with the Herren in Münster about it, since he will be there again
only in about 10 days, when the lecture period begins. Behmann’s ideas
in [Beh31] have always interested him very much, but they did not have
received greater attention because so far they have just been program and
it did not came to a precise calculus based on them. Although in the recent
manuscript the ideas are explicated further in some respects, the situation
has not much changed. Ackermann continues to describe the conditions
that must be satisfied to allow an exact discussion about the ideas: (1) An
overview on all used symbols – which would be easy to satisfy; (2) An exact
specification of the combinations of symbols that should be considered as
meaningful; (3) The formal rules and base forms that should be used. He
refers to his publication [Ack41], where he pointed out the difficulties that
arise if one wants to pass from Behmann’s ideas to a precise calculus and
mentions that Behmann has never commented on them. It does not suffice
to show that the paradoxes in the known way are avoided, but has to be
ensured that they do not appear in modified form. Ackermann brings the
related work by Church [Chu32; Chu33] again (see [Letter L7] ) to attention,
which later showed to be contradictory by the paradox discovered by Kleene
and Rosser. Ackermann proceeds with an example intended to be helpful
for pointing out the difficulties that can arise if there is no precise version of
all inference rules available. He concludes with noting that in the referenced
work by Church there is already a restriction operator (Limitator), at least
in connection with the universal quantifier, asking for clarification of the
exact correspondence of Behmann’s notation for this case with Church’s
and Ackermann’s own in the mentioned work, which follows Church’s.
52 In 1955 Heinrich Scholz (1884–1956) was professor emeritus, Hans Hermes (1912–
2003) and Gisbert Hasenjaeger (1919–2006) were professors, and Ackermann was
honorary professor at Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster with its renowned
Institut für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung founded in 1950 by
Scholz and lead after his retirement 1953–66 by Hermes.
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L12 Behmann to Ackermann, Bremen-Aumund, 6 December 1955, typescript,
6 pages. Carbon copies of two revised manuscript sections were originally
enclosed.
Thanking Ackermann for his letter [Letter L11], Behmann writes that he
has incorporated some of the addressed points essentially in form of ex-
planatory footnotes. He then discusses the three particular points (1)–(3).
About (2) he mentions that he succeeded to bring substitution algorithm
(Einsetzungsalorithmus) and at the same time and in immediate relation-
ship the criterion for meaningfulness (Sinnhaftigkeitskriterium) into a much
simpler and now completely determined form (zwangsläufige Gestalt). Ac-
cordingly, he changed the subject of his work to Der Algorithmus der Ein-
setzung und der widerspruchsfreie Prädikatenkalkül. Concerning (3) he is
reluctant to fix a thorough axiomatization at that point, because he does
not consider axiomatic representation as helpful for getting a first under-
standing of a subject. For him, a strong axiomatic pre-load (Vorbelastung)
was always a obstacle to get deeper into the meaning and essence of a sub-
ject. He had studied [Ack41] at its time, but the difficult outer and personal
circumstances as well as the wish to not just criticize but also give a positive
image had prevented that he commented it. Ackermann’s use of restriction
differs from his, in particular because the former is through the addition
of provability loaded with modality. Behmann conjectures a circularity, if
the concept of provability is already presupposed at the introduction of
the junction. He further expresses doubts that simple applications such
as syllogisms based on empirical facts can be expressed with Ackermann’s
provability-based notion. Behmann explains the differences between Ack-
ermann’s and his standpoint: His own proceeding is crucially determined
by starting from plain propositional calculus, with implication in the Stoic,
or Fregean, resp., sense, without modal or proof technical pre-load. Only
after its fixation quantification is added, then modality in form of modal
operators, and finally meta logic with inclusion of proof theory. For a pre-
sentation of the principles of this building-up, he refers to [Beh55], still
waiting for the proceedings to appear. He emphasizes that his notion of
meaningfulness (Sinnhaftigkeit) is unrelated to decidability as provability
or refutability (Entscheidbarkeit (als Beweisbarkeit oder Widerlegbarkeit)).
In [Hal49, p. 80] he found an expression that corresponds to the translation
of the restriction operator suggested by Ackermann for his and Church’s
notation. Further discussions concern the inclusion of the third truth value
meaningless (sinnlos) into the calculus. Behmann mentions that he intends
to include in his paper also a form of Russell’s paradox that was earlier com-
municated by Ackermann. He can now present its resolution much shorter
and clearer than in [Beh53]. Enclosing carbon copies of new Sections 6 and
7 of his paper, he asks Ackermann for judgment and transferal to his asso-
ciates in Münster. He intends to send copies of the two sections as well as
a copy of the present letter directly to Scholz.
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32 Discussions Related to Second-Order Quantifier
Elimination in Behmann’s Further Correspondence
In this section, further discussions in Behmann’s correspondence – beyond that
with Ackermann – with immediate relationship to his work on the decision and
elimination problem are summarized. They are presented chronologically, headed
by the respective correspondence partners, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap,
Heinrich Scholz and Alonzo Church.
32.1 Bertrand Russell
Behmann writes on 8 August 1922 in English to Bertrand Russell [BehNL, Kas-
ten 2, I 60], sending him an offprint of [Beh22a]. He sketches the role of Russell’s
work with respect to his dissertation, whose theme was proposed by Hilbert.
Leaving this subject, Behmann continues: “A I already remarked, my article
in the Mathematische Annalen follows another way. Not withstanding my state-
ment of its purpose and character in § 1 I beg leave for a few additional words. It
was what I call the Problem of Decision, formulated in the said paragraph, that
induced me to study the logical work of Schröder. And I soon recognized that
in order to solve my particular problem, it was necessary first to settle the main
Problem of Schröder’s Calculus of Regions, his so-called Problem of Elimination.
And – here I quote a sentence from a lecture of mine held before the Göttinger
Mathematische Gesellschaft – “I believe it to be a very lucky circumstance that
now an opportunity presents itself to embrace the earlier investigation relevant
to that topic, questionable, especially as regards the form of presentation, and
of difficult access as they are, under a new, uniform, and valuable point of view,
thus saving from oblivion a great deal of profound and hard work of thought.”
– Indeed, the chief merit of the said problem is, I daresay, due to the fact that
it is a problem of fundamental importance on its own account, and, unlike the
application of earlier Algebra of Logic, not at all imagined for the purpose of
symbolic treatment, whereas, on the other hand, the only means of any account
from its solution are exactly those of Symbolic Logic. – But I wish to avoid
anticipation.” (Parts of this letter are also quoted in [Man99]).
On 16 September 1922 Bertrand Russell [BehNL, Kasten 2, I 60] replies that,
so far, he not have had time to read Behmann’s paper carefully, but notes “I see
that you have a symbolism very admirably adapted to your subject”. He brings
Sheffer’s article [She13] to attention and explains how “the logic of propositions
can be developed with only incompatibility (not-p or not-q), instead of both
negation + disjunction.” (that is, Sheffer’s stroke NAND) or equally well “(NOT-
p and NOT-q)” (NOR).
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32.2 Rudolf Carnap
In his postcard dated 20 November 1922 [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 10] Carnap thanks
Behmann for sending him an offprint of [Beh22a]. He writes that it did interest
him very much and asks Behmann for sending a copy to Gerhards53.
In a letter dated 19 February 1924 [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 10], Carnap relates
Behmann’s work on the decision problem for relations to Behmann’s refusal to
contribute to the development of a symbolism that is based on Russell’s. Carnap
writes (in translation): “If you really succeed to solve the decision problem so
far that it also includes the of theory of relations (Beziehungslehre), and in
particular also that which uses constant non-logical relations, this would be
a very lucky and valuable progress and extraordinarily useful for my works.
However, I believe that the development until practical applicability will still
need a lot of time. Thus, for the time being I still want to stick to Russell’s
symbolism.” Carnap can understand that Behmann, being now busy with the
extension of his own symbolism, is not inclined to contribute to the appearance
of the other symbolism.
32.3 Heinrich Scholz
As discussed in Sect. 3 and 4, Behmann explains in his letter from 27 December
1927 [BehNL, Kasten 3, I 63] to Heinrich Scholz his contribution to the decision
and elimination problem. Here is an excerpt of the respective parts of the original
German letter:
Bezüglich des Entscheidungsproblems ist zu unterscheiden zwischen der Ent-
scheidung innerhalb der rein aussagenlogischen – die nur Begriffe der linken
Seite meiner Tabelle enthalten – und im Gesamtbereich der Begriffslogik. Wo
die beiden Lösungen des elementaren Problems, die Verfahrend der Einsetzung
und der konjunktiven Normalform, zuerst erwähnt und systematisch dargestellt
worden sind, ist mir nicht bekannt. Vielleicht kommt hier Whiteheads “Universal
Algebra” in Frage. Nach meiner Meinung führt die elementare Aussagenlogik so
zwangsläufig auf dieses Problem, dass seine Aufweisung und Erledigung wohl mit
der ersten strengen Darstellung jener überhaupt zeitlich zusammenfallen wird.
So weit ich mich erinnere, habe ich das Verfahren der Normalform – das andere
steht ja in den PM – durch Hilbert, der sich ja schon vor dem Kriege selbständig
mit dem Problem der symbolischen Darstellung der Logik, und zwar insbesonde-
re der Aussagenlogik, beschäftigte, kennen gelernt und weiss gerade aus diesem
Grunde hinsichtlich der Literatur dieses Punktes keine sichere Auskunft zu ge-
ben.
Was nun das allgemeinere Entscheidungsproblem betrifft – nicht zu verwech-
seln mit dem z.B. von Hessenberg in einer seiner Schriften in den Abh. d. Friess-
chen Sch. besprochenen Entscheidbarkeitsproblem (im Zusammenhang mit dem
Paradoxon von Richard) –, so ist dieses ausdrücklich als solches meinen Wissens
vor mir von niemandem behandelt worden. Wohl aber ist unabhängig von dieser
53 Karl Gerhards (1888–1957), German philosopher, mathematician and physicist.
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Fragestellung oder doch zum mindesten ohne ihre ausdrückliche Erwähnung eine
gewisse Teilaufgabe, das sogenannte Eliminationsproblem, das übrigens zugleich
einem passend eingeschränkten Entscheidungsproblem äquivalent ist, behandelt
worden, und zwar zunächst von den Amerikanern, insbesondere Peirce, und hier-
auf mit besonderer Liebe und Ausdauer von Schröder, und schliesslich hat es
einen Spezialisten in Löwenheim gefunden, der in den Math. Annalen darüber
mehrere Abhandlungen schrieb. Die wichtigste von ihnen ist “Ueber Möglich-
keiten im Relativkalkül”; sie erschien, glaube ich, einige Jahre vor dem Kriege.
L. ist dort schon zu wesentlichen Teilergebnissen meiner Abhandlung über das
Entscheidungsproblem gelangt, allerdings – in einer weder mathematisch stren-
gen noch hinreichend verständlichen Darstellung, so dass ich selber diese erst
nach dem Erscheinen meiner eigenen Schrift richtig herausgelesen habe. Dazu
gebraucht er eine ziemlich sonderbare Terminologie; was ich “Aussage des Berei-
ches A” nenne, heisst bei ihm “Zählgleichung”, usw. Wie ich es mir erkläre, dass
man zu dieser Fragestellung gelangen und dabei an dem Entscheidungsproblem
so völlig vorbeigehen konnte, habe ich in meiner Schrift über das Entscheidungs-
problem S. 218 – 19 auseinandergesetzt.
32.4 Alonzo Church
In his letter dated 15 April 1937 to Alonzo Church [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 11],
Behmann comments seemingly an offprint sent earlier by Church, where a sys-
tem by Quine is discussed. Behmann states that the idea as such to combine
(zusammenfassen) several argument to complexes that can then be handled like
uniform (einheitliche) arguments is rather obvious. He had applied it himself
in [Beh27a] (see Sect. 25) to reduce the general elimination problem – as pre-
liminary step (Vorsutufe) to the decision problem – for the case of universal
individual quantifiers onto the sequence (22), p. 59. However, without making
the principles of the reduction explicit. He considers the idea to use this possiblity
already for building-up propositional and predicate logic as new and valuable.
But, he continues, it needs to be done in way such that natural associativity is
preserved; Quine’s scruples on this should be countered by a reasonable formula-
tion of the logical rules. (Behmann also remarks that the statement in [Beh27a]
that elimination can be performed in general for that case does not hold.)
Church answers on 20 May 1937 [BehNL, Kasten 1, I 11]: “I believe that
I am in substantial agreement with what you say about Quine. There is only
one remark which it occurs to me to make. He does not introduce a law of
associativity such as you suggest. With him the ordered pair (x, y) is introduced
as an undefined concept; (x, (y, z)) is not the same as ((x, y), z); the ordered
triad (x, y, z) is defined to be ((x, y), z), the ordered tetrad (x, y, z, t) to be
(((x, y), z), t), and so on. This seems to me satisfactory; from certain points
of view one could even go as far as to say that an associative law would be
undesirable.”
In a much later letter from Behmann to Church, dated 30 January 1959,
where the main topics are the relationship of [Beh59] to lambda conversion, as
well as, possibilities to simplify propositional formulas, Behmann sketches his
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method in [Beh61]: As first step there, by means of simple transformation rules
– of the kind of Gentzen’s Mischungsregel, which, Behmann writes, he as already
stated in 1922 (i.e. in [Beh22a]) – the totality of prime implicants is obtained
in a deterministic way (zwangsläufig gewonnen). Also the name innex form is
suggested in this letter for the result form of his method in [Beh22a], where
quantifiers are propagated inwards (see p. 11, footnote 8).
33 Documents that could not be Located
The following documents would be relevant for the consideration of second-order
elimination and are referenced in the Behmann’s bequest, but, so far could not
be located:
1. The technical part of Behmann’s transcript of his talk Entscheidungsproblem
und Logik der Beziehungen on 23 September 1926 in Düsseldorf, which he
sent in 1928 to Ackermann. See notes on [Manuscript M10] and [Letter L4].
2. A contribution by Behmann on the solution and elimination problem (zum
Problemkreis Auflösungs- und Eliminationsproblem) in a memorial publica-
tion (Festschrift) for Ernst Schröder, mentioned in 1942 in the correspon-
dence with Scholz.
Two issues where, so far, no further relevant documents could be found in the
bequest are normalization with respect to given predicates, suggested in [Beh22a,
p. 201] (see Sect. 20) and the actual influence of Löwenheim’s work [Löw15]
and possibly Skolem’s papers [Sko19; Sko20] (with exception of Behmann’s 1927
letter to Scholz see Sect. 3, 4 and 32.3).
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34 Concluding Remarks
The early results on the decision problem by Löwenheim, Skolem and Behmann
1915–22 included the identification of relational monadic formulas as decidable
fragment of first-order logic, the development of a decision procedure for this
fragment, as well as the first explicit statement of the decision problem itself by
Behmann 1921. As became evident from our detailed inspection of Behmann’s
Habilitation thesis from 1922, where he made precise and extended earlier work
by Schröder, these early investigations of the decision problem were closely tied
to the problem of second-order quantifier elimination. The basic connection there
is that a relational monadic formula can be decided by eliminating all its predi-
cates one by one.
The decision problem has been much researched since then, with several
monographs [Ack54; Sur59; DG79; BGG97], where in particular the last cited
one gives a comprehensive survey, also on the history and literature. Despite
many “theoretical” results, the development of calculi that decide specific classes
is still an active issue of research in automated deduction.
The elimination problem was brought to larger attention in computational
logic in the 1990s with the development of two algorithms, the resolution-based
SCAN [GO92] and DLS [Sza93]. The latter initiated the so-called Ackermann
approach, which is, like Behmann’s method, based on equivalence preserving
formula rewriting. While DLS explicitly involves an essential idea from Acker-
mann’s 1935 paper [Ack35a], SCAN is in part a re-discovery of another tech-
nique from that paper [NOS99]. Early considered applications of second-order
quantifier elimination in computational logic were the computation of first-order
correspondence properties of modal formulas [GO92; CGV06; Sch12] and non-
monotonic reasoning by computing circumscription [DŁS97], which can be ex-
tended to model various semantics for logic programming [Wer10] and to the
computation of abductive explanations [KKT98] with respect to these seman-
tics [Wer13]. Since the mid 2000s, variants of second-order quantifier elimination
like uniform interpolation, forgetting and projection receive great interest as op-
erations for the processing of description logic knowledge bases, e.g. [GLW06;
LW11; LK14]. A number of specialized elimination methods for particular de-
scription logics have been developed, where advanced ones explicitly relate to
SCAN and the Ackermann approach [KS13]. Another current activity related to
second-order quantifier elimination is in SAT solving the investigation of formula
simplifications that perform elimination of Boolean variables in restricted ways
[Bie04].
In contrast to the decision problem, there is only a single monograph [GSS08]
on the elimination problem, with focus on modern developments. Some early and
fundamental results such as the success of elimination on relational monadic
formulas and Behmann’s rewriting-based method as a blueprint of the more
advanced DLS apparently came to surface again only recently [Wer15]. As shown
there, one can even today learn from Behmann’s method possible improvements
of modern methods such as DLS, the success on relational monadic formulas
emerges as a useful completeness property of elimination methods, and on a
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closer look the seemingly not very expressive class of relational monadic formulas
(Klassenlogik, as it was called at Behmann’s time), when considered together
with second-order quantification, shows interesting relationships to description
logics, the logics regarded today as adequate to represent concept (or class)
ontologies.
Behmann’s primary concern was the decision problem. In his correspondence
with Ackermann it can be observed that he talks about the decision problem,
even if the discussed method actually performs elimination, whereas Ackermann
often speaks about the elimination problem. The decision problem was first
stated explicitly by Behmann, the elimination problem, in contrast, was also
investigated earlier by others, in particular Schröder and Löwenheim. Neverthe-
less, the methods developed by Behmann decide formulas by performing elimina-
tion. He was dissatisfied with later decidability results by Bernays, Ackermann,
Schönfinkel and Schütte that reside on satisfiability for domains with finite car-
dinalities determined from syntactic structure, since these results only lead to
primitive methods, not suited for practical application. Thus, Behmann’s main
concern was actually not just the decision problem: it was the problem of finding
practically applicable decision methods.
This places his work into the context of computer science. He used a rela-
tively small set of essentially syntactic tools, which let his methods smoothly
fit into modern computational logic: Rewriting formulas such that equivalence
is preserved or to entailed formulas. Moving arguments inward and outward of
terms. Adding auxiliary definitions. Distribution among connectives. Propagat-
ing quantifiers inward and outward. Various ways of normalization, including
generalizations of disjunctive and conjunctive normal form and Boolean com-
binations of specific basic forms. Skolemization and un-Skolemization. And, as
outlined in a manuscript and the correspondence with Ackermann, representing
infinite sets of formulas by schematic formulas with superimposed graph struc-
ture. In view of his later works, quantifier restriction and variants of lambda
conversion have to be added.
Some of the material in this report should be useful for further investigations
in the technical-historical realm, such as the clarification of the exact relationship
between the works of Löwenheim [Löw15], Skolem [Sko19; Sko20] and Behmann
[Beh22a], or an in-depth investigation of Ackermann’s resolution-based method
for second-order quantifier elimination in [Ack35a] in presence of the related un-
published works by Behmann summarized here, related work by Craig [Cra60],
modern resolution-based elimination methods [GO92; Gor+04] and fixpoint tech-
niques as used to specify logic programming semantics [EK76] and in elimination
[NS98].
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